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ABSTRACT 
This research examines the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director 
(NED) within the corporate board. The literature identifies the NED as a boundary 
spanner. Boundary spanners are believed to be essential to the fulfilment of the 
firm's corporate responsibility mandate. The research specifically examines the 
ability of the NED to influence corporate responsibility practices within the board, 
whilst balancing the divergent expectations of different constituents. Previous 
research examining the role of the NED has failed to take account of the context in 
which the role is performed. Therefore an interpretive framework is developed, to 
examine the individual subjective perceptions of the NED, from within the role. 
Through a qualitative interpretation of 25 in-depth interviews, with individual 
NEDs, the dynamic context of the boardroom emerged as a key moderator of the 
their ability to make a contribution. The boundary spanning role prescribed for the 
NED by some theorists emerged as problematic. The research suggests that despite 
NEDs' personal expectation that they should represent a range of constituents, 
within the boardroom their ability to fulfil this role is often limited by the presence 
of groupthink. NEDs appear to set aside their personal beliefs in order to maintain 
the status quo within the group. As a result of their unfulfilled role expectations 
many NEDs appear to experience role conflict. 
This research contributes to our understanding of the actual role of the NED within 
the corporate board, and specifically the NED's ability to perform a boundary 
spanning role. The research also informs business and society literature, by 
examining how boards currently deal with issues of corporate responsibility. Finally, 
the research contributes to both group and role theory, by developing current 
understanding of how the complex dynamics of the group affect the individual's 
ability to contribute. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction 
This research explores Non Executive Directors' perceptions of their roles in the 
context of the corporate board. Specifically, the research examines the ability of the 
Non Executive Director to contribute to corporate responsibility practices whilst 
balancing the expectations of divergent constituents. 
Figure 1.0: Chapter Overview 
1.0 Introduction 
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Page 1 of 400 
The aim of this first chapter is to introduce the research topic and to provide a 
summary of the framework and development of the research. The chapter is divided 
into five sections: section one provides an overview of the research; section two 
introduces the rationale for the research; section three outlines the scope, objectives 
of the study and the research question; section four presents the contribution of the 
research; finally, section five outlines the structure of the rest of the research. 
1.2 Research Rationale 
As organisations become ever bigger and more global, the importance of individuals 
at the apex who can steer business towards more ethical and responsible practices is 
crucial, both for society and for the long-term health of the organisation. Research 
suggests that organisations that behave in a responsible way are also, in the long- 
term, likely to be more profitable. However, managers are often believed to seek out 
short- term gain at the expense of long-term corporate sustainability. 
Non Executive Directors are believed to play a pivotal role within the organisations 
in which they operate. The literature suggests that Non Executive Directors are 
sometimes appointed to deal with specific organisational constituents. They are 
likely to have a broad understanding of issues outside the organisation and are in 
position to provide the firm with scarce resources in the form of information and 
outside contacts. However, their role and contribution have been under-researched, 
and little is known about their actual contribution to organisational effectiveness or 
their actual operations within the board 
Page 2 of 400 
The resource dependency literature describes the Non Executive Director as a 
boundary spanner. Boundary spanners are important because they facilitate 
organisations in the fulfilment of their corporate responsibility mandates. 
Understanding how Non Executives are able to fulfil this role for the benefit of both 
the organisation and society at large provides a topic of considerable importance 
both to academic and practitioner audiences. 
1.2.1 The Need for Context 
To date there have been few studies which have been able to enter the inner sanctum 
of the corporate boardroom and actually talk to the people who hold the title `Non 
Executive Director'. Previous studies have tended to be positivistic, examining 
demographics, publicly available data and questionnaires with poor response rates. 
As a result of previous research approaches, little is known about the actual 
operations of the Non Executive Director within the corporate board and less still 
about the ability to influence corporate responsibility practices. 
This research will use an interpretive approach, through the analysis of qualitative 
data and in addition will assess the actual subjective perceptions of Non Executive 
Directors themselves about their role within the corporate board. Through this 
approach the research will uncover a rich and complex understanding of the factors 
that moderate the Non Executive Director's ability to make a contribution. 
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1.3 Research Scope and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to explore the role and contribution of the Non Executive 
Director in order to understand how these individuals are able to balance the 
expectations of divergent constituents whilst also making a contribution to corporate 
responsibility practices. The literature review presented in chapter two reveals that 
existing research which focuses on the role and contribution of the Non Executive 
Director is limited and tends to lack context. In addition no studies have been 
located which explore the Non Executive Directors' role in corporate responsibility 
from their own perspective. As a result of the literature review the following 
research question was developed: 
How do Non Executive Directors in their role as boundary spanners on 
corporate boards, balance divergent expectations whilst contributing to 
corporate responsibility practices? 
Through this question the research has sought to: 
a. Identify the Non Executive Directors' perceived role within the corporate 
board. 
b. Explore the factors which appear to moderate their ability to make a 
contribution. 
c. Explore the implications of the Non Executive Directors' perceptions of their 
roles for their ability to contribute to corporate responsibility practices. 
d. Explore the Non Executive Directors' perceptions of the expectations of 
divergent constituents. 
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e. Propose a model that enables academics and practitioners to understand how 
the boardroom context moderates the ability of the Non Executives to fulfil 
their perceived roles. 
1.4 The Contribution of this Research 
This section summarises the empirical contribution that this research makes. A 
fuller explanation of the contribution to both theory and practice is located in chapter 
seven of this thesis. 
1.4.1 Academic Contribution 
The results of this research make a number of contributions to academic knowledge. 
Most significantly the research adds new insight into the actual role of the Non 
Executive Director within the corporate board using the Non Executive Director's 
own unique perceptions of the role. The research has identified the contextual 
nature of the role and explored the factors that moderate the Non Executive 
Director's ability to make a contribution. 
The research contributes to the literature on business in society. This research has 
explored the perceptions of individuals who with the right motivation have the 
ability to make a significant impact on the role of business in society. The findings 
suggest that the excessive use of financial language impedes the ability of the Non 
Executive Director to introduce corporate responsibility issues. Corporate 
responsibility issues are perceived as requiring the use of `soft language', which 
does not fit easily with the groups' behaviour norms. 
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The research also makes a contribution to the literature on director interlocks. The 
findings suggest that Non Executives are often forced to rely on their interlocking 
directorates to find information about corporate responsibility practices, because 
i 
they lack legitimate sources of information and training. This research contributes 
to our understanding of interlocking directorates by adding a new instance of the 
effect on a firm's behaviour. The research findings suggest that interlocks can, at 
times, influence the likelihood of firms adopting corporate responsibility practices. 
This research contributes to boundary spanning theory and literature, Non Executive 
Directors are described by some theorists as `boundary spanners'. Tie research 
findings suggest that, although often employed to act as boundary spanners, the Non 
Executive Director's potential to fulfil this role is not always utilised effectively by 
the host organisation. The Non Executive Director's role as a successful boundary 
spanner is therefore questionable The implications of these findings challenge 
earlier research which argues that boards provide the link between managers and 
shareholders and the wider environment. 
The research adds to our understanding of the sources and uses of power in the 
boardroom. The findings support previous research conclusions that information 
and power asymmetry affects the Non Executive Director's ability to influence 
events. In addition this research suggests that language can be used as a source of 
power in the boardroom in order to control the behaviours of others; this finding 
contributes to the work on social control theory. 
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The research also adds to social control theory by confirming that within boards of 
directors those with very high group status might not always be subject to social 
controls to the same extent of lower status members. Further, the findings add to our 
understanding of the effect of personal capabilities. The Non Executive's ability to 
perform his role is affected by his tangible capabilities as well-as the perceptions of 
others in the team of his capabilities and status. The ability of the Non Executive to 
instigate a contribution is facilitated, if other members of the board perceive that the 
Non Executive Director is in some way powerful, in terms of capabilities, reputation 
and influence within the group. 
The research contributes to our understanding of complex decision-making 
processes within the board of directors. The findings suggest that Non Executive 
Directors use bounded rationality when dealing with complex issues, because of 
information asymmetry within the group. The resultant reliance on financial 
language often fails to reveal the subtlety of choice needed for effective decision- 
making, particularly in the context of corporate responsibility issues. 
The findings of this research contribute to both agency and stewardship theory. The 
prevailing agency view of boards of directors appears to be overly simplistic. The 
Non Executive Directors' role expectations encompass control elements in line with 
the normative agency approach to corporate governance, but also long-term 
organisational goals, which more closely reflect the behaviour of a steward. Non 
Executive Directors enter the boardroom in the belief that their role is to protect a 
range of different constituents, not just shareholders. 
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The findings of this research contribute to our understanding of the dynamics of the 
board of directors, in particular the prevalence of groupthink, which leads the Non 
Executive Director at times, to cognitively suppress the expectations of external 
constituents. Once in the boardroom, many Non Executives set aside their personal 
beliefs in order to conform to their perceptions of the group's norm. Non Executive 
Directors appear to prefer to maintain the status quo within their group, rather than 
risk social sanctioning or exclusion. They fear acting alone. Instead, Non Executives 
display functional commitment to the group. Non Executive Directors appear to 
effectively relinquish some external role expectations in order to maintain their 
membership and social status within the group. 
The research adds a contribution to the literature on roles, role theory and in 
particular to that of role conflict. The research reveals that Non Executive Directors 
appear to experience role conflict, due to the disparity between their personal 
expectations and their moderated behaviour within the boardroom. This finding is 
noteworthy because some studies have suggested that upper echelons do not 
experience role conflict to the same extent as lower level role types, because they 
have more control of their environments 
In addition to adding to the debate on the role and contribution of the Non Executive 
Director, this research makes a small methodological contribution. Despite many 
calls for more work that explores the real work of corporate board members, to the 
best of the author's knowledge this study is the first to use an interpretivist approach 
to examine the subjective perceptions of the individual Non Executive Director. The 
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use of in-depth interviews to develop thick descriptions has allowed a unique insight 
into the Non Executive Directors' perceptions of their important role. 
1.4.2 Practitioner Contribution 
This research makes an important contribution to management practice. By 
examining how the board of directors, and specifically the role of the Non Executive 
Director within the boardroom, works. In particular, the research provides guidance 
to those who wish to improve the relationships between business and society, by 
highlighting the current problems that the Non Executive Director experiences in 
trying to contribute to this important endeavour. 
The research also contributes to management practice by highlighting the role of 
boardroom dynamics in mediating the ability of those within the board to make a 
useful contribution. In particular, it highlights the need to ensure that board 
members understand their purpose and are provided with the facilities and training 
necessary to fulfil their role. 
The research also provides insight to practitioners on the overuse of financial 
language in the boardroom, which may not always reveal the nuances necessary for 
effective decision-making. This type of language also makes it difficult for board 
members to introduce soft issues into the debate. The research suggests that 
financial language is also difficult for some board members to understand. 
Practitioners need to find ways to introduce more contextual dialogue into the 
boardroom or, as a very minimum, ensure that all board members understand the 
debate in progress. 
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This research also contributes to our understanding, of how the individual Non 
Executive Directors' capabilities are utilised within the board. The research supports 
previous arguments that have suggested that by simply placing highly capable 
individuals onto a team will not in itself make a team work effectively. The research 
also finds support for the notion that just because individuals have specialised skills 
and knowledge does not necessarily guarantee their effective use by the team. Time, 
good management and the right mix of individuals remain as essential for long-term 
success. 
1.5 Research Structure 
This research is presented in seven chapters. Chapter one, the current chapter, 
presents the research rationale and the objectives for the research. This is followed 
by a summary of the research contribution to both theory and practice and a review 
of the research structure. 
Chapter two reviews the literature as it relates to the research topic. The research 
gap is identified along with the research question that will be used to guide this 
research. 
Chapter three describes the methodological and philosophical choices that have 
guided this research. The research framework is discussed along with the findings 
of the initial pilot study investigation. 
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Chapter four presents the complex analysis of the research. Emerging themes are 
developed using a qualitative interpretive approach, which facilitates the use of the 
actors' own words. 
Chapter five develops the complex analysis in chapter four by relating it back to 
existent knowledge, whilst still using the actors' own words to illustrate specific 
instances in order to preserve their original meanings and perceptions of their role 
and contribution. 
Chapter six reports the findings of the analysis as they relate specifically to the 
research question; a tentative model is presented to aid the explanation of the key 
findings. The model is followed by a set of propositions that might be used to test 
the model in the future. This is followed by a discussion of the implications of the 
research findings. 
Chapter Seven completes the research by demonstrating the originality and 
contribution of the research to both the academic and practitioner communities. The 
limitations of the research and suggestions for areas of further study are also 
presented in this closing chapter. The research will close with a short reflection 
from the author on the journey undertaken to bring this thesis to completion. 
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1.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has introduced the research topic along with the rationale that underlies 
the research. The aims of the research have been identified along with a summary of 
the contribution that this research makes to both theory and practice. The next 
chapter, chapter two, will present the literature review 
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Chapter Two Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This aim of this chapter is to systematically examine the existing literature 
surrounding the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director within the 
context of the corporate board. In addition, the chapter will examine the importance 
of corporate responsibility practices in terms of its two major dimensions corporate 
governance and corporate social responsibility. The chapter will identify the role of 
the board and the individual Non Executive Director in terms of the current literature 
and establish the key factors that might influence the Non Executive Director's 
behaviour. 
The chapter is designed to facilitate the identification of a gap in the literature and, 
as a result, the final section of this chapter will present the research questions and 
the conceptual framework for this research. The chapter is presented in three parts: 
part one defines the key terms, which will inform the rest of this research; part two 
comprises a review of the literature; part three identifies the research gap the 
research question that has emerged from the literature review. The outline of this 
chapter is provided in figure 2.1 below: 
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Figure 2.1 Outline of Chapter 2 
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2.2 Definitions of Key Terms 
2.8 Conclusions and 
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2.9 Chapter 
Summary 
2.6 The Non 
Executive Director 
This section will provide an introduction to the key terms that will be used 
throughout this research. They have been arranged into three categories, covering 
the main theories that underlie this research, concepts such as the corporate board, 
which impact upon the study and finally the perspectives from which this research 
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will be conducted. Some definitions may. be classified differently elsewhere. 
However for the sake of clarity, the meanings as they should be understood for this 
research are contained here. 
2.2.1 Theories 
Role Theory: A role is the set of behaviours that others expect of individuals in a 
certain context (Kahn et al. 1964; Katz and Kahn, 1978; Friedman and Podolny, 
1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). When roles are not clearly defined, individuals may 
experience role conflict or role ambiguity. This may lead to distress for the 
individual, avoidance tactics, lying, the withholding of information and 
organisational exit (Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
Groupthink: Janis (1971) refers to a phenomenon found in some groups where 
individuals ignore evidence that is contrary to a course of action or idea to which the 
group has already psychologically committed itself. (Floyd and Lane, 2000) 
2.2.2 Concepts 
Corporate Board: Corporate boards are characterised by Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
as "large, elite and episodic decision making groups that face complex tasks 
pertaining to strategic-issue processing". An important difference between top 
management teams and boards is that boards are designed to influence and monitor 
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strategy - they do not implement strategic decisions or handle the day-to-day 
administration. 
Non Executive Directors: Non Executive Directors are sometimes referred to as 
"part time", "independent" or "outside" directors. Non Executive Directors are 
defined in the corporate governance literature as "all non management members of 
the board" (Johnson et al. 1996: 417). Their role is to act as advisors to the 
management of the organisation and to ensure that the organisation is being run in 
the interests of its owners. 
Executive Directors: These are the individuals responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of the firm and are sometimes referred to as "Inside Directors". Executive 
Directors are described in the corporate governance literature as "those directors also 
serving as firm officers" (Johnson et al. 1996: 417). Some, though not all, of a 
company's directors will sit on the corporate board, they generally include the CEO 
and Finance Director. Executive Directors are responsible for implementing the 
organisation's strategy and report to the company's shareholders via the Board. 
2.2.3 Perspectives 
Constituents: In order to overcome the confusion within the stakeholder debate over 
who is and who is not a stakeholder (Waddock and Graves; 1997b), this research 
will use the word `constituents' to describe the various parties with whom Non 
Executive Directors might have a relationship. In addition to providing a more 
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holistic view of the parties who might effect or be affected by the Non Executive 
Directors this definition is also used because many of the individuals who took part 
in this study disliked the term stakeholder they described it as poorly defined and 
generally unhelpful. The use of the word `constituents' within the context of this 
research refers to shareholders, fellow board members, managers, the CEO, 
Chairman of the board and those groups and individuals identified by Hampel 
(1998) as having an interest in the organisation, this will be discussed in more detail 
later in the chapter. 4 
Corporate Responsibility: This research aims to explore the Non Executive 
Directors' role, in terms of their ability to balance divergent constituents. As was 
defined above, constituents include those affected by corporate governance practices 
as well as the social behaviour of the organisation. As a result in subsequent 
chapters this research uses the overarching term `corporate responsibility' rather 
than either `corporate governance' or `corporate social responsibility' (CSR) 
because the focus of the research is on the overarching influence of the Non 
Executive, as characterised by these issues. 
Boundary Spanners: Boundary spanners provide communication between 
stakeholders and the organisation, representing the perceptions, ideas and 
expectations of each side (Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Friedman and Podolny, 1992). 
Capabilities: The researcher could not locate a working definition of capabilities as 
they might relate to a Non Executive Director. However, the importance of 
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capabilities for the ability of the Non Executive to discharge his boardroom role 
would suggest that a definition would be useful at the outset of the thesis. For the 
purposes of this research the individual's personal capabilities relate to the sum of 
his previous experience and knowledge, his personal ability to apply that experience 
and knowledge and the perceptions of the rest of the board as to his reputed ability 
to use those skills successfully. 
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2.3 The Literature Review 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section will examine the existing literature in relation the area of inquiry, 
specifically the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director within the 
context of the corporate board. In addition, the literature review will draw upon 
other theories and concepts that will be used to inform the research. The section will 
explore the relevance of the chosen research topic and using existing literature make 
the case for the need for this empirical study to fill a gap in the current literature. 
The section is presented in three parts; part one will examine the importance of 
corporate responsibility; part two examines the board of directors; part, three 
examines the role of the Non Executive Director. 
2.4 Managing the Relationship between the Organisation and its Constituents 
Society grants legitimacy and power to business; in the long run, those who do not use 
power in a manner which society considers responsible will tend to lose it. 
Davis's `Iron Law' (1973: 312) 
2.4.3 Divergent Constituents 
Managing an organisations constituents has in modem times fallen under the remit 
of so called "stakeholder theory", this is concerned with the balancing of the needs 
of a variety of groups and individuals who are deemed to influence or are influenced 
by the behaviour of the organisation. Stakeholder theory can refer to a single 
individual or group, a group of individuals or a subset of an identifiable group of 
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individuals (Scott and Lane, 2000). Freeman and Reed (1983: 91) proposed two 
definitions of stakeholders firstly "wide sense" including groups which are friendly 
or hostile to the company and secondly "narrow sense" any group on which the 
company is dependant upon for its ongoing survival. Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
argue that stakeholders should include all those who have an expectation of gain 
through the organisation's successful operation. This definition, though, leaves out 
two important subsets of stakeholders: firstly, those who may lose through those 
successful operations and secondly, those who can, by whatever means, influence 
the organisation in either a positive or negative manner. The most commonly cited 
definition of a `stakeholder' is that of Clarkson (1995: 106) "Persons or groups that 
have, or claim, ownership, rights, or interests in a corporation and its activities, past, 
present or future". 
The broad and ill-defined nature of stakeholder theory (Hendry, 2001) has been 
argued by many scholars to lead to managerial decisions that are sub optimum 
(Dunham and Freeman et al, 2001; Phillips, 2002; Jensen, 2002; Phillips and 
Freeman et al, 2003). The resultant lack of clarity as to the identity and appropriate 
degree of importance of different constituencies within stakeholder theory, has it is 
argued created a vacuum, within which some managers have been able to develop 
strategies that are not in the best interests of the firm itself, its constituents and even 
its owners. Stakeholder based decision-making may work against the normative 
agency model of corporate governance because it leads to the sanctioning of 
behaviours that may not be in the best interests of the firm's owners (Jensen, 2002). 
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In some cases the use of stakeholder models may encourage a shift to a stewardship 
style of boardroom behaviour rather than the traditional agency style of approach. It 
is the view of the researcher that what is actually needed, is a degree of balance 
between these various constituents of the firm, in order to ensure its ongoing 
existence as both a successful business and also a societal entity. By addressing and 
balancing the needs of various key constituents managers can increase the efficiency 
of the firms adaptation to external demands (Freeman and Evans 1990), the board of 
directors understanding of who these constituents are and how they should be 
balanced is likely to be key to long term success. This section will examine the 
importance of effective balancing of divergent constituency issues towards the long- 
term survival of the firm. 
2.4.3a The Importance of Managing Divergent Constituents 
The principle that organisations have many constituents or stakeholders is now 
widely accepted in the management literature (Wood, 1991). The balancing of 
constituent issues is described as a "primary management function" (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Clarkson, 1995; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Harrison and Freeman, 
1999). Authors such as Scott and Lane (2000) and Pfeffer (1981) argue that the 
principal job of leadership is to manage organisational identity to enhance reputation 
in the eyes of constituent groups; in fact reputation should receive "constant 
leadership attention" (Petrick et al. 1999: 60). The role of Non Executive Directors 
in developing these practices is unclear. From the review so far, it is clear that Non 
Executive Directors should have an important role to play in communicating issues 
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to certain constituents, but how this role is played out in practice has not previously 
been thoroughly researched. 
Organisations serve multiple constituents, all with distinct criteria for assessing 
corporate performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). Ogden and Watson (1999) in 
their study of the effect of improved customer orientation in the newly privatised 
UK water industry found that improving behaviour towards customers increased 
shareholder value, despite the need for short-term discretionary expenditure, whilst 
Turban and Greening (1996), found that organisations with reputations for high 
levels of corporate responsibility were more attractive to prospective employees. 
Such attractiveness is vital when trying to recruit superior personnel who may 
already have many job offers (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Turban and Greening, 
1996). Constituents rely on corporate reputation when making "investment 
decisions, career decisions and product choices" (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990: 233). 
Because of managers' limited resources, their ability to deal with constituent 
expectations is likely to be limited. As a result, the most powerful constituents are 
likely to be dealt with first, with less powerful constituents being dealt with as and 
when resources allow (Nasi et al. 1997). "The squeaky wheel gets the grease; and 
even more, the loudest squeak gets the most grease" (Masi et al. 1997: 317). 
Clarkson (1995) argues that it is important to distinguish between an organisations 
constituent issues and wider social issues; his research suggests that corporations 
and managers are likely to have relationships with specific groups rather than with 
society as a whole (Clarkson, 1995). The Hampel Report (1998) identifies (though 
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not exhaustively) these groups as follows: employees, customers, suppliers, credit 
providers, local communities and governments. The Report recognises that the 
relationship directors have with shareholders is different from that which they have 
with other constituents. "The directors as a board are responsible for relations with 
stakeholders (constituents); but they are accountable to shareholders" (Hampel, 
1998). 
Jensen (2002) argues that stakeholder theory is flawed because it does not provide 
advice as to how to differentiate between the needs of different constituents; this 
leaves managers to make their own (sometimes unprincipled) choices as to which 
groups are most important. Despite this developing goodwill within one constituent 
group, when carried out shrewdly, appears to create synergy with other constituent 
groups (Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Waddock and Graves, 1997; Ogden and 
Watson, 1999). So, for example, creating a safe, high-quality product will increase 
the perception of good reputation not only with customers, but also suppliers, 
employees and shareholders, thereby multiplying reputational capital. Waddock and 
Graves (1997: 254), suggest that "quality of management" can be defined, at least in 
part, "as the firm's overall reputation for being soundly run". Their findings suggest 
that the traditional view of reputation as a measure solely of financial performance is 
inadequate and incorrect. When assessing the reputation of an organisation, the 
ability of management to balance the requirements of divergent constituent groups 
appears to be critical to reputational success. 
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According to Weigelt and Camerer (1988: 443) corporate reputation is an "asset 
which can generate future rents" as well as long-term strategic advantage (Caves and 
Porter, 1977; Petrick et al. 1999). We can define it as the outcome of a competitive 
process in which firms signal their key characteristics to constituents to maximise 
their social economic and moral status (Spence, 1974; Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; 
Petrick et al. 1999). Weigelt and Camerer (1988: 449) discuss the importance of 
strategies that invest in "non salvageable firm-specific assets" such as contributions 
to socially responsible causes designed to create barriers to new market entrants. 
Reputational capital can be defined as "that portion of excess market value that can 
be attributed to the perception of the firm as a responsible domestic and global 
corporate citizen" (Petrick et al. 1999: 60). As the media becomes more global, 
businesses are under great pressure to behave in an ethical way in all their operations 
(Ahmed, 2003; (Simms, 2000; Nakra, 2000). An organisation may spend years 
developing a relationship with its constituents only for it to be destroyed in an 
instant (Petrick et al. 1999). 
2.4.1 Corporate Responsibility 
For the purposes of this study, corporate responsibility has two major dimensions; 
the first is in terms of the organisation's responsibilities to its shareholders through 
corporate governance Becht (1997). The second dimension to corporate 
responsibility relates to the way in which the organisation discharges its 
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responsibilities to broader constituents, in terms of corporate social responsibility. 
The two dimensions of corporate responsibility practices are illustrated in figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: The Two Dimensions of Corporate Responsibility 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
Corporate Responsibility 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
This definition builds on that of Demp and Neubauer (1992: 9) who take a broad 
perspective on corporate governance, arguing that corporate governance "is the 
process by which corporations are made responsive to the rights and wishes of 
stakeholders". To avoid the confusion currently surrounding the inclusiveness of the 
concept of corporate social responsibility (Waddock and Graves; 1997) and the dual 
use of the term corporate governance, this research will adopt an overarching 
definition `corporate responsibility' to describe the way in which the board 
discharges its duties to its broad constituents. The two dimensions to corporate 
responsibility will be discussed in more detail next. 
2.4.1a Corporate Social Responsibility 
The premise underlying corporate social responsibility (CSR) is that business and 
society are inextricably linked rather than being separate entities: society has the 
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right to expect certain standards, behaviour and outcomes from business, in return 
for which it allows business to exist (Wood, 1991; Szwajkowski and Figlewicz, 
1997; Badaracco, 1998; Swanson, 1999). For the purposes of this study Davis's 
(1973) definition of CSR has been chosen. It is considered to be a classic definition 
(Wood, 1991) and not only encompasses the importance of societal influences but 
also acknowledges the importance of economic survival for the firm. Davis defines 
CSR as "the firm's consideration of, and response to, issues beyond the narrow 
economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm (to) accomplish benefits 
along with the traditional economic gains which the firm seeks" (Davis 1973). 
The debate on the proper relationship between business and society has continued 
for many years and in recent decades attention has focused on the concept of 
corporate social responsibility (Klonoski, 1991; Wood, 1991; Greening and Gray, 
1994). Well publicised corporate scandals, such as Enron and WorldCom, along 
with environmental disasters such as that of Union Carbide in Bhopal, have 
inevitably channelled debate about the dilemmas decision-makers face in being 
simultaneously good managers through maximising shareholder value, whilst at the 
same time balancing the needs and requirements of society, through behaving in a 
way that is both ethical and equitable towards the needs of diverse constituents 
(Freeman, 1994). Steering firms towards more socially responsible practices is now 
a strategic consideration of growing importance (Prahalad and Hamel, 1994; Egri 
and Herman, 2000; McWilliams and Siegal, 2000). Social reporting (Jackson and 
Bundgard, 2002), triple bottom lines (Clarke, 2001) and stakeholder models 
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(Clarkson, 1995) have all emerged in recent years in an attempt to address 
constituent audiences. 
2.4.1b Linking Corporate Social Responsibility and Firm Profitability 
According to neo-classical economic theory, the main aim of business is profit 
maximisation, as long as it stays within the rules of the `game' (Friedman, 1962). 
This has been used by some as a reason for discouraging organisations from 
adopting social policies. Although there has been some debate over the linkages 
between CSR and profitability, there now appears to be evidence that such a link 
does exist. Organisations that are perceived to behave in a way that is respectful of 
the needs of broad constituents and maintain and develop a good reputation, are also 
likely to be more profitable (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Caccese, 1997; Vergin 
and Qoronfleh, 1998; Roman et al. 1999), when compared to those organisations 
that rely solely on profitability as their end goal. 
6 
Roman et al. (1999), identified studies over the past three decades that have 
scrutinised the correlation between CSR and corporate financial performance (CFP). 
They paint an interesting picture. During the 1970s, interest was starting to develop 
into the correlation between social performance and financial well-being. Results 
were somewhat mixed, but it is clear from the data that some kind of relationship 
was starting to emerge. The 1980s produced many studies into the relationship, with 
very mixed results. This fuelled the debate well into the next decade and has led to a 
very conservative approach on the part of management scholars who, despite the 
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work carried out during the 1990s (which appears to indicate a definite link between 
CFP and financial performance), have continued to debate the linkage and are still 
not prepared to say authoritatively that a link does exist. 
Waddock' and Graves (1997a) describe the link between CSR and financial 
performance as a "virtuous circle". Their research showed a link, but found it 
difficult to distinguish what came first, strong financial performance or good 
behaviour. They concluded that the two variables operated together, strengthening 
each other and creating a "strategic intent" within the organisation and an 
understanding by constituents of the philosophies that guide the organisation. 
Szwajkowski and Figlewicz (1997), reached a similar conclusion, arguing that both 
financial and social performance are driven by effective management in terms of 
both values and practice and how these fit with the demands of constituents. 
By managing the requirement of a broad range of constituents the board of directors 
may facilitate the legitimisation of the organisation (Ogden and Watson, 1999; 
Lerner and Fryxell, 1994; Nasi et al., 1997), enhancing overall organisational 
reputation and improving long-term financial performance (Waddock and Graves, 
1997a; Ogden and Watson, 1999; Roman et al., 1999; Antunovich et al., 2000). 
2.4.2 Corporate Governance 
The most well know and commonly understood definition of corporate governance 
is probably that used in the Cadbury Report, governance is "the system by which 
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companies are directed and controlled; with boards of directors being responsible for 
the governance of their companies" (Cadbury, 1992: 2.5). Becht (1997: 11) 
describes corporate governance as being "about the mechanisms that can ensure that 
powerful managers run companies in the interests of their owners". Demp and 
Neubauer (1992: 9) take a broad constituency perspective on corporate governance, 
arguing that corporate governance "is the process by which corporations are made 
responsive to the rights and wishes of stakeholders". 
The literature on corporate governance as a possible source of performance 
enhancement in its own right has grown significantly in recent years (Dimma, 1996; 
Dalton and Daily, 1999; Cutting and Kouzmin, 2000; Oliver, 2000; Korac 
Kakabadse et al. 2001). One reason for this may be the fact that institutional 
investors are now less willing to simply stand idly by when companies in which they 
have invested heavily fail to perform (Dimma, 1996; Sudip, 1999; Meyer, 2000). 
Another reason might be that information is now much more widely available to 
constituents on the behaviour of organisations and their executives (Drucker et al. 
1997). 
Jensen (2002) uses the term "enlightened value maximisation" to describe the 
management of broader constituents towards enhanced corporate profitability. 
Jensen suggests that the real debate should be about what behaviour will result in the 
least social waste "what will get the most out of society's limited resources (Jensen 
2002: 238). However despite the growing interest in corporate governance, Korac 
Kakabadse et al, (2001) argue that the link between good governance and enhanced 
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performance has not been irrefutably proven. In terms of the board of directors 
studies such as Dalton and Daily (1999: 28), in their analysis of 159 earlier studies 
covering a forty-year period, they found no clear link between board composition 
and financial performance. A number of frameworks have previously been used to 
analyse the effect of corporate governance within organisations. Resource 
dependency, legalistic, class hegemony, agency theory and stakeholder models are 
all commonly used to assess the ability of the board of directors to influence 
corporate performance (Korac Kakabadse et al, 2001). This research aims to 
understand the contextual nature of the Non Executive Directors role therefore an 
integrative theoretical approach will be used within this study. 
Despite problems in identifying the actual link between corporate performance and 
governance practices, the link between perceived shareholder value and governance 
is shown clearly in a study by the consultancy firm McKinsey & Co (2000), who 
found that institutional investors around the globe were prepared to pay a premium 
for well-governed companies in the UK or USA of up to 18% and up to 27% in Asia 
and Latin America. Well governed companies were defined in the study as those 
who hold regular director evaluations, are responsive to investor requests for 
information on governance issues, have directors who receive a majority of their pay 
in stock options and - importantly for this research - with a majority of outside 
directors on the board. This may be because, as agency theory and legal 
perspectives suggest, outsiders have the potential to appraise strategic alternatives 
more objectively (Fama and Jenson, 1983). 
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The essential purpose and underlying mechanisms of corporate governance are more 
similar than different in the UK and USA (Demp and Neubauer 1992: 9). In the UK 
and also the USA, the governance debate has focused on the "responsibility and 
accountability of corporate managers" (Becht, 1997: 10). There have been calls for 
fewer inside directors, the separation of the role of Chairman and CEO, the creation 
of self-governing nominating committees, systematic evaluations of the CEO, 
independent nominating committees and the designation of lead directors (Alderfer, 
1986; Cadbury, 1992; Becht, 1997; Hampel, 1998; Hambrick and Jackson, 2000: 
108; Cutting and Kouzmin, 2000: 499; Oliver, 2000; Meyer, 2000). Becht (1997: 
11) describes this debate on corporate governance as being "about the mechanisms 
that can ensure that powerful managers run companies in the interests of their 
owners". 
2.4.2a Agency Theory 
The UK and USA governance systems are based predominantly on agency theory, 
which deals with the contractual relationships between parties. In the context of this 
research, agency theory examines the relationship between managers and owners 
and argues that managers (agents) will always try to maximise their own benefit, 
even at the expense of the owners (shareholders) of the business (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Davis et al. 1997). The role of the Non Executive within the agency model is to 
control the self-serving behaviour of management on behalf of shareholders 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Much of the agency theory literature is concerned with the governance procedures 
necessary to avoid the problem of "self-serving behaviour" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59). 
Conflicts are avoided through the "coalignment of incentives" (Eisenhardt, 1989: 
63). Such an incentive might take the form of a performance bonus for the board, or 
payments in shares rather than cash. High equity holdings by board members are 
believed to align their interest with those of shareholders. This may lead the board 
to take a longer-term perspective and to attempts to "avoid negative reputations" 
from inappropriate behaviour (Johnson and Greening, 1999: 568). 
Agency theory makes an important contribution to organisational research; it regards 
information as a vital commodity that can be bought. By arguing this, according to 
Eisenhardt (1989: 64), it gives an important role to formal information systems such 
as the board of directors (Fama and Jenson, 1983). When boards are provided with 
rich information, senior executives are likely to engage in behaviour that is 
consistent with the interests of shareholders. To test this Eisenhardt (1989: 65) 
suggests that it might be possible to determine the operational richness of boardroom 
information by measuring the following: 
" Number of board meetings 
9 Number of board sub-committees 
" Number of board members with long tenure 
" Number of board members with managerial and industry experience 
9 Number of board members representing specific ownership groups 
Non Executive Directors are believed to be of key importance to this information 
gathering and dissemination process; and their role as boundary spanners 
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(Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997: 662) may place them in a position of power. 
Boundary theory argues that as receivers of rich information Non Executive 
Directors will choose only to pass on that information which they consider relevant 
or alternatively will choose to retain information in order to improve their individual 
status (Aldrich and Herker, 1977: 218; Wood, 1994: 199). Furthermore, Non 
Executive Directors may face role conflict in dealing with both internal and external 
constituents who have differing agendas as well as varying degrees of power and 
control over the individual Non Executive and the board. Indeed Jensen (2002) 
argues that many senior executives are placed in an impossible position by the need 
to balance constituency demands with few usable guidelines as to how to assess the 
merits of divergent choices. This may lead to distress for the individual, avoidance 
tactics, lying and organisational exit (Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 
2000: 162). To overcome this, organisations must see that the right culture, formal 
and informal mechanisms are in place to ensure that information is both received 
and acted upon in a timely fashion (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981; Friedman and 
Podolny, 1992; Wood, 1994: 199; Floyd and Lane, 2000) It is argued that the 
agency model may not explain some situations; a further theoretical dimension may 
be necessary to account for the behaviour of some boardroom members and some 
boards as a group. 
2.4.2b An Alternative to the Agency Model: Stewardship Theory 
Stewardship theory is relatively new (Davis et al. 1997). This theory views the 
director as a steward whose wants are closely aligned with those of the organisation, 
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and whose behaviour is described as "collective and pro-organisational" (Davis, 
Schoorman et al. 1997: 26). When faced with the competing objectives of 
stakeholders and shareholders, stewards are motivated to make choices that are in 
the best interests of the organisation (Davis et al. 1997). Stewardship theory has its 
roots in psychology and sociology rather than economics; it focuses on intrinsic 
rewards in contrast to agency theory, which relies on extrinsic rewards such as 
economic gain. The focus of the theory, according to Donaldson and Davis (1991), 
is on the higher order needs of the individual as defined by Maslow's (1970) 
hierarchy, Alderfer's (1972) growth needs, and McClelland and Burnham's (1976) 
achievement and affiliation needs. 
The premise underlying stewardship theory is autonomy. Unlike the agency system, 
where control through governance and economic incentives are paramount, under a 
stewardship system control might even be considered counter-productive, because it 
undermines the pro-organisational behaviour of the steward (Davis et al. 1997). 
Donaldson and Davis (1991) argued that CEO's who are stewards are best facilitated 
through governance structures that provide them with a high level of autonomy and 
managerial discretion. This might be fulfilled through a CEO also taking the role of 
Chairman on the board of directors. Such a situation would be considered highly 
inappropriate under the agency model. 
Due to the shifting interests within the relationship between the organisation and its 
leaders, over time it is possible that "today's agent may well be tomorrow's 
steward" (Albanese et al. 1997; Davis et al. 1997). For example, Kakabadse et al. 
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(2000) found that age and tenure were related to leaders taking a long-term 
organisational perspective. Furthermore, according to Lerner and Fryxell (1994: 79) 
leaders who have extended tenure and are "older" are likely to be more socially 
responsive when compared with younger individuals. The stewardship model rather 
than that of agency might explain these findings more efficiently. 
The role of Non Executive Directors, either as stewards themselves or operating 
within a board where the CEO might be classed as a steward, is interesting. The 
dilemma for many Non Executive Directors as boundary spanners lies in trying to 
act both for the organisation and also broader constituents whose requirements may 
not always align (Tushman and Scanlan, 1981: 301). This role conflict might, it is 
argued, be less apparent on boards that take a stewardship approach to the 
governance of the organisation, thus giving board members the opportunity to 
strategise beyond short-term profitability. 
2.4.4 Summary 
The first part of this literature review has highlighted the importance of managing 
divergent constituents. Research suggests that organisations with a reputation for 
good corporate governance and who are considerate of the needs of wider 
constituents are also likely to be more profitable. The critical role of the board of 
directors in managing these processes has been discussed. Research suggests that the 
Non Executive Director may have an impact on an organisation's corporate 
responsibility practices, but their actual role in this process lacks empirical 
underpinning. Part two will examine in more detail the board of directors. 
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2.5 Boardroom Research 
2.5.1 The Board of Directors 
'Powerful boards imprint their firms with their unique world-view that sets the tone for 
definition of expectations of executives and employees - in essence they function as the 
brain and soul of the organisation' 
(Pearce and Zahra, 1991: 136) 
To date there have been few studies which have been able to enter the inner sanctum 
of the corporate boardroom and actually talk to the individuals who reside there. 
Previous studies have tended to be positivistic, examining demographics, publicly 
available data and questionnaires with poor response rates or alternatively have 
relied on loosely gathered data which has resulted from consultancy experiences or 
opportunistic data which has been assembled through other research or researchers. 
As a result of previous research approaches, little is known about the actual 
operations of the Non Executive Director within the corporate board and less still 
about the ability to influence corporate responsibility practices. The researcher has 
not located a single study that has examined from their own personal perspective the 
role and contribution of the Non Executive Director to corporate responsibility 
within the Board. The following section examines the role of the Board of Directors 
and explores the findings of previous research in the area. 
Fama and Jensen (1983) describe the board as the "apex of the firm's decision 
control system". Forbes and Milliken (1999) characterise boards of directors as 
"large, elite and episodic decision making groups that face complex tasks pertaining 
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to strategic-issue processing". Furthermore, Forbes and Milliken (1999) highlight 
an important difference between top management teams and boards "in that boards 
are responsible only for monitoring and influencing strategy - not implementing 
strategic decisions or for day to day administration". They provide the formal link 
between the shareholders of the firm and its managers (Fama and Jenson, 1983). 
Table 2.1 shows the critical functions of the board. Reports such as Cadbury (1992), 
Hampel (1998) and Higgs (2003) as well as the new Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the USA 
have fuelled the debate on the governance role and responsibilities of boards of 
directors. 
Table 2.1. The Critical Functions of the Board 
Define the company's purpose 
Agree the strategies and plans for achieving that purpose 
Establish the company's policies 
Appoint the CEO and review his performance and that of top executives 
In all of this to be the driving force of the company 
Source: Compiled from Cadbury (1992), Hampel (1998) 
The Cadbury Report in the UK urges that the responsibility of the board should 
include "setting the company's strategic aims, providing leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on 
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I 
their stewardship". It adds, "The board's actions are subject to laws, regulations and 
the shareholders at general meetings" (Cadbury, 1992: 2.5). 
It should be noted that boards of directors differ from other organisational work 
groups in terms of size; most of the work groups that have been examined 
previously average five or six members (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Whereas 
Boards of Directors average thirteen members (Monks and Minnow, 1985) and 
unlike most work groups they only operate episodically, full board meetings may 
only be held seven times a year (Monks and Minnow, 1985). Further, most work 
group members are full-time members of the organisation whereas boards are made 
up primarily of part-time Non Executive Directors making their relationship to the 
organisation one of "partial inclusion" (Weick, 1979). 
2.5.1a Researching the Board of Directors 
Despite investors' intuitive belief that it does exist, the link between corporate 
responsibility and firm performance has not been proven, which suggests a possible 
failure in previous research methodologies in this area. A great deal has been 
written about the demographics of individual board members. However, according 
to Pettigrew (1992: 170) the difficulty in separating the many "endogenous and 
exogenous factors" that influence corporate performance makes it almost impossible 
to determine how demographic factors affect boardroom performance. Much of the 
research into the correlation between boardroom performance and company 
performance has failed to take account of organisational context. This has led to 
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conflicting and confusing research results (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Dalton and 
Daily, 1999; Korac Kakabadse et al. 2001). Pettigrew (1992: 173) believes that 
"great inferential leaps" are made between input variables and output variables, such 
as from board composition to board performance, without assessing the context in 
which these variables are situated. He calls for more work which embraces the 
heterogeneous nature'of boardroom members. 
Many authors have argued that taking account of context is of primary importance 
when researching the behaviour of corporate boards (Pettigrew, 1992: 163; Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; Korac Kakabadse et al. 2001), however the seeming inability of 
researchers to gain access to real boards of directors has curtailed their ability to 
adequately understand the affect of these variances. 
The context within which Non Executive Directors operate is likely to vary 
substantially, each with their own specific `peculiarities' (Kakabadse et al, 2001). It 
is doubtful whether a single, theoretical model will adequately explain the behaviour 
of all individuals or organisations (Letza et al. 2004). Furthermore, the complexity 
of organisational systems, and the plethora of variables that can react with them, 
suggest it is unlikely that an organisation could or should be viewed in isolation or 
that the behaviour of individuals could be successfully understood simply through 
their demographics (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Therefore a multi-dimensional 
perspective may be necessary to account for the behaviour of some boardroom 
members and some boards as a group. 
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2.5.1b Powerful Effective Boards 
The research of Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that powerful independent boards 
were associated with superior financial performance. Their findings showed that 
CEO's described such boards as being `more progressive and more encouraging and 
supportive of CEO efforts'. Power reflects the capacity of directors or CEO's to 
bring about the outcomes they desire through formal and informal means (Salanicik 
and Pfeffer, 1977). However, Mace (1986) argues that boards often fail to realise 
their potential contribution due, in part, to their failure to even "do the homework" 
needed for understanding the organisation's problems. Lorsch and Maclver (1989) 
found that directors who give enough time to their duties and seek out the 
information they need are better able to prevent and manage crisis and govern more 
effectively in times of instability. 
Eisenhardt et al. (1997) found that teams who always sought consensus tended to 
display high levels of interpersonal conflict whereas teams who encouraged 
divergent opinions and conflicting viewpoints created a greater number of strategic 
options and make more effective decisions. Within top teams performance was 
likely to be enhanced if power within the group was balanced between the leader 
and other team members, Eisenhardt et al. (1997) describe such an environment as a 
balanced power structure. Balanced power structures require a clear leader, but also 
that other group members are able to substantially influence decision-making. A 
similar structure was also found to be optimum by Pearce and Zahra (1991) who 
describe such boards as participative, with both powerful Non Executives and also a 
powerful CEO. 
Page 40 of 400 
Powerful boards are, according to Pearce and Zahra (1991), the "brain and soul of 
the organisation, as well as the guardians of shareholder interests". Dimma (1996: 
217) describes them as "a heretofore under-utilized but absolutely essential link in 
the search for improved corporate performance". Pearce and Zahra (1991: 136) 
argue that "powerful boards" are considered necessary for "organisational 
effectiveness" because they strengthen the links between the organisation and its 
environment by providing useful business contacts (Pettigrew, 1992; Meyer, 2000). 
They actively contribute to the development of organisational mission, evaluate 
CEO performance and advise on strategic options (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; 
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). They provide appropriate checks and balances in 
corporate governance and play a vital role in formulating corporate identity, through 
the establishment and monitoring of codes of ethics (Purcell, 1978; Andrews, 1984; 
Nader, 1984; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Pettigrew, 1992). 
2.5.1c Corporate Responsibility in the Boardroom 
The board is faced with a difficult task in trying to balance the needs of 
shareholders, who may have a short-term bias, with the longer-term necessity to be 
socially responsive. This problem is particularly apparent in the prevailing 
shareholder system where stocks are held not by individuals for the long-term, but 
by huge investment groups. A man sitting at a screen may hold stock A on Monday 
morning, sell it on Monday afternoon and buy it back on Wednesday (Witherell, 
2000), leaving managers torn between the requirements of block shareholders for a 
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regular and sustained short-term profit Lowengard, 1997) and the long-term survival 
of the organisation (Meyer, 2000). As Frederick (1978) put it in his classic paper on 
CSR: "when it becomes necessary to weigh social costs and benefits against 
economic costs and benefits, the entire question of trade offs becomes very murky 
indeed" (Frederick, 1978: 153). 
The dilemma of balancing the needs of block shareholders is further confused by the 
work of Johnson and Greening (1999), whose research suggests that block 
shareholders can be split into two groups. Firstly there are investment fund 
managers, who rely on quarterly performance bonuses for their income and are 
therefore likely to be concerned with short-term profitability. Secondly there are 
pension fund managers, who are paid a salary and are often employed by groups 
such as unions; these have a longer-term perspective, and are likely to show concern 
for issues such as women employees, minorities and the threat of future 
environmental hazard. Investment managers were found to involve themselves with 
governance issues such as board composition, whereas pension fund managers 
involve themselves actively with much broader social questions. The impact of this 
split on the strategies adopted by the board does not appear to be known. 
Social responsiveness represents the ability of the board to balance the 
heterogeneous requirements of various constituent groups towards the long-term 
survival of the organisation. The difficulties in fulfilling this commitment are 
illustrated in Figure 2.2, which shows the pressures faced by directors trying to 
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balance the financial necessity of maintaining a good reputation with shareholders 
against the needs of broader constituents. 
Figure 2.2: The conflicting pressures Faced by the Board in Enhancing Corporate Reputation 
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Figure 2.2 suggests that shareholders use signals of financial success in their 
purchasing decisions. However as stakeholders, shareholders might also be expected 
to pay attention of other non-financial signals such as the behaviour of the 
organisation as a good corporate citizen. 
Lerner and Fryxell (1994), during their empirical examination of the attitudes of 
CEO's towards stakeholders, discovered a separation of shareholder issues from 
those of other constituents in the minds of CEO's. They also found that CEO's with 
a shareholder orientation had a negative impact on philanthropic giving. Moreover, 
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their research demonstrated that those CEO's who took a broad constituency view of 
their organisations were also likely to enjoy superior financial performance. 
Interestingly, Lerner and Fryxell's (1994) research also showed that corporate social 
performance was related to CEO tenure, in that the longer a CEO had been in place 
the more likely it seems to be that social issues will acquire some priority (Lerner 
and Fryxell, 1994). These findings are reinforced by the work of Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse (1999), who found that extended tenure both in post and within the 
organisation, along with being older, leads to a much more long-term perspective on 
the part of the individual (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 1999). These findings seem 
more in line with stewardship theory (Davis et al. 1997), than with that of the more 
commonly accepted agency model of managerial preferences. Petrick et al. (1999) 
maintain that the best leaders are able to understand complex issues from multiple 
strategic positions and act out a complex strategy by playing several roles in a very 
integrated and complementary way. They term this "behavioural complexity". 
Looking beyond a board's requirement to protect the shareholder is a complex task 
(Weidenbaum, 1986) and sometimes a right answer may not even exist. 
Oliver (2000) argues that the executive sometimes finds it difficult to understand the 
wider context and tends to concentrate on short-term goals such as cost cutting. This 
maybe at the expense of wider or more long-term issues (Sonnenfeld, 1981). In 
contrast to their executive counterparts Non Executive Directors are in the singular 
position of championing various internal and external interests (Johnson and 
Greening, 1999). Furthermore, it is argued that Non Executives improve the overall 
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performance of the board at two levels: firstly, they stimulate a desire on the part of 
executives to "keep their house in order" (Forbes and Milliken, 1999) and secondly, 
they are likely to see the board's responsibility for governance as distinct from, but 
complementary to, management. In contrast, management may see their role in 
governance as merely an extension of their managerial function (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). 
2.5.2 Moderators of the Non Executive Director's Role within the Board 
2.5.2a A Team of Leaders 
Alderfer (1986) observed that directors tend to see themselves as individuals and 
therefore find it difficult to perceive themselves as a group. For this reason they 
often feel powerless to act when they are unhappy with a situation, because they feel 
that they alone will not be able to change it. Alderfer (1986) argues that truly 
effective directors see themselves as part of a larger group and are therefore less 
daunted by the need to make changes. This may be of key importance as it is argued 
by Forbes and Milliken (1999) that board cohesiveness is a fundamental criterion by 
which to assess the effectiveness of boards as decision-making groups. The paradox 
is that, although by their very nature boards are made up of individual leaders, their 
ability to work together is likely to determine their success. 
Lorsch and Maclver (1989), in their seminal work Pawns or Potentates, also 
highlight the importance of group cohesion. From their three-year study of 
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boardroom practices with over 100 director participants, they found that there was 
typically little consensus during board meetings about accountabilities to various 
constituencies. This surprised them, as the research also pointed to the fact that 
directors within the study almost universally saw shareholders as their top priority. 
As a result they identified three distinct groups, as illustrated in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.2: Typology of Director Group Behaviour Preferences 
Traditionalists Adhere to strict belief in the primacy of the shareholder and decline to recognise the 
conflicts that exist between their traditional perspective and that of other constituents. 
Rationalisers See the conflicts and feel the tensions inherent in their responsibilities in an increasingly 
complex world, however they rationalise them away. What is good for the shareholder 
will be good for the corporation and other constituents. 
Broad Constructionists Openly recognise that their responsibilities encompass more than shareholders. If this 
attitude creates conflicts they recognise and deal with them, without assuming that every 
decision must be in the shareholders' interest. 
Source: Compiled from Lorsch and Maclver (1989: 39) 
Lorsch and Maclver (1989: 49) use the analogy of the ostrich to illustrate the 
behaviour of the three groups. The Broad Constructionists "would be actively 
confronting the dangers of life on the sandy plains, while the Rationalizers might 
gaze enviously at the buried heads of the Traditionalists ". Their research 
highlighted the problems directors face in feeling unable to discuss their convictions, 
most specifically with regard to the imbalance between the apparent primacy of 
shareholders and the pressing need for a much more long-term managerial approach 
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than might be considered desirable by the kind of shareholders who are perceived to 
come in only for a short-term profit. 
2.5.2b Groupthink 
Some researchers have suggested that boards of directors may be susceptible to a 
phenomenon known as groupthink (Demp and Neubauer, 1992; Cohan, 2002). 
Groupthink occurs when a group of individuals ignore evidence that is contrary to a 
course of action or idea to which the group has already committed itself (Janis, 
1971; Janis, 1972). The account of Arthur Taylor, president of CBS and a Non 
Executive Director to Eastern Airlines provides a good example. Taylor spent hours 
trying to persuade his fellow board members to seek professional advice before 
agreeing to the Chairman's plan to sell off the business but was outvoted, as Taylor 
put it "most of the board were admirers of (the Chairman)" (Baum and Byrne, 
1986). 
When groupthink occurs within a board of directors, board members will typically 
seek consensus and may avoid alternative strategy seeking in order to minimise 
opportunities for dissent from within the group. As in the Eastern Airline case, 
strong-willed executives are able to gain support for poor decisions (Sims, 1992). 
Board members may choose to ignore contrary evidence in order to reduce stress 
levels within the group (Janis, 1972). Ambiguous information may be categorised 
by individuals within the group as unmanageable and is likely to be dismissed 
(Cohan, 2002). Board members may risk exclusion or social distancing from the 
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group if they introduce dissonant or unacceptable information into the group setting 
(Schwenk, 1989; Cohan, 2002; Westphal and Khann, 2003). Social distancing may 
manifest itself by, for example, the exclusion of the individual from important 
meetings or the use of language that the individual does not understand or is not 
privy to (Westphal and Khann, 2003). 
Although originally group cohesiveness was believed to be the main predictor of 
groupthink, research over the past 30 years has shown that rather than just esprit de 
corps, loyalty to a leader, promotional leadership, the desire to belong to the group, 
arrogance, overconfidence and a bottom line mentality may all be indicators of 
groupthink (Baum and Byrne, 1986; McCauley, 1989; Sims, 1992; Esser, 1998). 
Esser and Lindoerfer (1989) argue that groupthink should be considered a 
`syndrome' which is identifiable by its symptoms. They believe that it is not 
necessary for all symptoms to be present to justify a diagnosis of groupthink, rather 
that groupthink symptoms are contextually relevant. 
Overcoming groupthink is an issue that has created some debate since Janis first 
examined the phenomenon in 1972. The general consensus is that in order to 
overcome the negative effects of groupthink, conflict should be introduced into the 
board in the form of alternative strategies and opinions. Individuals should be 
encouraged to play devil's advocate in order to improve the efficiency of decision- 
making (Schwenk, 1989; Sims, 1992). The culture of some boardrooms in both the 
UK and USA appears to be one where a single individual or a small group of 
individuals within the board, control the behaviour and decision making of the larger 
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team. In the last few years many accounts in the media have emerged of individuals, 
particularly those in the role of CEO or Chairman, who rule `their' boards with an 
iron will and with little regard for the input of fellow board members who often 
appear to have been hand picked for their ability to sit quietly in the boardroom. 
High profile examples include the Disney Corporation, Hanson and the now 
beleaguered giants Enron and Worldcom. 
2.5.3 Summary 
The second part of this literature review has highlighted the role of the board of 
directors. They are described as the "apex of the firm's decision control system" , 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983). Despite the board's importance to the health of the 
organisation previous research into the board of directors has tended to be highly 
positivistic. Empirical research has often failed to take into account the context 
within which the board actually performs its duties. This section will now focus 
specifically on the role of the Non Executive Director. 
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2.6 The Non Executive Director 
"The board of directors can be the difference between a raging success story and an utter 
failure" 
(Oliver, 2000: 7) 
The average Non Executive board member in the UK is over sixty years of age and 
has neither international nor public sector experience. He will almost certainly hold 
positions on other boards and may well have attended public school. The proportion 
of women on the board remains small; in a survey of 1800 firms only 17% had 
actively sought to appoint a women non-executive director (Pierce, 2001) and the 
actual number of women on UK boards is around 6% (Higgs, 2003). The 
demographics of American board members appears to be very similar to their British 
counterparts, the number of American female directors is slightly higher at 10% of 
the total (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002). 
2.6.1 The Role of the Non Executive Director 
Non Executive Directors frequently form the majority on corporate boards and could 
be described as "the formal link between the shareholders of a firm and the 
managers entrusted with the day-to-day functioning of the organisations" (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999). Most Non Executive Directors perform other roles outside the 
host organisation, the majority holding, or have previously held the position of CEO 
elsewhere. Others may come from military or civil service, political or academic 
backgrounds. 
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Non Executive Directors are in a unique position, privy to the inner workings of the 
organisation and yet, in theory, independent of it. Although they share equal 
responsibility for the behaviour of the organisation with other board members, they 
are distinct from other directors because they have no involvement in the day-to-day 
operations of the organisation but are instead concerned with ensuring good 
governance, strategic direction and organisational well-being. There has been some 
debate about the effectiveness of the current role of the Non Executive Director. 
The President of the Institute of Directors in the UK, Lord Young, has recently 
advocated the abolishment of the Non Executive Director role, arguing that relying 
on part-time individuals to keep- a check on management when they only have 
limited access to inside information is `naive' (Pass, 2004). 
2.6.1a Non Executive Directors' Role in Corporate Governance 
Reports such as Cadbury (1992) have highlighted the important role that Non 
Executive Directors should play in steering organisations towards improved 
governance practices, discouraging excessive "fat cat" pay deals and protecting the 
rights of shareholders. Two important roles are prescribed for Non Executive 
Directors in terms of corporate governance: the first is to review the performance of 
both the board and the executive (Cadbury, 1992: 4.5) and the second is to take the 
lead where potential conflicts of interest occur (Cadbury, 1992: 4.6). The emphasis 
in the Cadbury Report was on the "control function" of Non Executive Directors, as 
they highlight themselves - this was a result of their remit. However, the Report 
raises the point that this should not "detract from the primary and positive 
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contribution which they (Non Executive Directors) are expected to make, as equal 
board members, to the leadership of the company" (Cadbury, 1992: 4.10). Hampel 
(1998) highlights the problem faced by the Cadbury Report in over-emphasising 
monitoring and control, and stresses that Non Executive Directors should have both 
a strategic and a monitoring function. The Higgs (2003) Report adds to these 
principals by suggesting that Non Executive Directors should meet separately from 
the main board on a regular and planned basis. Higgs (2003) also suggests that the 
Non Executive Director's qualifications, compensation, access to management and 
continuing education should be disclosed. 
It is suggested that when used properly these highly experienced individuals should, 
as a minimum, provide a valuable resource as sounding-boards to the organisational 
executive (Dunlop, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Kakabadse et al. 2001). 
Their knowledge of the complex business environment (Johnson and Greening, 
1999) and their position outside the organisation provides them with a unique vision 
of the system that surrounds and maintains organisational well-being. Frederick 
argued in 1978 and even more strongly in 1998 that social responsiveness requires a 
systems approach along with environmental scanning to detect emergent problems 
(Frederick, 1998). 
2.6.1b Research into the Role of the Non Executive Director 
Despite their seemingly pivotal role in the governance and leadership of 
organisations (Alderfer, 1986; Westphal, 1998; Meyer, 2000; Kakabadse et al. 
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2001), Non Executive Directors have not received a great deal of attention from the 
academic community (Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999: 489; McNulty 
and Pettigrew, 1999; Oliver, 2000). Most writing in this area has been either 
practitioner-based or of a more prescribed nature (Pettigrew, 1992), with most 
analysis being performed based on publicly available statistical data (McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999). Such limited reporting may be due to the difficulties faced by 
researchers in gaining access to these often high-profile, busy individuals' and partly 
also, because "those who sit amongst the mighty do not invite sociologists to watch 
them make the decisions about how to control the behaviour of others" (Kahl 1957, 
p. 10). Thus little documentation exists regarding Non Executive Directors' 
contribution to corporate strategy or their influence on corporate behaviour (Forbes 
and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). 
However, certain studies penetrated the inner sanctum of the boardroom. McNulty 
and Pettigrew (1999) have found that Non Executive Directors are able to play an 
influencing role in the setting of strategy. Their findings contradict the common 
belief that Non Executive Directors act merely as a rubber stamp to the desires of the 
Executive. Their research showed that although most proposals are ratified by the 
board once they reached the committee stage, the Executive was forced to spend a 
great deal of time behind the scenes ensuring that their plans would meet with the 
approval of the board. Thus unacceptable plans rarely ever even reach the official 
table. 
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Kakabadse et al. (2001), in their study of the role and contribution of Non Executive 
Directors, found that Non Executive Directors influence strategic behaviour. They 
note that Non Executive Directors have become much more professional, with many 
boards now using specialist recruitment agencies to find prospective Non Executive 
Director candidates with specific knowledge and skills. Additionally, this study 
highlights the heterogeneous nature of boards which forces newly appointed Non 
Executive Directors to quickly adapt to the culture and customs of the board in order 
to make a recognisable or meaningful contribution. 
2.6.1c Corporate Responsibility and the Non Executive Director 
Ibrahim et al. (2003) found that the presence of Non Executive Directors in the 
boardroom was likely to lead to a company engaging in socially responsible 
activities. This may be because they have wider organisational goals than their 
executive counterparts (Johnson and Greening 1999). Therefore, although Non 
Executive Directors are governed by the same legal responsibilities as other board 
members, we would argue that their perceptions of that responsibility are probably 
different from those of executive members. To date however, there has been little 
qualitative work which explores the role of the Non Executive Director and how that 
role might affect corporate behaviour (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999; Oliver, 2000; Ibrahim et al. 2003), perhaps because of the 
difficulties researchers face in gaining access to these often high profile and always 
busy individuals (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). 
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2.6.1d Research into the Non Executive Influence over Corporate 
Responsibility 
Thompsen (2004) proposes that organisational values will be influenced by the 
identity of its board members. Johnson and Greening (1999) believe that Non 
Executive Directors may be employed primarily to deal with outside constituencies. 
This, in their opinion, represents a strategy for dealing with an organisation's 
relationship with its environment. Furthermore, Non Executive Directors may 
enhance the reputation of an organisation, developing credibility and organisational 
legitimacy, whilst protecting their own (Dutton and Jackson, 1987; Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). Non Executive Directors are likely to be sensitive to negative 
media attention and the loss of reputation that might ensue (Greening and Gray, 
1994; Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Empirical research findings in this area are very limited, O'Neil et al. (1989) found 
that outside directors were more orientated towards ethical concerns than were their 
CEO counterparts. Ibrahim and Angelidis (1995) also found that Non Executive 
Directors were less economically orientated and more sensitive to philanthropic 
endeavours than inside directors. 
Webb (2004), found that when she compared companies that were listed as being 
socially responsible in an ethically screened stock portfolio, with a matched sample 
of `non-SR' firms, those organisations that were defined as being socially 
responsible had a significantly higher percentage of outsiders on their boards. This 
finding suggests that Non Executive Directors may have some influence over their 
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organisations' strategic choices in terms of corporate social responsibility 
behaviours. 
Ibrahim et al. (2003) examined Non Executive Directors in the service industry and 
concluded that by having more Non Executive Directors on the board of directors, a 
firm is more likely to engage in socially responsible activities. However, conversely 
Coffey and Wang (1998) found that increasing the number of Non Executive 
Directors on the board had little effect on the philanthropic behaviour of the 
organisation concerned. It should be noted that all of the studies mentioned in this 
section employed a positivistic approach using publicly available data or postal 
questionnaires with relatively low response rates (O'Neill et al. 1989; Ibrahim and 
Angelidis, 1995; Coffey and Wang, 1998; Ibrahim et al. 2003), to gather data that 
was then statistically analysed. 
2.6.2 Boundary Spanners 
Wood (1994: 196) describes boundary spanners as the "Janus Head" of the 
organisation with faces looking both ways. The importance of boundary spanners is 
noted by a number of authors (Aldrich and'Herker, 1977; Tushman and Scanlan, 
1981; Wood, 1994; Pava and Krausz, 1997). These are individuals who can straddle 
the boundary between the organisation and its environment, gathering then feeding 
back information about emerging issues and also representing the organisation to its 
environment (Manev and Stevenson, 2001). According to Pava and Krausz (1997), 
only through an active stance on the part of boundary spanners can the organisation 
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hope to fulfil its social responsibility mandate. Such individuals provide a "key 
channel for the organisation to influence its socio-political environment" (Manev 
and Stevenson, 2001: 185). 
2.6.2a The Non Executive Directors' Boundary Spanning Role 
The resource dependency literature views Non Executive Directors as boundary 
spanners (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Daily and 
Cannella, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) bridging the divide between the 
organisation and its environment and feeding back relevant information to 
management (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). Resource dependence theory argues that 
organisations are comprised of external and internal coalitions, which exist in an 
environment that contains scarce and valuable resource essential to organisational 
survival (Selznick, 1949; Johnson et al. 1996; Dalton et at. 1999; Hillman et at. 
2000). As early as 1949, Selznick suggested that organisations could gain external 
resources through co-optation. One way to achieve co-optation is through the use of 
Non Executive Directors. However, much of the work in the last decade has 
informed the director interlock literature (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Manev 
and Stevenson, 2001), and has therefore concentrated on the frequently negative 
consequences of directors sitting on each others' boards, so-called "cronyism". 
Boundary spanners are believed to be critical in fulfilling an organisation's CSR 
mandate (Wood, 1994; Pava and Krausz, 1997). The value of individuals capable of 
understanding the complex organisational environment, anticipating unexpected 
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events, challenges and opportunities and having the governance procedures in place 
for their voices to be heard should not be underestimated (Petrick et al., 1999). The 
presence of such individuals at board level is also viewed as providing competitive 
advantage for organisations (Petrick et al., 1999; Geletkanycz et al., 2001). 
However, the specific role of Non Executive Directors in terms of how they might 
influence corporate responsibility as boundary spanners remains somewhat of a 
mystery. 
Johnson and Greening's research (1999: 568) found that Non Executive Directors 
have both profit goals (in line with agency theory) and wider non-profit goals. They 
have a strong "stakeholder orientation", recognising that the organisation has 
responsibilities to groups other than shareholders (Wang and Dewhurst, 1992; 
Johnson and Greening, 1999). Johnson and Greening (1999) believe that Non 
Executive Directors may be employed primarily to deal with outside constituencies; 
in their opinion, this represents a strategy for dealing with an organisation's 
relationship with its environment. 
2.6.2b Non Executives' Role in Balancing Divergent Constituents 
According to Tushman and Scanlan (1981) it is important to differentiate clearly 
between those who sit on the boundary of the organisation and boundary spanners. 
It is their belief that to be a true boundary spanner an individual must both 
communicate out to the environment and also back to the organisation in equal 
measure. For example, they argue that salespeople, who are generally considered to 
I 
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be boundary spanners, may communicate to the environment but often fail to 
communicate back into the organisation. 
Figure 2.3 presents a model of the complex factors, which may influence the Non 
Executive Directors' Role. The model clearly shows that Non Executive Directors 
sit on the boundary between the organisation and its environment, their ability to act 
as boundary spanners from this position could be moderated by many factors. 
Figure 2.3: Influences on the Non Executive Directors' Role 
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The ability of Non Executive Directors to balance the requirements of these various 
constituents is likely to be affected by the explicit nature or otherwise of 
expectations within the board. If Non Executive Directors are faced with ambiguous 
signals as to their role it is possible that role conflict will develop. 
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2.6.3 Moderators of the Non Executive Directors' Role 
2.6.3a Role Conflict 
Empirical research suggests that individuals who are in boundary spanning positions 
are likely to experience role conflict (Friedman and Podolny, 1992). A role is the set 
of behaviours that others expect of individuals in a certain context (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). Role expectations are beliefs and attitudes about what a manager should and 
should not do as part of his role (Kahn et al., 1964). Expectations may be directed at 
the individual from others in their role set or they may be `self sender' expectations 
arising from the individual's personal attitudes and beliefs (Kahn et al., 1964). The 
effectiveness of an individual within the role set is based on the degree of 
congruence between the individual's interpretation of role expectations and the 
expectations that others in the role set have for the individual (Fondas and Stewart, 
1994). Rodham (2000) suggests that role theory research has generally failed to 
take account of the context of the role. 
Role conflict is common among individuals in boundary spanning positions, 
particularly when such individuals deal with secondary role sets (Friedman and 
Podolny, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). These are functions that are not part of the 
day-to-day functioning of the position. By its very nature it is argued that much of 
the Non Executive Directors' work is probably non-routine; rather it is of a strategic 
nature, involving the "acquisition and exchange" of information regarding a 
changing environment and organisational response to it (Floyd and Lane, 2000: 
158). Although it should be noted that some previous studies have suggested that 
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upper echelons may not suffer from role conflict problems to the same extent that 
lower echelons do ( House and Rizzo, 1972; Hamner and Tosi, 1974). 
Role conflict may lead to distress for the individual, avoidance tactics, lying, 
organisational exit and the withholding of information (Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
However, it may be possible to avoid conflict by ensuring that expectations are 
clearly articulated; individuals are then more likely to conform (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). Interaction within clearly defined roles also becomes more predictable, 
leading to greater openness, trust, information sharing and learning (Floyd and Lane, 
2000). 
2.6.3b Implications for the Non Executive Directors' Boundary Spanning Role 
Boundary spanners provide communication between constituents and the 
organisation, representing the perceptions, ideas and expectations of each side 
(Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Friedman and Podolny, 1992). Because role conflict can 
arise from disparate beliefs or priorities on the part of managers (Aldrich and 
Herker, 1977; Tushman and Scanlan, 1981; Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000) it is likely to affect the behaviour of individuals in boundary spanning 
positions. Thus Non Executive Directors are likely to experience divided loyalties, 
as between the organisation and outside groups, which they are expected - or feel 
obliged to represent. Weidenbaum (1986) argues that the wider stakeholder 
perspective, which is now being put forward by some management experts, has led 
many directors to become confused as to where their responsibilities lay. 
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Weidenbaum believes this causes problems, for example when a company is 
threatened with a takeover, when employees want more wages or customers want 
lower prices (Weidenbaum, 1986). 
Such conflict creates stress for the individual, makes interactions less predictable 
and impedes the development of trust within the group (Kahn et al., 1964; Floyd and 
Lane, 2000). Creating organisational structures which allow the board to interact 
within clearly defined roles should encourage greater levels of trust and more 
predictable behaviour, thereby avoiding the problems created by role conflict such 
as avoidance, lying and organisational exit (Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Tushman and 
Scanlan, 1981; Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
2.6.3c Information Asymmetry 
Although much of the current literature on the role of the Board of Directors has 
suggested that Non Executive Directors provide the key to good corporate 
governance, some theorists still have concerns about the Non Executive Director's 
role and its value to the organisation and its shareholders. For example, it is 
commonly argued that Non Executive Directors have imperfect access to key 
information about the firm. Insiders control what information is made available to 
the Board of Directors and also have the option to decide when to release 
information to the Board (Fama and Jenson, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskinsons, 1990; 
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Schaffer, 2002; Pass, 2004). 
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2.6.3d Commitment 
Non Executive Directors have only a limited amount of time to carry out their 
duties. They are almost always very busy people, often holding multiple board 
positions, as well as a full-time CEO post elsewhere. Some studies have found that 
not having enough time to suitably complete their duties was one of the Non 
Executive Director's biggest complaints (Mace, 1986; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). 
The amount of time spent by board members preparing for meetings is widely 
considered to be of great importance in determining the board's ability to represent 
shareholder interests, contribute to strategy, understand company problems, prevent 
and manage crisis and effectively manage the organisation in times of difficulty 
(Mace, 1986; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
Studies suggest that many boards do not spend the necessary preparation time to 
properly fulfil their potential (Mace, 1986). However, boards which set 
recognisable standards and "norms" of excellence for their members and encourage 
diligence and participation, conducive to high effort among members, are more 
likely to perform their control monitoring and service tasks successfully (Lorsch and 
Maclver, 1989; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). 
Some researchers have argued that Non Executive Directors may not have the 
emotional commitment to an organisation necessary for them to care enough about 
doing a good job (Schaffer, 2002). However, this argument is counter-balanced by 
those who argue that a Non Executive Director is motivated to provide good 
stewardship by the desire to maintain personal reputation and therefore maintain and 
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enhance future individual earning potential (Wilson, 1985; Weigelt and Camerer, 
1988; Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
2.6.3e Non Executive Director Personal Reputation 
In terms of agency theory, Non Executive Directors are in a very interesting 
position. On the one hand they are well placed to monitor the self-serving behaviour 
of the executive and protect the rights of the shareholders - or possibly constituents 
(Johnson and Greening, 1999). On the other, they are also self-serving individuals 
in their own right, and we have no reason to assume that they are any less likely than 
the appointed agents to maximise their own benefit. However, one important factor 
may be the desire of the individual Non Executive Director to protect and enhance 
his own personal reputation (Johnson and Greening, 1999); misconduct by the 
organisation is likely to reflect badly on the individual's perceived ability as a top 
executive and therefore future earning power and status. 
Furthermore, reputation acts as a subtle behaviour control mechanism at two levels: 
at the individual level, Wilson (1985: 27) maintains that "the essential requirements 
for a player's reputation to matter for his current choice of action are his anticipation 
that his later decisions will be conditioned by his later reputation". This point is also 
made by Weigelt and Camerer (1988). They suggest that board members bring their 
reputations to an organisation and that protecting this reputation leads them to act in 
the shareholder interest. At the organisational level, Fombrun and Shanley (1990) 
believe that the desire of managers to protect reputation once it is established is 
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likely to act as a strong control over their future behaviour. In this context, Caves 
and Porter (1977) describe it as a "strong source of intraindustry structure". Dutton 
and Jackson (1987) argue that the publication of reputation rankings such as those 
offered by Fortune magazine may lead managers to perceive external threats and 
opportunities differently and moreover alter their perception of their own firm's 
strengths and weaknesses. 
2.6.3f Remuneration 
The literature suggests that, as with executive board members, one factor that can 
improve the alignment between the individual Non Executive Director and 
shareholders is high managerial equity holdings (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Linking Non Executive Director remuneration to stock options is regarded by many 
governance experts to provide an important means of encouraging greater 
commitment to the organisation, helping in the development of a psychological 
contract between the individual and the organisation (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). It 
is believed to result in less passive board behaviour, it reduces the inclination to 
bestow excessive executive pay, it minimises the tendency to undertake wasteful 
diversification and it diminishes concerns about protecting the organisation from 
takeovers. Finally, it increases the likelihood of the removal of poorly performing 
CEO's (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Hambrick and Jackson, 2000). 
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2.6.3g Director Interlocks 
Because many Non Executive Directors sit on multiple boards there is often overlap 
between boardroom relationships with many individuals working within a complex 
social network of boards. These are described as interlocking directorates 
(Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Manev and 
Stevenson, 2001; Geletkanycz et al. 2001). 
Many theorists have argued that interlocking directorates reduce the overall 
effectiveness of the Non Executive Director. Individuals may feel indebted to the 
CEO for appointing them to the board. Additionally that same CEO may sit on the 
board of the Non Executive Director's own company. These ties may discourage 
individuals from criticising management for fear of losing social capital. Some 
researchers have even found that when a Non Executive Director raises unpopular 
issues he risks social distancing by the rest of the group (Westphal and Khann, 
2003). 
Research suggest that boards use interlocks to scan the environment for new 
business practices (Mace, 1986; Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). Some researchers have 
suggested that interlocks may influence firm behaviour for example Haunschild and 
Beckman (1998) found that interlocking directorates affected firms' acquisition 
strategies. The effect of interlocks on the ability of the Non Executive Director to 
influence corporate responsibility with the firm is not clear. 
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2.6.4 Summary 
This final part of the literature review has examined the possible role of the Non 
Executive Director as a boundary spanner, balancing the needs of various 
constituents. The literature suggests that Non Executive Directors may have wider 
social goals than their Executive counterparts. The factors that might be expected to 
influence the Non Executive Director's ability to fulfil his role were then discussed. 
The review suggests that few empirical studies have actually talked directly to Non 
Executive Directors in order to ascertain how different factors moderate their ability 
to make a useful contribution. There follows a summary of this section. 
2.7 Literature Review Summary 
The aim of this literature review was to uncover a gap in the current literature 
regarding the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director within the 
corporate board. The review reveals that despite a great deal of interest in the board 
of directors, and specifically the Non Executive Director within the board, there is 
currently little empirical research that examines the behaviour of these individuals 
within their own context. 
The literature suggests that an important role for the Non Executive Director is that 
of a boundary spanner. However their ability to fulfil this role has not been 
adequately researched. Boundary spanners are considered key to the fulfilment of 
an organisation's corporate responsibility mandate. As a boundary spanner the Non 
Executive Director would be expected to deal with a variety of divergent 
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constituents and this may lead to role conflict. The next section will specifically 
examine the gap in the literature and present the research question. 
2.8 Conclusions and Identification of Gap 
Scholars and practitioners alike have stressed the importance of the Board of 
Directors. They have described it as the "apex of the firm's decision control 
system" (Fama and Jensen, 1983). The Board provides strategic guidance and 
leadership and sets the tone of the organisation for a range of constituents (Pearce 
and Zahra, 1991). 
However, within the boardroom one important group has been neglected by 
academics. The role and contribution of the Non Executive Director remains largely 
a mystery. Little is known about their contribution to corporate strategy or actual 
their activities within the organisation (Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; 
McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Cohan, 2002). Much has been written in the 
governance literature about how the Non Executive Director should behave, but few 
have been able to research real behaviour, perhaps because of the difficulties faced 
by researchers in accessing the phenomenon (Pettigrew, 1992). Many authors have 
argued that taking account of context is of primary importance when researching the 
behaviour of corporate boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992; Korac 
Kakabadse et al. 2001). 
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Little research currently exists which explores the ability of the Non Executive to 
contribute to corporate responsibility. In addition, the type of research in this area to 
date has been highly positivistic in its approach. Coffey and Wang (1998) found that 
increasing the number of Non Executive Directors had no effect on corporate 
philanthropy, whilst Ibrahim et al. (2003) and Webb (2004) both found correlation 
between the number of Non Executive Directors and a firm's social performance. 
The resource dependency literature views Non Executive Directors as boundary 
spanners (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Daily and 
Cannella, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Boundary spanners are believed to be 
critical in fulfilling an organisation's corporate social responsibility (CSR) mandate 
(Wood, 1994; Pava and Krausz, 1997). Research suggests that Non Executive 
Directors have a strong constituency orientation and may be employed specifically 
to deal with outside constituents (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Johnson and Greening, 
1999). 
As boundary spanners Non Executive Directors have a unique perspective on 
constituent management. The literature suggests that boundary spanners are 
susceptible to role conflict (Aldrich and Herker, 1977; Tushman and Scanlan, 1981; 
Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). However, previous studies 
have suggested that upper echelons may not suffer from role problems to the same 
extent that lower echelons do (House and Rizzo, 1972; Hamner and Tosi, 1974; ), 
because they have greater autonomy in their roles. 
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2.8.1 The Research Question 
Most of the previous research examining the role of the Non Executive Director has 
failed to take account of the context in which they perform their roles. This study 
will examine the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director from their 
perspective within the context of the corporate board. As a result of the literature 
review presented in this chapter the following research question has been framed to 
address the current gap in empirical research: 
How do Non Executive Directors in their role as boundary spanners on 
corporate boards, balance divergent expectations whilst contributing to 
corporate responsibility practices? 
In order to answer the posed question, the study will explore: 
a) How do Non Executive Directors perceive their role within corporate 
boards? 
b) How do Non Executive Directors' perceptions of their role impact on their 
ability to contribute effectively? 
c) How do Non Executive Directors' perceptions of their role impact on their 
ability to contribute specifically to corporate responsibility practices? 
d) How can Non Executive Directors effectively enhance their board 
performance? 
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2.9 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a review of the literature. As a result of the literature 
review a gap in current empirical knowledge has been identified, and a research 
question has been generated that will be used to guide this research. The next 
chapter, chapter three, will introduce the philosophical perspective chosen for the 
research; this will be followed by an explanation of the research methodology and 
the pilot study findings. 
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Chapter Three Research Methodology 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter will outline the philosophy and methodological approach, which will 
provide the framework for this research. Included in the chapter are the findings of 
the initial pilot study, the methods of data collection and the methods by which the 
data were analysed and interpreted. An outline of the format of this chapter is 
presented below: 
Figure 3.1 Outline of Chapter 3 
3.1 Introduction 
3.2 Overview: A 
Philosophical 
Perspective 
3.3 Choosing 
an Approach 
Ontology Positivism 
Epistemology Realism 
Summary Interpretive Inquiry 
The Constructivist Perspective 
3.5 Research Design 
3.5.1 Pilot Study 
II3.5.2 Operationalising 
the Research 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
3.4 Research 
Methodology 
Philosophical Influences 
Methodology & Research Design 
How to Answer the Question 
Data Collection 
Research Boundaries 
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The literature review presented in chapter two revealed that existing boardroom 
research has failed to take account of context (Pettigrew 1992). This has led to 
conflicting and confusing research results ( Dalton and Daily, 1999; Korac 
Kakabadse et al. 2001). Pettigrew (1992: 173) believes that "great inferential leaps" 
are made between input variables and output variables, such as from board 
composition to board performance, without assessing the context in which these 
variables are situated. Therefore the aim of this research is explore the role and 
contribution of the individual Non Executive Director, so as to add to empirical 
research a rich new understanding of this role from the perspective of the Non 
Executive Director. The methodology that will be used in this research is outlined 
below. 
3.2 Overview: A Philosophical Perspective 
Philosophy has at its heart the inter-connected concepts of ontology and 
epistemology. Blaikie (1993: 6-7) explains the two concepts thus: "ontology refers 
to the claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes about 
the nature of social reality, and epistemology refers to the claims or assumptions 
made about the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of this reality, 
whatever it is understood to be, claims about how what exists may be known". 
This research adopts the ontological perspective of broad constructivism. 
Constructivists believe that what we view as objective knowledge and truth is 
merely the result of perspective, reality is a subjective construct, "emphasising the 
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instrumental and practical function" of knowing (Schwandt, 1994: 125). By 
interpreting the meanings of actors the constructivist describes their subjective 
realities which, in the case of this study, broadly concerns, as the unit of analysis, the 
`individual Non Executive Director' focusing on perceptions of their role and 
contribution within the corporate board. 
This section will now discuss in more detail the implications of the chosen approach 
in the light of other perspectives currently used within management research. 
Attention will then be turned to the methodological implications of the constructivist 
approach and specifically the choice of a qualitative interpretive epistemology. 
3.2.1 Ontology - Social Reality 
Reality is based on our understanding of the world; it is deeply embedded by the 
social and personal values and constraints that surround us. We each interpret it 
uniquely through our culture, nationality and individual experience layered with 
those of our peers, leaders and family. It seems highly improbable that there can 
ever be just one truth, which can be generalised universally. However some truths 
may be broadly generalised within `realistic' boundaries (Miles and Huberman, 
1992: 4). In order to gain any deep understanding of the reality of others we must 
first understand their context and also be reflexive enough to identify our own 
partiality. 
Page 74 of 400 
Individuals such as for example, Non Executive Directors, operating within similar 
boundaries of context may possess similar views of reality (Guba and Lincoln, 
1994). We can reasonably assume this because much of the previous research in this 
area has examined the Non Executive Directors' demographics and shows clearly 
that most come from similar backgrounds, have similar levels of education and are 
of a similar age. However, it may be necessary to interpret the words of 
respondents, to develop and conceptualise their meanings, to provide a broader and 
more generalisable theory. Diesing (1971) writes; "actual scientific knowledge is in 
large part an invention or development rather than an imitation; concepts hypotheses 
and theories are not found ready-made in reality and must be constructed". With 
this in mind it is true to say that the researcher's own ideas, own truth, will 
undoubtedly `contaminate' the data. 
3.2.2 Epistemology - the Truth is Out There? 
Epistemology has broad implications in terms of the selection of a research 
methodology; of concern is the seeming lack of connection between usefulness and 
validity. The main reason for this concern stems from an over-reliance on research 
methods that place accuracy, in the sense of replicability, above all else. Such 
positivistic approaches generally employ statistical surveys of large groups. Whilst 
this type of research may lead to a greater likelihood of duplication much of the rich 
context of a phenomenon may be lost without trace. The researcher's aim in this 
project is to provide a rich understanding of those Non Executives who take part in 
the study. It is not necessarily the study's aim to produce a theory that can be widely 
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generalised. In the governance and boardroom literature Pettigrew argues again and 
again for descriptive empirically-based research into boardroom roles (Pettigrew, 
1992; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Starkey, 2001). Researchers, anxious to bring 
practicality to organisational research, are increasingly voicing this theme. 
However, the problem for many academics appears to have been a lack of access to 
the phenomenon, leading to an enforced "hands off" approach and a dependence on 
positivistic research methods. Through a great deal of effort, this challenge has been 
largely overcome in this project. 
The next section will briefly address the perspective of the researcher in order to 
give a clearer understanding of what motivated this research. 
3.2.3 Who Am I? 
The process of carrying out an interpretive study is highly personal, particularly for 
the constructivist researcher. Although the author has tried her very best to remain 
an objective observer of the world of the corporate board, it is only human to 
develop ones own opinions. To separate these opinions entirely from the research at 
hand might not only lead to a bland one dimensional study, but would also work 
against the constructivist philosophy that all things of themselves are subjectively 
viewed by the observer. In light of this it is important for the reader to understand 
from whence this research came and what drove "me" the author to try to understand 
the issues contained within this thesis. 
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During the night of December the 3rd 1984, in a part of India then little known to the 
western world. A chemical plant leaked forty metric tons of methyl isocyanate into 
the heart of the city of Bhopal, killing at least 15,000 people and maiming as many 
as 600,000 more. 
The chemical plant belonged to Union Carbide a huge chemical conglomerate, who 
had moved the production of certain hazardous chemicals to India in order to avoid 
American regulatory pressures. The company has always denied responsibility for 
the accident, despite warnings years earlier that such an accident was almost 
inevitable, Union Carbide has always claimed that a single employee sabotaged the 
plant. 
In the ensuing aftermath, Union Carbide refused for some days to inform local 
hospitals of what chemicals they were dealing with, for fear of revealing industrial 
secrets. As a result, many individuals were left without proper treatment. Attempts 
were made to bring members of the Union Carbide board of Directors to account by 
the Indian Government, but after pressure from the Americans and internal fears 
about loosing foreign investment these attempts were stalled. 
I was just 15 years old when these events began to unfold in India, living in rural 
England they completely passed me by. However years later I was asked to do some 
research into Union Carbide and was profoundly moved by what I discovered. From 
this small beginning my interests grew into a desire to understand how it might be 
possible to effect the behaviour of these corporate giants and in particular how those 
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who sit at the apex of the firm might be guided towards more ethical and responsible 
decision making. 
3.3 The Choice of Approach 
This section will now address the broad range of philosophical approaches in order 
to explain why the constructivist's view is considered most applicable to the 
research in question. 
3.3.1 Positivism 
Positivists take the position that society exists in a regular and scientifically 
observable state, that the researcher should be in control, and totally objective. This 
style of research tends to be quantitative in nature and is characterised by 
generalisability. Methods of data collection in positivist research tend to include 
experimental design and surveys. As a consequence positivism also gives less 
attention to context than qualitative research does (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). A 
positivist methodology will provide greatest insights where theory development is 
already well advanced, but only limited insights during the early stages of the 
understanding/theory development life cycle (Blaikie 1993). The phenomenon in 
this study, the individual Non Executive Director, has undergone little academic 
research. There is currently little or no theory in the subject area (McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999). It is argued by Mintzberg (1979) that quantitative research is not 
an appropriate method for theory building because "Creative insight seems to 
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require the sense of things - how they feel, how they smell". The use of a 
positivistic approach is therefore rejected. 
3.3.2 Realism 
Realism is a relatively modern philosophical perspective, with its own ontology and 
epistemology. For example Bhaskar's formative work on realism (1978: 250) 
suggests "things exist and act independently of our descriptions, but we can only 
know them under particular descriptions". This might be contrasted with the 
positivist view of science, which is seen as a systematic attempt to express in 
thought, the structures and ways of acting of things that exist independently of 
thought (Bhaskar 1978). Realists in general favour the interpretive school over 
positivism, but without totally rejecting the possibility of gaining some insight from 
a partially quantitative approach. They believe that there are fundamental 
differences between natural and social phenomena (Blaikie, 1993). They do, 
however, criticise positivism for not adequately explaining the linkages between 
things, as it fails to allow for context. The realist philosophy was rejected in this 
study because it does not adequately fit with the posed research question; realists see 
objectivity as a key characteristic of their epistemology (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Realism fails to recognise the socially constructed nature of reality (Schwandt, 
1997); this research will examine the roles of individual Non Executive Directors. It 
is argued that individuals bring with them their own interpretation of reality that is 
innately a subjective version of truth. 
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3.3.3 Interpretive Inquiry 
Interpretive inquiry is an alternative to the styles espoused above. By using the 
interpretive approach, meaning is developed through interpretation of the actor's 
complex processes of social interaction. The approach has two main philosophical 
perspectives constructivism and interpretivism, both of these approaches have at 
their heart the desire to understand "the complex world of lived experience from the 
perspective of those who live it" (Schwandt, 1994: 118). Their understanding of 
reality is similar but subtly different in one important way; the interpretivist believes 
that through their construction of the subjective world they can then seek objectivity 
(Schwandt, 1994). The researcher's own views differ from this perspective in that, 
even when knowledge gained from the subjective perceptions of the actor has been 
constructed by the researcher, it still remains only the researcher's personal 
subjective interpretation of the world view of the actor, in this case the Non 
Executive Director. This personal perspective is in line with that of the 
constructivist who believes that all world views are subjective (Goodman and Elgin, 
1988). 
3.3.4 The Constructivist Ontology 
In contrast to the realist's and the positivist's view of reality the constructivist argues 
that what we view as objective knowledge and truth, is merely the result of 
perspective; reality is a subjective construct "emphasising the instrumental and 
practical function" of knowing (Schwandt, 1994: 125). Constructivists believe that 
realities are multiple intangible mental constructs; they argue that elements of reality 
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may be shared amongst groups and even across cultures (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). 
Reality is viewed as subjectively interpreted by the individual or group (Schwandt, 
1994). 
In terms of the aims of this research, constructivism is useful because it accepts the 
importance and uniqueness of the individual's perceptions of reality. The aim of 
this research is to explore the role and contribution of Non Executive Directors from 
their own perspective. Constructivism would suggest that the Non Executives' 
perception of the reality of the role they perform will most likely differ from the 
reality of the role from the perspective of their CEO for example. In this way all 
reality is viewed as subjectively constructed. The constructivist also believes that 
those within a group or culture may have developed similar world views, therefore 
Non Executives in general may, using the constructivist philosophy, have similar 
understandings of what it is to be a Non Executive Director. 
It is this researcher's belief that the knowledge of reality obtained by the study will 
be dependent on the choice of actors. Those who simply observe the role may view 
the role differently from those who actually perform it (Blaikie, 1993). Therefore, it 
is essential to view the role of the Non Executives from their own subjective 
perception of reality. This research will address a gap in empirical research by 
focusing on Non Executive Directors within the corporate board; the research will 
explore their subjective perceptions of their role, the need to balance divergent 
constituents and their role in corporate responsibility practices within a rich context. 
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3.4 Research Methodology 
3.4.1 Philosophical Influences on Methodological Choices 
There is a broad spectrum of methodological approaches for management research 
from scientific and objective (positivist) through to the subjective (interpretive) 
(Bryman, 1988). The importance of these when exploring social issues rests on two 
concerns: firstly, the researcher's own view of reality and how that might impact on 
the phenomenon under investigation; secondly, the type of data and information, its 
sources and the means by which it is to be analysed (Gill and Johnson 1991). These 
provide the differentiation between quantitative and qualitative approaches. 
3.4.2 Methodology and Research Design 
The rejection of both the realist and the positivist paradigms in favour of 
constructivist ontology has implications for the choice of research methodology. 
The methodology must be able to capture the subjective perceptions of the 
individual Non Executive Director. Blaikie (1993) suggests that it is possible to 
construct theory using the language of those being studied, describing their activities 
and meanings and then developing categories and concepts, at last developing ideas 
through the induction of data. 
The constructivist believes that to understand meaning one must first interpret it 
(Schwandt, 1994). Interpretive research attempts to interpret and explore whilst in 
the process of developing theories. Methods of interpretation are qualitative and 
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tend to include participant observation, open or unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews. Such methods can be especially effective where existing theory is weak 
(Eisenhardt 1989), as is the case with the phenomenon under investigation. In 
choosing an appropriate research method, Blaikie (1993) writes that the key issue is 
how the question(s) can be answered. The, choice of methodology should therefore 
depend on the nature of the research enquiry. 
3.4.3 How to Answer the Question 
Many authors have argued that taking account of context is of primary importance 
when researching the behaviour of corporate boards (Pettigrew, 1992; Korac 
Kakabadse et al. 2001). However boardroom research has tended previously to be 
highly positivistic, examining such things as the statistical demographics of 
boardroom members. Positivistic methodologies provide greatest insights where 
theory development is already well advanced, but only limited insights during the 
early stages of the theory development life cycle (Blaikie 1993). 
A serious consequence of the positivists approach is an inability to account for the 
context in which a phenomenon exists (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). Mintzberg (1979) 
argues that quantitative research is not an appropriate method for theory building. 
He believes that "creative insight" requires a more in-depth descriptive approach. 
For these reasons an interpretive approach to the methodology using qualitative data 
gathered from individual Non Executive Directors will best fulfill the aims of this 
project, and fit with the researcher's own philosophical standpoint. 
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3.4.5 Data Collection 
This research explores Non Executive Directors' subjective perception of their 
individual role and contribution. In order to implement this, three types of data 
collection were apparent. The first, participant observation, would involve spending 
time at board meetings with the relevant Non-Executive Director. This approach 
was discounted as it became clear that appropriate access would not be granted in 
almost all instances. 
Focus group interviews were also considered. However, these posed two problems: 
firstly organising a group of Non Executive Directors to congregate together would 
be problematic, as they are busy people and were identified as having limited 
discretionary time. Secondly, research suggests that personal and sensitive 
information is unlikely to be gained from this type of examination (Kaplowitz, 
2000). 
The aim of this research is to explore the role and contribution of the individual Non 
Executive Director. As so little is known about the actual operations of the 
individuals in question, it was considered to be most appropriate to use an in-depth 
interview technique; gently leading individual subjects through a conversation whilst 
also allowing the Non Executive Directors to take an active part in uncovering the 
phenomenon. This type of inductive approach can be difficult for an inexperienced 
researcher (Miles and Huberman, 1992). Time can be spent wading through months 
of interviews only to discover a few "banalities". However, such methods are 
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considered to be highly appropriate when uncovering under-studied and complex 
phenomenon (Miles and Huberman, 1992). The rewards of using an inductive 
approach seemed worth the risk. 
To ensure the value of the data collection method, in-depth interviews were first 
used during the pilot phase of the research and were found to unearth relevant data. 
It was therefore decided to continue with this technique for the main study. Previous 
studies have found that individual in-depth interview participants "are significantly 
more likely to raise sensitive discussion topics than focus group participants" 
(Kaplowitz, 2000: 429), this technique is therefore ideal for uncovering previously 
unidentified issues of a sensitive nature. Additionally, individual interviews position 
participants so that they are "forced" to explain themselves (Kaplowitz, 2000) and 
this, according to Agar and MacDonald (1995), leads to sharing and elaboration, and 
sometimes generates intimate information. Kaplowitz (2000: 421) defines this type 
of data "as utterances that specifically concern difficulties in and between 
communities and community members" In the case of this research, communities 
are the network of boards with which the individual Non Executive is involved. 
In-depth interviews were also considered most useful for this research because they 
provide "thick descriptions". Thompson (2001: 70) argues that "Understanding 
meaning requires context; thick description provides that context". "Thick 
description", according to Geertz (1973) is a way to discover and reveal the depth of 
meaning that individuals inscribe in their language and actions. Geertz does not 
define "thick description" but demonstrates what he means by describing the 
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difference to an observer between a wink and a blink, the observer must use her 
understanding of the context in which the action took place to understand the action. 
Denzin (1989: 33) goes further and characterises "thick descriptions" in four ways; 
1. It gives context to an act, 
2. It states the intentions and meanings that organise the action, 
3. It traces the evolution and development of the act, 
4. It presents the action as a text that can be interpreted. 
In-depth interviews enable the researcher to collect "thick descriptions" from one 
interviewee at a time. The researcher then compares each interview with other 
interviews to determine similarities and differences between the different instances. 
The researcher keeps adding instances until saturation is attained. Saturation is 
reached when the researcher stops learning new things about the phenomenon and 
recently collected data appear repetitious or redundant (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
3.4.6 Research Boundaries 
A problem facing the researcher when using qualitative research is the often 
staggering volumes of data (Eisenhardt, 1989; Pettigrew, 1988). The volume of data 
is all the more daunting because the research problem being addressed is often open 
ended (Eisenhardt 1989). Figure 3.2 depicts the phenomenological research 
boundaries for this research; they are intentionally wide to allow the deep and broad 
context of the individual Non Executive Director to be articulated. By presenting 
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the bounded nature of the phenomenon at the outset it is hoped that data overload 
can at least be managed, if not completely averted. 
Figure 3.2: The bounded Context of the Non Executive Director 
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This research aims to explore subjective perceptions of individual Non Executive 
Directors focusing on their ability to balance divergent constituencies whilst 
contributing to corporate responsibility practices within the corporate board. The 
unit of analysis is therefore the individual Non Executive Director. The level of 
analysis is the board of directors focusing on the Non Executive Director and the 
context of the study is their role as boundary spanners in balancing divergent 
constituents and corporate responsibility practices within the corporate board. 
3.5 Research Design 
This research consisted of three stages. Firstly, a review was undertaken of the 
relevant literatures as described in chapter two of this thesis. This guided and 
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informed stage two, a pilot study of eight Non Executive Directors and six expert 
witnesses. This is discussed next, followed by detailed information about the 
operationalisation of the data collection and analysis. Figure 3.3 shows the 
methodological map that has been used to guide this research: 
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Figure 3.3: Methodology Road Map 
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3.5.1 The Pilot Study: Research Phase Two 
Data for the pilot study were gathered through in-depth interviews and archival data 
regarding the individuals and their organisations. The Institute of Directors were 
very helpful in providing a list of possible candidates for interview along with their 
postal and e-mail addresses, the researcher also utilised her own contacts and those 
of Cranfield School of Management and WP Carey School of Business to gain 
access to potential interviewees. Interview candidates were approached most 
successfully via email using the name of a mutual contact to enhance the legitimacy 
of the request; most of those who were contacted in this manner later took part in the 
study. 
The social standing of the main actors in this study made it imperative that the 
researcher be well-informed before entering the field. If the researcher had been 
perceived as naive or ill-informed it may have affected her ability to gain further 
interviews. Therefore the data from expert witnesses were used to inform the 
researcher prior to embarking on the main pilot study. 
The purpose of the pilot study was to insure the appropriateness of the methods and 
the viability of the research question (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This initial 
exploratory study aided the researcher in her understanding of the phenomenon. The 
learning from the pilot phase guided the third phase of the research. Phases two and 
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three both adopted an exploratory interpretive approach based on in-depth 
interviews with individual Non Executive Directors. 
At the outset of this project there was little qualitative empirical research examining 
the operational role and contribution of the Non Executive Director. Key themes 
were developed to aid the conversations with the interviewees. Interviewees were 
almost unanimous in their generosity of time, some giving as much as three hours to 
the project. The original themes are documented in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1: Exploratory Pilot Study Themes 
" The contribution of Non Executive Director's role, impact, interests. 
0 Corporate social responsibility in the boardroom. 
9 The decision making process. 
0 Corporate reputation: the role and contribution of the board. 
0 Capabilities of Non Executive Directors, skills, personal reputation and reputation 
by association. 
0 The impact of corporate constituents. 
" Non Executive Director expertise and external experiences. 
0 The contribution of senior managers, role, impact and relationship with the board. 
" Boardroom contexts. 
" Enhancing boardroom performance in the future. 
Questions were posed regarding the Non Executives' perceptions, in line with the 
themes displayed in table 3.1. However, given the exploratory nature of the pilot 
study, each interviewee was allowed to develop the conversation in relation to 
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individual interests and concerns. The researcher simply brought the questioning 
back into line whenever it became appropriate to do so. As the interviews 
progressed it became clear that some areas were producing more fruitful data and 
were easier for the interviewees to discuss than others. Interviewees were extremely 
candid and went into a great deal of detail about their own experiences and 
relationships. The study participants provided vivid and often surprising insights 
into life in the boardroom. Protecting their confidentiality has become critical to the 
success of this project. By allowing the interviewees to develop the conversation in 
this way, the researcher found that individuals became much more animated and 
open and almost certainly more willing to divulge information, which a more 
regimented technique could not have achieved. 
3.5.1a Pilot Study Analysis 
After each of the pilot study interviews was completed, the data were transcribed in 
full and placed into NVivo for further analysis. Each data set was then analysed 
individually and key themes were produced manually. Data sets were then 
amalgamated into tables so that themes could be analysed across cases. Appendix I 
at the end of this thesis illustrates the use of these tables. An asterisk was marked 
next to each theme that the individual expressed as important, and either two or three 
asterisks, depending on how significant the individual made the theme. It should be 
noted that the theme tables in appendix I were not used as a dialogue counting 
mechanism, rather importance was assigned based on a qualitative criterion; 
Although significance was attributed where appropriate when a theme was 
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mentioned on multiple occasions, significance was also attributed when the tone and 
style of conversation led directly or indirectly to the conclusion that a theme was of 
importance. This method required that both the transcripts and the tapes of the 
original conversations be listened to on several occasions by the researcher in 
conjunction with the notes made at the physical meeting. Once the issues had all 
been gathered into the table it was clear that the volume of themes was going to be 
difficult to work with. Themes were therefore grouped into manageable sets. 
This type of analysis is obviously open to researcher bias. Therefore an independent 
third party also analysed one of the interviews to test the reliability of interpretation. 
The interpretation of the interview by the third party was shown to be similar to that 
of the researcher, suggesting the trustworthiness of the interpretation. The main 
findings of the pilot study are outlined below. 
3.5.1b Pilot Study Findings 
The pilot study findings have been arranged into themes to aid the reader. 
Themes Specific to the Individual 
The themes specific to the individual relate to the way each interviewee felt about 
himself or herself whilst working in the boardroom environment. Many discussed at 
great length their feelings of insecurity and lack of confidence particularly when 
faced with a group of individuals who, they felt, were somehow superior to them. 
The word "intimidation" came up on a number of occasions. As interviewee 4 put 
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it, referring to the relationship that the directors had with the CEO, "I couldn't 
believe how silently everybody sat.... you wouldn't have dared speak out and I think 
all of us were terrified of him". This was particularly interesting, as most of the 
interviewees had spent their entire careers as leaders and people of prominence. The 
study participants also felt particularly strongly about the issue of training. There 
was a clear lack of role understanding; they all felt that they needed more training 
particularly in terms of an understanding of the financial aspects of the organisation 
and its general operations. 
Themes that Relate to the Individuals' Context 
This theme revolves around the actual technicalities of meetings and how this 
affected the role and contribution of the study participants. There was debate among 
interviewees about the use of informal sessions and how this affects the board 
overall. Some felt that the use of informal meetings was derisive and made the CEO 
feel extremely uncomfortable, particularly if such meetings were not planned. This, 
in turn, they felt could lead to poor or short-term performance within the 
organisation. The CEO would be more likely to seek short-term profits to protect 
his job, rather than looking at the long-term stability of the organisation. They 
talked a lot about the importance of a "safe haven" where the CEO could enter into 
long-term decisions without the ever-looming threat of the City hanging over him. 
Other issues related to the use of agendas to control debate and the common use of 
financial language in the boardroom. 
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Information Flow 
This theme centred on the flow of information both to and from the subjects. Many 
talked about their surprise at not to be asked to make a contribution when issues 
were discussed on which they might widely be considered to be an expert. Some 
were too intimidated to intervene. The flow of information to the interviewees was 
also highlighted, some talked about reluctance within the executive to provide wider 
access to the organisation. 
Unity 
An interesting finding was the role of the Executives other than the CEO. Some of 
the Non Executive Directors expressed the view that they had sometimes been 
suspicious that the CFO (for example) might have a different opinion on a given 
subject from the CEO. However, the pressure to have unity would, it was felt, 
always have prevented the CFO from speaking out. When asked if they would 
speak to the CFO outside the boardroom, most felt that the CEO would be very 
unhappy about this, although some felt that it was a matter that they might bring up 
with the Chairman; many were obviously intimidated at the prospect. Others 
discussed their understanding that it was taboo for them to speak to Executives 
because of the discomfort this appeared to create for the CEO who seemed to feel 
very threatened at the prospect. 
Meeting Style 
The effect of the Chairman and CEO came up during the interviews time and time 
again; many seemed to be intimidated by the CEO, particularly if the Chairman were 
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seen to be very "hands on". Many described situations where the Chairman and 
CEO formed a "double act", controlling the board rather than seeking advice from it. 
They fairly unanimously were of the opinion that the Chairman should run the board 
and the CEO the company, but described a number of situations where this did not 
happen and the Chairman was effectively trying to run the company. This type of 
behaviour had a major effect on the team dynamic. A factor that came through very 
clearly was the importance, particularly to the Chairman and CEO, of having 
consensus; a number of interviewees commented on the desire to avoid any kind of 
split in the board. 
Themes that are influenced by role expectations 
Many of the issues in this section focused around an apparent lack of understanding 
about an individual's role. A number of Non Executive Directors talked about not 
really understanding their role, and receiving little or no guidance from the 
company. They talked about their past work experience and how they felt that the 
companies had failed to utilise them in any meaningful way. 
How I Feel About the Job? 
An overriding factor in this whole set of interviews has been intimidation. 
Interviewees described situations where they did not act because they felt too 
intimidated, generally because they felt they lacked the necessary skills or because 
the CEO or Chairman was putting the argument forcefully. This kind of scenario 
was sometimes averted when one Non Executive Director had taken the lead on an 
issue because of a strong understanding of a particular area. This in turn had made it 
much easier for others to speak out. One caution here was that, sometimes, such an 
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individual would try to dominate proceedings with their own agenda. Some 
interviewees described how the nuances of behaviour from others within the board 
could affect both the desire and also ability of individuals to fulfil their role and 
provide that extra "ten percent" which makes the difference between an average 
board and a really powerful one. 
How I Do the Job? 
For many of the individuals who took part in the pilot study, the complexity of the 
organisations in which they operated was immense. The different ways in which 
they handled this were very interesting. Some worked on the basis of the smallest 
common denominator. For example, one individual tended to use their mother as an 
example when talking about the effect of an international telecommunications 
company on its customers. Most agreed that having direct knowledge of a specific 
industry was not as important for a Non Executive Director as having experience of 
working at that level. In fact many argued that it was their ability to bring their 
experience from elsewhere that made them useful. 
For many there was concern about where they should go for guidance. There is no 
professional body for Non Executive Directors. The Institute of Directors is seen as 
being there for the executive board. Many felt that they had no one to turn to when 
it came to difficult dilemmas. Interviewees said they hoped that they would be able 
to obtain guidance from other members of the board, and use them as sounding- 
boards when they felt unhappy about something. However, upon closer examination, 
when talking about instances of actual behaviour on a number of boards, it became 
clear that the reality was that off-the-record conversations and telephone calls were 
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not really encouraged by CEO's or Chairmen. A number spoke of situations where 
another board member who had had a previous experience of a particular issue had 
spoken out. The third party's ability to speak out gave others the confidence to then 
enter the debate. This type of boundary spanning appears to be highly effective in 
that not only are new skills brought to the initial host board, it would also appear 
that when Non Executive Directors witness a useful strategy on one board they are 
likely to transfer it to other boards within their network. 
Risk and Reputation 
At the beginning of this project, the researcher set out as one of the goals of this 
project, a better understanding of the role of the Non Executive Director in terms of 
corporate social responsibility. The findings so far suggest that Non Executive 
Directors do not appear to become involved in CSR unless they have a deeper 
understanding or prior experience. Instead, most boards are moving towards a 
committee structure for dealing with these issues. Most of these committees are still 
in the formative stages and it is not yet clear how they will report back to the board. 
Two Non Executive Directors recounted stories of their boards finalising major 
strategic plans without making any enquiries about the effect on the workforce until 
the very last minute - almost it would appear, as an afterthought! Others described 
the weighting of decisions being in favour of the financial aspects rather than the 
"softer" people aspects of the decision. 
In general there was agreement that CSR was a difficult term for boards to deal with, 
that it had connotations of "giving money away". Instead, interviewees often talked 
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of the need for a business case and the importance of a meaningful return on any 
`investment'. The term `risk and reputation' they generally felt provided a better 
basis for them to make decisions and was more palatable to their most important 
constituent - the shareholder. This cost benefit approach appears to fulfil an 
important criterion for success, in that it does not (or should not) lead to the long- 
term dilution of profits, which after all is the raison d'etre of most organisations. 
Furthermore, there is a suggestion that some projects which, if they were not thought 
of in terms of risk and reputation, would not receive the same degree of backing. 
3.5.1c Summary and Implications of the Pilot Study Findings 
The analysis of the pilot study findings had three purposes: to identify what issues 
were of relevance to the study, to link those findings back to previous literature, and 
to guide the issues to be developed during the main study. 
One important issue, which emerged from the pilot study, was the relevance of role 
theory to the behaviour of individuals within'the boardroom. The literature suggests 
that Non Executive Directors work as boundary spanners between the organisation 
and the outside world (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992), and this is confirmed by the pilot 
study findings. However, their ability to use this role effectively for the good of the 
organisation appears to be influenced by the nuances of the boardroom environment 
on a number of levels. This is exemplified in the pilot study by instances such as: 
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" Individuals appearing uncomfortable about voicing opinions on issues about 
which the wider world would consider them to be experts. 
9 Apparent lack of trust between different , 
`factions' on the board. For 
example, Non Executives not trusting what they are being told by the 
Executive Directors and CEO's feeling the need to control conversations 
between Non Executive Directors. 
" Non Executive Directors feeling intimidated into silence by those around 
them. 
" Non Executive Directors failing to understand what is required of them. 
The literature identifies problems for boundary spanners in terms of their role 
(Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000) but this has not previously 
been applied to Non Executive Director roles. Theory in this area suggests that if an 
individual's role is not clearly defined role, conflict may occur leading to distress for 
the individual, avoidance tactics, lying, organisational exit and the withholding of 
information (Floyd and Lane, 2000). The pilot study suggests that many Non 
Executive Directors do not receive any kind of job description or training, yet both 
the pilot study and the literature suggest that they are expected to adapt very quickly 
to the boardroom environment (Kakabadse et al. 2001). As most of the individuals 
who were interviewed held multiple board positions, some were able to contrast 
boards, which offered guidance with those that did not. These individuals were in 
agreement that the boards that identified their roles explicitly were, in their opinion, 
more effective than those that did not. 
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3.5.1d Learning from the Pilot Study 
Types of Data Collection 
In the pilot phase of this research much attention was paid to gathering data 
regarding the organisations in which the Non Executive Director worked, 
particularly the board, that the researcher had assumed would be discussed during 
the interview. It quickly became apparent that it was difficult for the Non Executive 
to talk in terms of a single board. The study participants often worked on as many 
as seven boards at any one time and they generally wanted to talk about all of them, 
plus historical information about previous board experiences. Given that the aim of 
this research was to uncover the `world view' of the individual Non Executive 
Director from inside the role, the decision was made not to include information from 
outside sources in phase three of the project. Instead, the final stage of the research 
has concentrated on understanding the role of the Non Executive from their 
individual perspective. Instead of gathering data regarding the Non Executives' 
various boards, prior to each interview a dossier regarding the individual was 
compiled, so that the researcher could be well-informed and conduct the interviews 
in a conversational manner, thereby putting the study participants at their ease and 
creating a safe environment in which they could speak freely. 
Data Analysis 
Initially the researcher used NVivo for data analysis purposes. However, it became 
apparent that much of the intuition, which is associated with this type of research, 
became blurred. Words lost their potency and took on false meanings, theories 
became overly complex and individual case studies became intermingled in the 
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researcher's own thought process. After some weeks of working with this package 
the decision was made to return to a manual method of analysis, allowing the words 
to speak for themselves (Miles and Huberman, 1992). This involved bringing 
together concepts and themes using post-it notes, which now line the researcher's 
walls. This method has proved to be much more satisfactory and effective. NVivo 
was used in phase three, but more as a storage tool for quick access to data and to 
confirm the manual analysis. In the final stages of stage three the researcher 
designed her own computerised database; this allowed data to be viewed more 
quickly and effectively both within and across instances. 
3.5.2 Operationalising the Research: Research Phase Three 
3.5.2a The Study Participants 
This study of the role and contribution of the Non Executive director utilised study 
participants residing in both the USA and the UK, all of who held Non Executive 
positions in one or more organisation. Although resident in these two countries, 
many held or had previously held positions in boards in other countries also, 
including Australia, Canada, France and South Africa. In addition, a number of 
study participants held positions on the boards of organisations, which might well be 
categorised as global business concerns. 
It should be noted that some fundamental differences exist between the governance 
systems in the UK and USA, the most important of which is the difference in their 
legal standing. In the UK the corporate governance system consists of a set of 
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principals laid out in the Combined Code; this is a voluntary set of guide lines for 
corporations to interpret as they choose (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). In contrast 
the USA has a system of regulations which are contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(Keenan, 2004). 
The major procedural difference between UK and US boards is the combined role of 
the CEO and Chairman. This is still commonplace in the USA where 75% of 
companies still combine these two roles into one individual (Keenan, 2004). In 
contrast the combined role is now somewhat unusual in the UK, where most 
Chairmen are part-time members of the board. All the Non Executives from the 
American sample had experienced both the combined role of CEO and Chairman 
and also organisations in which the roles were separated, as had many of the study 
participants from the UK sample. 
3.5.2b The Selection of New Study Participants 
As with the pilot study interviewees were sourced through the Institute of Directors, 
Cranfield School of Management, WP Carey College of Business and the 
researchers own network contacts. However as a research project matures and 
evolves, the selection of additional instances should be influenced by the 
researcher's growing understanding of the phenomenon under investigation (Ragin, 
1998). Questions and issues that arose during earlier stages of the research should 
therefore determine the selection of new participants. During the pilot study phase 
of this project, a theoretical sample was used, based on the need to investigate a 
4 
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broad sample of Non Executives. This method was used in order to gain 
understanding of the underlying issues facing the Non Executive. The data collected 
during the pilot study were then used to develop appropriate themes. The pilot study 
findings suggest that the role of the Non Executive Director is fundamentally 
different within small organisations and start-up ventures, when compared with large 
established organisations. Therefore, during the main phase of the study a reframed 
theoretical sample was used focusing the research on Non Executives from large 
complex organisations. 
3.5.2c Study Size 
The number of study participants necessary to ensure the usefulness of a research 
project is complex. Some very well known studies have very successfully been 
based on a very small number of study participants, for example Mintzberg's (1973) 
study of managers was based on just five individuals. As a general rule in 
qualitative research, instances should continue to be added until saturation is 
reached. This is the point at which new data produce little or no new insight into the 
phenomenon (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
This approach was considered to be most appropriate for the research because by 
studying several `instances' of the same thing, different characteristics may become 
more visible within different instances. By exploring multiple instances of the same 
thing it is possible to deepen and enrich a representation (Ragin 1998). In this 
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research, instances refer to the subjective perception of individual Non Executive 
Directors concerning their role and contribution within corporate boards. Following 
the pilot study it was clear that although boards themselves were often very 
different, the perceptions of the Non Executives were quite similar. Further instances 
were added to understand the complex influence of context on the Non Executives' 
perceptions. As a result, a total of 25 interviews with individual Non Executive 
Directors were used to inform the main stage of the research. 
3.5.2d The Interviews 
The in-depth interviews were held in the Non Executives' own offices or in their 
homes. This provided both comfort for the study participant and also allowed the 
researcher to study the actor within his own environment, which provided added 
insight into their personalities and status. Two individuals preferred to meet over 
dinner in a restaurant and one at his club. 
In all cases the study participant was placed in control of where and when the 
interview should take place. Access to the study participants was often difficult to 
obtain; meetings were sometimes booked months in advance and frequently had to 
be rescheduled. However, once the interview was underway, the participants often 
wanted to continue the conversation long after the allotted time was over. The 
participants frequently mentioned their interest in the topic and their surprise at 
never having previously put into words their own perceptions of the role. One 
interviewee insisted on three separate meetings before he felt sure that he had 
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adequately provided his views. The length of interviews varied from one to three 
hours in duration, all the interviews were taped and then transcribed following the 
encounter. 
3.5.2e Analysing the Data 
A problem found all too often in academic research, is the perceived gap between 
the researcher's description of data collection and the conclusions finally drawn 
from the project. According to Eisenhardt (1989) the process of analysing data is at 
the heart of theory building, and yet it is both the most difficult and least codified. 
As Miles and Huberman (1984: 16) put it so eloquently; "one cannot ordinarily 
follow how the researcher got from 3600 pages of field notes to the final 
conclusions, sprinkled with vivid quotes though they may be". In order to overcome 
this problem the researcher has kept notes, following the development of the project. 
These outline early insights, observations and problems, and how these were 
managed (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
As the data from each interview were collected, it was transcribed in full and then 
systematically coded by the researcher using both manual and computer assisted 
methods. NVivo was used as a method to retrieve information quickly. In addition, 
as the project progressed, the researcher also developed a separate computer analysis 
system, which allowed her to examine emergent themes and theoretical categories 
more successfully. As more interviews were added the researcher spent many hours 
reflecting and reviewing the contents of each interview, an important part of the 
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analysis process was reviewing the actual words of the interviewees, this process 
became more and more important as the research process progressed. Table 3.2 
outlines the inductive process that was used to analyse the data: 
Table 3.2: Coding process through inductive analysis 
Process Operationalisation 
Initial read through of text data Each interview transcript. 
Identify specific segments of 
Within each transcript themes emerging from the data 
information using NVivo to manage the data. 
Label the segments of information to 
Create categories from the emerging themes, with a 
create categories qualitative 
description of each category. 
Reduce overlap and redundancy 
Look manually across interviews and compare 
among the categories categories 
for duplication of meaning. 
Qualitative step wise analysis 
Categories are examined side by side to ascertain 
patterns within and between the instances. 
Create a model incorporating most 
Overarching categories that describe the Non Executive 
' important categories 
Director s role and feedback to existing theory and 
literature. 
Source: Based on Creswell (2002) 
The researcher continued to add new interviews to the study until it was clear that no 
substantially new evidence was forthcoming. Once this saturation point was reached, 
the themes developed across instances were then analysed using a qualitative step- 
wise approach to develop overarching themes. A step-wise approach can be used 
for two purposes: to aid classification of data, and for data discrimination. The 
objective of the approach is to differentiate amongst instances (Individual Non 
Executives' subjective perceptions) within overarching categories that emerge from 
the data. Operationally for this study, inductive analysis involved looking across the 
themes generated in the first part of the analysis, in order to categorise and possibly 
distinguish instances that did not readily fit into the identified pattern, thus creating 
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new categories. For example, the pilot study suggested that some Non Executives 
experience role conflict whilst others do not. By using a qualitative step-wise 
approach, it was possible to discern categories that were commonly held or 
experienced (e. g. role conflict) from categories that were not, thereby creating sub 
categories, which were then be used to construct a tentative model. As the themes 
were categorised a third party was asked to also sift through the emerging themes 
and suggest their notion of categories for the data. This was then compared by the 
researcher to her own classification of emerging themes in this way the risk of 
excessive researcher bias may have been somewhat reduced. 
The final stage of the project was to write up the findings of the research. Iterations 
of the findings had been evolved over the course of the study often meta-morphing 
in rows of connecting post-it-notes around the researchers office and home. The 
final act was to bring all of this together into an interpretation of the Non Executive 
Directors' own subjective perceptions of their role, relating the emergent themes 
back to existent literature and arguing the case for the tentative model. The rest of 
this thesis will examine the findings of the study. 
3.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has described the research methodology and the philosophical 
perspective that underlies this thesis. The findings of the pilot study have been 
exhibited along with the effect of the pilot study on the methodological choice going 
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forward into the main study. The next chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the 
results of the research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: ANALYSIS 
4.0.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an analysis of how Non Executive Directors perceive their role 
and contribution within the boardroom team. The analysis draws upon the Non 
Executive Directors' own words from individual interviews to highlight and explore 
specific instances. Their perceptions of their roles are analysed by interpreting their 
personal and subjective meanings and the implications of these within their Non 
Executive Director roles. 
In light of the interpretive approach that has been adopted in this research, it should 
be noted that in all probability analysis of the accounts of the Non Executive 
Directors convey some bias towards the researcher's own experience and 
understanding of the reality of any given situation. Additionally an interpretive 
approach does not treat the Non Executives' perceptions as something that could or 
should be measured in an exact way, but should instead be explored through detailed 
analysis of accounts from individual Non Executive Directors of their own 
understanding of their role. The organisation of this chapter is illustrated in figure 
4.1 below. 
Page 110 of 400 
Figure 4.1: Outline Chapter 4 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
In order to gauge the Non Executive's ability to contribute to Boardroom 
proceedings, the first section of this chapter examines the Non Executive Directors' 
role expectations through an exploration of the formal and informal interactions that 
constitute the Non Executives' actual experience of their role, within the overall 
boardroom role set. 
Building on section one, the second section of this chapter aims to provide an 
understanding of the Non Executive Director's relationship with the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO) and Chairman. The analysis examines how the roles of the CEO and 
Chairman were perceived by the Non Executive Directors to affect their own ability 
to contribute to boardroom events. 
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Section three draws on the analysis presented in the first two sections and is 
concerned with the Non Executive Directors' expectations of their roles, alongside 
emergent themes pertaining to the Non Executives' perceptions of their actual 
experience. Throughout, the analysis endeavours to draw out the implications of any 
perceived gap, between the Non Executive Directors' role expectations and their 
actual experience, in order to facilitate a better understanding of their actual 
behaviour in the boardroom, and its impact on their ability to influence boardroom 
events. Each section is followed by a summary of the central emergent sub themes. 
4.1 Section One: Role Set Interactions 
The Non Executive Directors who took part in the study had a number of perceived 
expectations about their interaction with others within their role set. The following 
section will examine the Non Executive Directors' subjective perceptions of the 
effect of the nuances of their role set upon their ability to make a contribution. Two 
types of interaction are identified: (1) formal interaction governed by the normative 
conventions shaped by members of the role set, and (2) individual interaction based 
on relationships with and perceptions of individual members of the role set. We can 
broadly define the role set for the Non Executive Director as those individuals 
working within the boardroom. Within this set there were considered to be four 
clear subgroups. 
1. Peers (other non executives of the same rank) 
2. Executive officers 
3. CEO 
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4. Chairman 
The latter two members of the role set will be examined here as part of the role set 
and then in more detail in the next section of this chapter. This section will examine 
the Non Executives' emergent expectations of the role set, followed by the 
identification and analysis of their actual experience of the role within the set and its 
perceived effect on the Non Executives' behaviour. The structure of this section is 
shown in figure 4.2. 
Figure 4.2: Section Layout 
4. introduction 
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4.1.1 The Character of the Boardroom 
Formal interactions are classified here as those governed by the formal processes of 
the board meeting. Non Executive Directors discussed their subjective perceptions 
of their expected role within this structure. A recurring theme during the interviews 
was the Non Executive Director's belief about the unique character of each board. 
This is captured in the following response: 
They're all completely different. Every board completely different, very unique, and 
some are social, some are almost anti-social, some pure business, others less so. So 
you know the board experience. It's not as homogenous as it might appear. 
NED 1 Warren 
Despite this perception of the uniqueness of each board, the Non Executive 
Directors projected surprisingly uniform expectations of the interactions with and 
perceptions of, other members of their role set. Analysis of the research revealed 
that on some levels each board was seen as unique. However all boards are likely to 
have certain variables that make them different from all other boards, probably 
because of industry, location, size of company and, perhaps most importantly, the 
mix of individuals working in the boardroom. Despite this, it emerged from the data 
that most Non Executive Directors report the same kinds of fundamental challenges 
in terms of making a positive contribution to their boards, and also the same positive 
results from employing certain fundamental strategies for success. The Non 
Executive Directors' subjective perceptions of their relationships and interactions 
with others in the boardroom, starting with their formal interactions, will be 
discussed in detail in the subsequent pages. 
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4.1.2 Formal processes 
4.1.2a Expectation: Level of Discussion 
There was a strong belief amongst the Non Executive Directors who took part in the 
study that discussions in the boardroom should remain at a strategic level. - the 
informants broadly defined "strategic level" as including the discussion of corporate 
strategy, vision, profitability, risk and reputation. They did not perceive that it 
would be advantageous to the organisation for them to be drawn into the more 
technical (or managerial) areas of the business. They expected that it was the role of 
the Executive team and the CEO to deal with the everyday management of the 
business whilst it was their role to advise, guide and patrol management's behaviour. 
The Non Executives in turn, they believed, should be taking a more long-term 
perspective on the health of the business. The following comments highlight their 
understanding of the formal level of discussion: 
They (management) have to run the business, it's their responsibility to make the 
numbers. 
NED 17 Vicky 
You can run the risk of getting too current-event focused and that's a problem, so you 
have to balance long- and short-term. 
NED 1 Warren 
It is not the role of the NED's to run the company. That is plainly the responsibility 
of the CEO and his team. 
NED 21 Billy 
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4.1.2b Experience: Level of Discussion 
The Non Executive Directors had an expectation that Board meetings should be used 
for strategic level discussions. It was felt that straying into more technical areas was 
likely to affect the Non Executives' ability to take an overarching perspective on the 
long-term business. However, close analysis of the data revealed that many Non 
Executives felt the Executive team and CEO did not always fully understand this 
concept. The following representative views illustrate the frustration that many Non 
Executives felt: 
The sense is not well enough implanted in the minds of the Chairman and the CEO 
and some of the Executive Directors that the role of a Board is different from the 
business of running the company and it needs to be structured accordingly and the 
responsibilities need to be divided more clearly and that when you're coming to the 
Board, you're not just extending an on-going piece of business which you think you've 
already come to a conclusion over, no, this is actually a rather important hurdle to be 
confronted. You have to go back a bit to some other first bases, re-establish the 
argument and proof the argument with the Board, because if you can't prove it with 
them, you're certainly not going to be able to prove it with stakeholders more 
generally. 
NED 10 Phillip 
The technical side consumes afar too big a proportion of all board meetings... and 
too little on actually influencing the business. 
NED 4 Ray 
In contrast to the views of some Non Executive Directors, one individual made an 
interesting observation about the content of the boardroom agenda. He argued that 
there was little discussion of what was actually going on in the organisation which 
might lead to an inherent disconnect between the skills of those on the board and 
their application to the organisation: 
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Well you see there were negotiations going on and that had a lot to do with politics 
and congress. While I didn't get particularly involved they at least said I should 
comment on some of the processes. But absent from that, certainly its understandable 
boards tend not to have agendas to talk about issues of what's going on. 
NED 18 Joe 
It emerged that many Non Executives were surprised not to be asked to make a 
contribution when issues were discussed on which they might be considered to be 
experts. Some were too intimidated to intervene, others who were more confident 
(or motivated), pushed themselves forward despite not being asked. The study 
participants believed that this surprised the board, although they perceived that the 
Executive subsequently seemed pleased to receive the input. In the next excerpt one 
Non Executive describes his disappointment that his many skills had not been 
tapped into by any of the companies that he worked for: 
1 have always been disappointed that boards have not used my skills as an 
international businessperson. I am hoping that in the future when I leave my role 
here, that such opportunities will arise but they have not as yet. The problem is that 
the market is controlled by the accountants, the lawyers and a few head-hunters. If 
you are not in with these guys then you don't get asked to take on the job. 
NED 22 Harry 
Another described the experience of a colleague who, despite being hired for 
specific skills, was not made privy to what the organisation was trying to do: 
4 
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Let me just say, a former British Ambassador in ******, extremely able man, was 
hired when he retired, which is already a long time ago, by a major international 
investment bank, for his expertise. But then when senior members of the bank go off 
to that country in order to explore some of the new areas of possible investment and 
involvement, seeing all the top people, all of whom he knows personally, they don't 
actually ask him to go with them and he only discovers accidentally that they've gone. 
NED 10 Phillip 
4.1.2c Organisational Complexity 
Many of the Non Executives interviewed worked for large companies, often with a 
portfolio of businesses and thousands of employees. One Non Executive from a 
company with several million customers described her colleagues' understanding of 
the business in terms of a "patchwork quilt": 
So what you do is you created a bit of patchwork in the top left hand corner, that 
might be a licence in Italy, you then perhaps went down to Spain and jumped into bed 
with (name removed) and thought well, we'll do a deal here too, so there's lots of 
little mini deals all over the place. It was extremely difficult for other non executive 
directors to assess the strength of that business. 
NED 7 Jane 
The extreme organisational complexity which is inherent in such large businesses, 
caused some study participants to adopt personal scenarios to enhance their 
understanding of the problems facing their organisations. For example, three of the 
participants described using their parents as an example of a customer who might 
find it difficult to deal with a particular issue. Interestingly, this was particularly 
common among the female respondents in the study. The following example 
exemplifies their approach: 
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There was a tendency to look at things from individual experiences, you know, my 
granny has had a bad experience with her hip or something and therefore we 
extrapolate from that that all grannies have bad experiences with their hip. 
NED 23 Rachel 
4.1.2d The Language of the Boardroom 
A strongly emerging theme from this research was the Non Executive Directors' 
subjective perceptions of the effect of language in the boardroom. The general 
consensus was that the language used in board meetings tended to be almost entirely 
financial in nature. The study participants believed that financial language was used 
because it was viewed as a common denominator, which most Non Executives were 
expected to be able to understand and was transferable across different settings. The 
following three examples are of Non Executive Directors' own perceptions of the 
use of financial language in the boardroom: 
I am expected to understand the financials and usually end up on the finance 
committee. It is very difficult if you don't have a financial background to understand 
the working of the boardroom. It has always been skewed that way though or 
towards the lawyers, not so much marketing or logistics and interestingly that is 
where many companies fail. In fact that is where the company (I worked with) that 
went bankrupt fell down. They didn't understand the marketing logistics function. 
NED 22 Harry 
The language of the boardroom is very, very financial and because of this financial 
speak, unless they themselves had a financial background, they simply couldn't keep 
up with what was going on around them. if you haven't run a business and you don't 
have a financial background you might be at a disadvantage in a boardroom. 
NED 11 Barry 
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I do think expediency is a factor because there are certain things that boards have to 
do and financials are actually the easiest. Because there's much more of a common 
denominator with financials than there are with other things. There is always a focus 
on financials. It's a language that generally boards can communicate in almost 
without regard to what the board members' background was because chances are 
they had some financial experience before they got there. 
NED 1 Warren 
Another outcome emerging from the use of primarily financial language in the 
boardroom was its impact on discussions of "softer issues", such as for example, 
labour relations, the environment and relationships with broader constituent groups. 
Although most of those who took part in the study identified strongly with the need 
to engage with a variety of stakeholders, at the same time they found it difficult to 
think of situations where such groups had been discussed in the boardroom. 
However, many believed that such issues were now forcing their way on to the 
agenda in a way that they had not seen in their careers until quite recently. 
The thing is that language of the boardroom is basically financial and I think what we 
are seeing is that the language is having to change and although we are not familiar 
with the language, we are now moving from the financial to the language of risk, and 
therefore you can start looking at something like reputation, not in terms of ethics 
and morality which most boards can't deal with. I've never heard of a moral debate 
in the boardroom. Not once. But I've certainly heard good debates on an analysis of 
risk to perhaps an audit committee and I think quite a lot of what they need and what 
boards need today to debate, is the reputation being one of them. They can bring that 
in, under a lingua franca that is common to all of them, I mean let me take a risk to 
reputation. 
NED 7 Jane 
As was described in the previous section, many of the Non Executives discussed 
how the use of language in the boardroom was now evolving, possibly due to a more 
Page 120 of 400 
diverse role set and certainly because of the more public nature of many companies. 
`Risk and reputation', according to the Non Executives, was becoming a useful 
method of guiding debate which was more encompassing than the purely financial 
discussions, although these still, to a large extent, appear to dominate boardroom 
discussions. 
4.1.2e Language - The Use of Jargon 
A second area of concern for some of the Non Executives was the use of language or 
more specifically industry jargon in the boardroom. Many study participants 
described the first few board meetings that they attended with some companies as 
being almost incomprehensible. They described how many executives appeared to 
enjoy the use of industry acronyms, implying that some enjoyed the feeling of 
control or possibly superiority that could be gleaned from using, what was for the 
Non Executives, intimidating and difficult language. 
I think they would be very quiet (those who did not understand). You would get the 
stronger and more assertive people who would always, in any environment, always 
be more vocal, but it was exacerbated by their use of language. 
NED 9 Geoff 
Whatever business you are in, that industry has its own set of customs that you just 
assume that everyone around the table knows and that is a very bad assumption 
because if you are the non profit member you have no idea what turnover means, 
unless you have responsibility for sales. In London it's sales. Here it's how fast 
inventory moves and you have to know the difference between the two. Those are 
things that can be taught. It just takes a sensitivity. 
NED 19 John 
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It's also a matter of language. And every profession, every type of business, has it's 
own jargon. And the military, or anywhere in government, they talk in acronyms. So 
it can be very difficult for the outsider going into those sorts of bodies and it can 
difficult for them, to understand 
NED 13 Hanna 
We sometimes have a problem with individuals feeling like they can't contribute, 
because of the vocabulary. We do have a problem periodically with industryjargon 
and we have to catch ourselves and not talk in acronyms. We even had the board go 
as far as request a dictionary. 
NED II Barry 
Learning to successfully interpret boardroom language was an issue for many of the 
Non Executives, especially for those coming from outside either the traditional 
business environment, or from industry sectors different from those in which they 
held boardroom positions. 
4.1.2f Role Experience: Learning the Jargon 
The last comment above touches on one of the most useful strategies for success in 
overcoming language problems. A number of Non Executives described board 
situations where they had asked for a dictionary or guide to be designed, which 
explained industry jargon in a way that they could understand. The use of this type 
of tool precluded the Non Executives from having to speak up and ask for terms to 
be clarified; one Non Executive described the use of a dictionary in a boardroom he 
worked in: 
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We had a little dictionary of grocery industry terms. The book was available on the 
table. So if someone was giving a talk, rather than interrupt they would just look at 
the book. But you know it was like ten pages, and it just set out the language. Most 
importantly we were saying don't be embarrassed Obviously someone didn't get it or 
we wouldn't have the ten pages already produced. So feel comfortable to use it. 
NED 19 John 
4.1.2g Expectation: Operationalising the Agenda 
Working through the agenda efficiently, particularly with regard to the value of 
people's time emerged as an important factor for all the Non Executives. As a result 
of this, some felt that there were advantages in putting time constraints on items on 
the agenda. The study participants believed that it should be clear, concise, and 
concentrate on strategic rather than operational issues. The view of the Non 
Executive in the next excerpt is typical of the general views of the study 
participants: 
I don't like, sort of, totally open-ended conversations without any, time discipline and 
so on without any prioritisations; I'm probably much more of a control freak as far 
as the formal board is concerned. 
NED 15 Martin 
4.1.2h Experience: Operationalising the Agenda 
The perceived misuse of meeting agendas emerged as a consistent theme across the 
interviews. In some cases this was perceived as just bad management. In others it 
was perceived as a highly effective mechanism for controlling outcomes. Some of 
these practices will be explored along with some of the strategies the Non 
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Executives have used to overcome them. One Non Executive explains the 
significance of the boardroom agenda as follows: 
The importance of the agenda is very often overlooked by people. They leave it to the 
Company Secretary. It's how you plan your agenda through the year. How you plan 
the agenda for the day to ensure you give the right amount of time to the discussion 
and also that you have the right papers in advance of the meeting. 
NED 6 Laurence 
One issue that emerged on a number of occasions regarding the agenda was the use 
of time controls to keep the meeting moving forward. There was some division 
among the Non Executives about the use of agenda timing. Some study participants 
perceived that imposing a time limit on agenda items could be very divisive, because 
they found that it was sometimes used to stifle proper debate. This is the view 
expressed in the following quotes, which also suggest a perception that whoever is 
setting the agenda might deliberately be using agenda timing to ensure that some 
matters are passed through the board without adequate debate. 
The agenda shows time limits for the discussion of each item. We are expected to stick 
to these. It certainly means that we get through the agenda efficiently. But to be 
honest, there were times when I have wanted to speak up but haven't because of the 
time limits. 
NED 16 Roberta 
They time the agenda, what I have seen done by design, is that anything that is real 
controversial gets pushed to the end. So your plane is ready to leave so they can push 
something through. So you don't focus on it. 
NED 3 Liza 
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Conversely, many Non Executives discussed the frustration that they felt at having 
prolonged discussions during board meetings without any attempt to seek closure. 
This is highlighted in the next two quotes: 
They prattle on. It's quite ill-disciplined and we're not quite so good at using 
mealtimes for actually pursuing business discussions, in my view. 
NED 10 Phillip 
They had an agenda, but you just sort of drifted around and around it, and so on. As 
the business has become bigger and more complicated, you cannot behave like that. 
NED 15 Martin 
Emerging from the data was a strong dislike among many Non Executive Directors 
of `time wasting'. It emerged as one of one of the most frustrating elements of the 
role for the majority of those who took part in the study. Non Executive Directors 
tend to perceive time as a precious commodity. Many of those who took part in the 
study worked as Non Executive Directors on multiple boards as well as having a 
full-time CEO role elsewhere. 
They spent the first hour haggling......... they were just waffling away and after about 
an hour I thought I would have a little tantrum. And I said this is absolutely 
outrageous this organisation is dying and you guys are sitting around doing nothing - 
you know I said something quite vulgar. 
NED 4 Ray 
To a large extent the Non Executive Director's frustration appears to relate back to 
their overarching belief that the Board of Directors should not get involved with the 
routine running of the business. Many believed that the agenda needed to be set in 
such a way as to concentrate the minds of those present on the overarching strategy 
of the business and away from day to day managerial activities: 
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It feels a bit to me like a kind of slightly enlarged meeting of the Group Executive 
Committee at which it happens to be the case that Non-Executive Directors are 
present, a kind of continuation of certain types of senior management discussion by 
other means. 
NED 10 Phillip 
The frustrating thing is that they want to talk about what colour the doors should be. 
You know, should they be painted blue or pink? 
NED 9 Geoff 
4.1.2i Availability 
Another problem that the Non Executive Directors identified in terms of meetings 
was that of `the phone board meeting'. It emerged that the recent pressures to 
improve governance practices in boards, has led to an increase both in the frequency 
and also the length of board meetings. As a result of this increase in time demand 
Non Executives were sometimes unable to be present for every meeting due to other 
engagements, this meant that they had to take part in the meeting via the telephone. 
The frustration of the Non Executives at having to deal with telephone interviews 
are exemplified in the next two excerpts: 
To me, you can do interim meetings that way for quick decisions and quick issues, but 
to have a meeting that way? I have not found that to be very valuable. We have to do 
a lot of it. We just have meetings on the telephone and you find that if you really want 
participation you won't get it. Well they're doing e-mail. You know they're doing e- 
mail, not concentrating on the meeting. And you can't see their body language. 
NED 9 Geoff 
Phone board meetings are inferior. You have a meeting and then you have one or 
two board members sitting on the conference call. That happens in all meetings. 
That's very common here. We discourage it; we do what we can to discourage it. 
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Since Sarbanes Oxley (2002) it'll happen more often. The legislation means more 
requirements for board meetings but one of the goals is, you want engaged, capable 
people and their schedules generally are not that flexible. 
NED 1 Warren 
4.1.2j Role Experience: Improving the Agenda 
One Non Executive Director described an approach that his board had put in place to 
help Directors get through the agenda and generally have more productive meetings 
by using boardroom facilitators: 
They (the facilitators) did the agendas and they did the follow-up memorandums and 
they'd schedule the next meeting, I would always have them call me a week before the 
meeting. We'd go through the agenda, we'd determine if there were follow up items 
we hadn't done yet, try to do it more quickly, and then make sure that all the other 
people who had follow up items weren't going to be embarrassed when they came to 
the meeting. We would call them and if they hadn't got it done, we'd try to help them 
work it through. 
NED 9 Geoff 
Another Non Executive described how, having been faced with an incomprehensible 
and unmanageably long agenda before every meeting, she went to the CEO and 
insisted that there be a change to the way the agenda was presented prior to the 
board meeting: 
I said I would like the agenda changed I would like board meeting to happen as 
follows. I don't want a 3000 page bullet book that everybody reads and is then read 
to us again at the meeting. I mean they used to get where they were just ridiculous. 
So I said no more of that and then I said I want a contact to reach a decision and I 
want a priority. It should be like a political briefing book where you talk about "this 
is the issue, this is the background on the issue, this what we are doing, this is 
managements recommendation, this is the downside of it ", that type of a structure. 
NED 3 Liza 
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4.1.2k Expectation: Information Exchange 
Being provided with timely, clear and concise information was considered central to 
the Non Executive Directors' ability to effectively perform the role. There was an 
expectation from those who took part in the study that they would have access to 
whatever part of the business they deemed necessary to fulfil their Non Executive 
role, and that they should be free to talk to others within the organisation if they 
needed to do so. The study participants believed that, above all else, it was 
important that the CEO should not suppress information. This view is captured in 
the following remark: 
My personal feeling was that the board needed to know the bad as well as the good. 
They had a right to it, they should never be embarrassed by hearing from anyone 
other than the CEO in my case about something negative. If we have a lawsuit filed 
against us, for any reason, the first person that needs to know is fifteen individuals 
around the table and say, "If you have any thoughts on this let us know this is how we 
are managing it. " If you are not sure, err on the part of sharing the information not 
hiding it. 
NED 19 John 
Information exchange between the Non Executive Directors themselves was also 
considered to be very important. The analysis revealed that all the study participants 
felt that, in order to be an effective board, it was valuable from time to time to have 
meetings away from the CEO and the Executive Team. The Non Executives 
stressed the importance of feeling comfortable enough to discuss issues informally 
with other members when they needed. This is revealed in the remarks that follow: 
I'm a believer in having the non-executives as capable of meeting and discussing, 
issues separately where necessary. 
NED 15 Martin 
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The board should have meetings just for the board members. With one another, away 
from management, and procedural enough so that it happens. You know it can't be 
one of those things where procrastination wins and they never get together. So it has 
to be rigid enough to do it. 
NED 1 Warren 
A healthy board needs to spend time away together, they need to feel comfortable, 
together, so that they can ask the difficult questions without feeling intimidated, 
without feeling, I am not worthy, I trust you guys to back me up. 
NED 21 Billy 
In the next few sections we will examine the perceptions of the Non Executive 
Directors in terms of their expectations and experiences of their informal 
interactions with others in the Boardroom. 
4.1.21 Experience: Information Exchange 
Despite the fact that the Non Executive Directors perceived having free access to the 
senior management team as being very important, it emerged from the interviews 
that they often experienced difficulty in gaining free access'to managers outside of 
boardroom proceedings. Some Non Executives even discussed feeling that they 
could not rely on other members of the executive team to speak up, even if the CEO 
was making a decision with which they fundamentally disagreed. In the next 
excerpt a Non Executive talks candidly about his fear that the board may not always 
hear the full argument on an issue from the management team: 
At the end of the day the CEO's the guy who's getting paid to make the decision, but 
you're never certain whether there are other alpha members of senior management 
who are also on this board who actually don't agree with that decision or would do it 
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a different way or think it's in the wrong order. Because you cannot have what seems 
to suggest a situation in which the CEO would say something to the board, the global 
board, and the CFO says well I don't agree, you would never hear that any board 
that had an operations or CFO would never say well the CEO would do that, but I 
actually wouldn't. 
NED 18 Joe 
The issue of avoiding division in the boardroom was a common theme and this may 
partly explain the reluctance of other members of the management team to come 
forward. As the Non Executive in the next quote discusses, the management of the 
board will always try to seek a consensus. 
What the Chairman dreads is a split board, so the chair will always, always, always 
be trying to seek consensus, consolidation, unity amongst the board. That isn't really 
what you want, but I can see why a chair wants that. Nothing worse than a split 
board! 
NED 7 Jane 
The Non Executives indicated that this need for consensus did not necessarily mean 
that there was no discussion, although interestingly discussion did not tend to take 
place in the boardroom, instead the study participants found that most debate went 
on before items were presented to the board officially. Issues would be debated first 
among the Senior Management team, and then through direct contact between the 
CEO, Chairman and individual board members prior to the actual meeting. The 
following quotes are typical of how the Non Executives perceived the way 
information was provided to them: 
The trick is that most things are chewed over before they reach the boardroom, and 
more fool any CEO who just tries to put things in at the last minute - it will serve him 
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right if it gets thrown out. Things need to be mulled over; you need information 
before you get into the Boardroom. 
NED 8 Thomas 
I think there's a blend between providing advance information and pre-selling it. I 
don't see anything wrong with pre-selling it. I think if you had to fail on completely 
avoiding pre-selling versus making sure they had sufficient information, I think 
you're better off to give them sufficient information and run the risk of pre-selling 
some things because of the complexity, because of the significance. I think erring on 
more rather than less up marked information and dialogue is probably valuable 
NED 1 Warren 
I think certainly the board needs to lead and support core values. I certainly agree 
with that. But it's, I think it is a bigger role than that and I do think that the board 
has to agree with management and visa versa on the fundamental strategies. 
NED 11 Barry 
The underlying assumption of the Non Executive Directors was that when a board 
was being run correctly, an item would not succeed in getting to the formal board 
meeting unless the individual members of the board had first ratified it, in 
conjunction with informal negotiation with the senior management team, with the 
CEO and/or Chairman operating as the intermediary between the two groups. 
4.1.3 Informal Processes 
4.1.3a Expectations: The Peer Group 
The analysis revealed the individuals' expectations for their relationships with other 
Non Executive Directors within the peer group. Two words emerged as being 
Page 131 of 400 
important in describing their perception of this relationship; these were `trust' and 
`respect'. Their thoughts on this issue are presented in the following passages: 
You have to be, in a way, happy to be on a board and trust your colleagues is another 
thing. In a big business, you need sometimes to trust your colleagues because you 
can't know everything on everything. But if you know that another non-executive has 
perhaps looked at a certain part of the business and you can trust him, that gives you 
great comfort. 
NED 6 Laurence 
I think I give people good strategic advice. That's probably why they trust me. I 
think they trust me because they say I'm very straight. 
NED 2 Anne 
You need somebody. You do, you really need somebody who you can talk to and who 
you trust. 
NED 7 Jane 
The Non Executive Directors believed it was imperative that they were able to 
communicate with each other and be honest about their assessment of the 
organisation and its management. The next example illustrates this point: 
It is important to like the people. So when I call they say "John how are you doing? " 
and I say "Fine Ruth. How are you? Well what's going on? " "Well, it's just an 
issue, and I may be way off track here. But I am starting with you and I am going to 
call another couple of the board members, but what do you think about such and 
such? You know I am concerned about this new strategy we have moved from A to C 
without going through B and that is a huge jump and I am not sure if this 
management team can keep their hands around this thing, but I don't want to be the 
one to just jump up and cause a rift unless there is a lot of support and I will be glad 
to take the lead. But what is your feeling on this? " That kind of interface can only be 
done if you like the people, you have to respect each other to call it what it is and to 
talk about it. 
NED 19 John 
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4.1.3b Experience: The Peer Group 
The Non Executive Directors believed that good working relationships between 
board members were crucial in enhancing their ability to contribute to board 
proceedings. Their perceptions of the depth of relationship required to enhance 
contribution varied, but there was general consensus that at a minimum one should 
trust and respect fellow board members, even if on a personal level you didn't like 
them particularly. 
Despite the belief of the study participants that relationships played an important 
part in enhancing contribution, some Non Executive Directors talked about the 
isolation they felt. One individual in particular described how the Non Executives 
were actively discouraged from having contact away from the boardroom. This 
individual had a strong feeling that things were going very wrong for the company, 
but never took action because he was unable to seek the opinions of others in the 
group and felt too intimidated to stand alone: 
The inability of non-executive directors who rarely met together and never alone, in 
consolidating an exchange of views in a think tank kind of way, where people could 
have brought their three cents worth of experience to bear on an issue, suffice it to 
say that my experience at ***** of my own contribution was that I fell both stifled by 
my lack of experience in the telecommunications sector and yet seized with what I 
thought was an intuitive grasp by the businesses going wrong. But in the latter 
respect it was extremely difficult to make a contribution there that was either 
recognised or listened to, or understood. 
NED 10 Phillip 
This portrayal of isolation from others in the group is repeated by a number of Non 
Executives about their own boards, such as in the next illustration: 
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There is obviously no-one, we never see each other, never talk together, there is no 
team in any way. 
NED 4 Ray 
The study participants in the following examples explained their perception of why 
Non Executives found it so difficult to take a stand on issues without a feeling of 
support from the rest of the group: 
Well, you know, it is an old cliche but there are no stupid questions. But that is not 
true - there are a lot of stupid questions... you walk into the boardroom and you 
realise that the board is not meeting for your education and your edification. The 
first couple of times you get acquainted with the ways of the board, but after that the 
board meets on quality time and I fully understand that. 
NED 18 Joe 
The behavioural issues are very important. The technical issues are important but 
the behavioural issues are also very important, and the attitudinal ones and the ego 
comes into it, because if you look around the board of a big company these are all 
people who have all had success in their life and then they come into an often an 
unfamiliar environment. They will not get into anything where they are going to show 
themselves up, so ego becomes a major issue. 
NED 4 Ray 
Nobody would picture him (a NED) as shy or easily intimidated but what you do see 
is the intimidation does lead to this. Very few people will ask questions, because they 
don't want to be, you know, they have been successful in the real life, all of a 
sudden... You know it's amazing, having been a linguist and taught, I have always 
maintained how much harder it is to teach a second language to an adult - sounding 
stupid, mispronouncing, someone is going to laugh at you. The truth is, it is the same 
on the board, people won't ask a question. 
NED 3 Liza 
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Yet another Non Executive Director attested to what he perceived as the problem of 
oversized egos in the boardroom, which he felt needed to be "managed" if the board 
was to work together successfully: 
You know these boards don't suffer small egos. And generally, the people on the 
board are pretty demanding. Board egos are important. You have to manage that. 
NED 1 Warren 
4.1.3c Role Experience: Creating Team Togetherness 
Many of the Non Executives discussed the use of pre and post meeting dinners to 
allow board members to get to know each other better; these were used for 
discussion but also sometimes as a way of introducing promising talent from within 
the company. In this way the boards used these meetings for succession planning 
and to develop an understanding of the strength of the organisations' personnel. 
I mean there is a very constructive debate amongst non-executives, but it's not really 
amongst non-executives as a separate group, it's really with the executives as well. 
We have, I mean every time we have a board meeting, which as I've said is about 
eight times a year, we have a dinner the night before and we will always have 
something formally on the agenda over dinner, and often it is issues of succession and 
so on. 
NED 15 Martin 
The study participants perceived that these meetings could be particularly useful if 
they were occasionally held away from the Executive Team, with only the Non 
Executives present. This allowed the Non Executives more freedom to speak freely 
without fear of retribution from management or of stepping on overly delicate egos: 
If you only do it when there's a crisis, you send a very clear signal when you are 
getting together, this must be a crisis, and you don't always want that. 
NED 15 Martin 
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The previous one (Chairman) didn't like it when we went off on our own but he was a 
bit of a control freak and 1 do think that you have to have faith that you have done the 
right job and you know that you have an open line of communication. Nothing should 
take the execs by surprise but there are just certain things that are easier to talk 
about as a group without the execs present so 1 think that it is a mixture. 1 think 
business-wise you should always feel free to bring up the issues, claim ignorance. 
NED 17 Vicky 
Others talked about the value they perceived that they had derived from having away 
days with their fellow board members. 
We also had away days at least once a year when we went away for the best part of a 
couple of days and thrashed things round in a more open ended fashion. 
NED 10 Phillip 
Most study participants felt that their boards were not given enough opportunities 
for such gatherings. One Non Executive described the effect that a three-day session 
had had on one particular board that he worked with: 
We spent three full days together, and we decided to focus on trying to work out what 
exactly our role was, why we were there. I can tell you this is the best, by far the very 
best board that I have ever worked with. I can't understand why more of my boards 
don't do it but I think I might bring it up. 
NED 18 Joe 
In contrast some Non Executives could not see the value of away days. In their 
opinion as long as everybody respected each other away days were not really 
necessary: 
I'm not convinced about all this bonding and away days. I think that's a bit overdone 
and comes from a consultancy route. I think you want to have directors who can 
naturally be respected and that is probably from their track record and abilities. 
NED 6 Laurence 
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Although the above comment represented a minority view among the study 
participants, there was general agreement that there was more to creating 
togetherness among board members than merely spending time together. Some Non 
Executives described it as putting together a dinner party or arranging a marriage. 
The study participants perceived that there needed to be some area of commonality 
among the individuals a "meeting of minds". The motivational value of having a 
team that enjoy being together and feel valued is captured in the next excerpt: 
I felt so important and I was by far, career-timing-wise, the junior member, all the 
other guys were CEO's of major companies but every single person was valued for 
what they contribute, and he (the CEO) found a way, as a communication expert that 
he was, to make each board member feel valued and it's a typical thing that you see, 
you tend to do more, you step forward you volunteer, I shared. 
NED 3 Liza 
4.1.3d Expectations: Role Set Skill Diversity of the Peer Group 
The key way in which the Non Executive Directors perceived that the board could 
overcome personal gaps in individual knowledge was by having a diverse group of 
people working in the boardroom. The study participants all accepted that the 
requirements now being enforced upon them by Sarbanes Oxley (2002) in the USA 
and reports such as Higgs (2003) in the UK, as well as the effect of various recent 
corporate scandals, had forced them to pay much greater attention to a whole range 
of issues. They believed that individually it was unrealistic to expect a Non 
Executive Director to have a complete understanding of all the issues that a large 
organisation could face. The following excerpts capture the general sentiment: 
Having individuals on the board that represent different points of view, I think 
enhances your role. Diversity on the board makes it much more valuable to the 
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organisation. You know CEO's that get outside directors that are just like they are 
don 't need them. What you need are people that are the opposite of what you are. So 
you need to have a diversified, almost a collective board. 
NED 1 Warren 
I guess in that kind of situation though you're forced also to really rely on other 
people, the people around you, to be sure that they actually have that experience to 
be able to back you up when you need it. And that seems to be something that's 
really important in the boardroom, having that kind of mix of people who trust each 
other enough to work together. 
NED 2 Anne 
Despite the need for diversity, the Non Executive Directors perceived it as being 
very important to an individual to feel that others within the role set had achieved a 
similar status to their own, in order to gain the other group members' respect and 
trust. It emerged that before agreeing to join a board many Non Executives would 
ask who else was on the board then insist upon meeting current board members 
privately to try to assess the strength of the board and the relationships between 
members. The following quote summarises the perceptions of many of those who 
took part in the study: 
I think you want to have directors who can naturally be respected and that is 
probably from their track record and abilities. It doesn't mean to say they're all from 
the same business or necessarily known to each other. But they've got to have some 
achievements before you invite them. They've either run a good business and you 
know it's a good business because they are the CEO, or whatever, of that business, or 
they have a particular lead skill in something. You want to have people who are not 
secretive; you want them to speak their mind. 
NED 6 Laurence 
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4.1.3e Role Experience: Role Set Skill Diversity of the Peer Group 
As the study participants had anticipated, many Non Executives found that it was 
difficult for them to understand all the issues facing the large organisations for 
which they worked. Many of the Non Executive Directors discussed the need for a 
more diverse skill set in the boardroom, particularly since the introduction of new 
legislation such as Sarbanes Oxley (2002) in the USA and Higgs (2003) in the UK. 
The study participants revealed that many boards were beginning to look outside of 
the corporate world for new Non Executive talent. One Non Executive Director 
discussed her role in creating a more diverse boardroom skill set: 
I try to get the boards that I am on to create a matrix of skills and competencies that 
aren't represented For instance one board that I am on is a company that 
specialises in government contracting and it's very interesting because one of the 
things we need on the board is political influence. So, do we go out and look for a 
republican or a democrat? Yes we do, because if they can pick up a phone, we can 
have the governor pick up a phone, we are in the running for this project and we are 
a very good company and we'd like -I don't know who we kid, business is done with 
people you know, so those types of qualifications. Definitely I am seeing that. 
NED 3 Liza 
Because of the amount of work and the sheer volume of data being passed to the 
Non Executive Directors for ratification, even those who felt competent in a certain 
area sometimes found that they became overwhelmed by the amount of detail they 
had to deal with. Because of this, as the study participants had anticipated, many 
Non Executive Directors discussed relying on others occasionally, to have 
adequately understood the issues being presented to them. The Non Executive 
Director in the following quote perceived herself to be very financially literate but 
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despite this, even in matters of a financial nature; she was sometimes forced to rely 
on the judgement of others because of the volume of work she was faced with. 
Without actually having the time to really sit down and think about something, to 
actually work out what's going on, you therefore have to rely sometimes on other 
people around you to understand things. 
NED 2 Anne 
The Non Executives found that there was an important role for those directors with 
an "unconventional" background; one such individual described the role as that of 
the "idiot boy", someone who could ask the questions those others with more 
experience simply passed by. The following is an example of how one Non 
Executive Director with a civil service background perceived his contribution to the 
boardroom debate: 
I mean, was it primarily for my expertise? If so, they haven't used it very much but 
do they feel they get their worth from me and my guess is yes, because I do typically 
play the role of looking at this sometimes like the idiot boy and asking the obvious 
but, in fact, very direct questions that no-one else has asked. Like here we've got all 
this elaborate risk management analysis to show that we've got our minds around 
Turnbull but I don't see anywhere listed in the risk analysis, the risk to us of carrying 
so much off balance sheet financing in the light of the fact that this is 'Oh! My God! 
You're absolutely right! ' I try to major on being Mr Hard, difficult questions on the 
strategic issues that may need to be revisited because everybody else takes these 
issues for granted because they're so much wound into the system. 
NED 10 Phillip 
Other Non Executive Directors talked about the fresh perspectives that individuals 
from very specific fields were able too offer to the boardroom debate, and how this 
enhanced discussions and provided confirmation, to those not expert in a particular 
field, that their "gut" reaction to an issue was correct. Such highly specific input 
Page 140 of 400 
seemed to allow the Non Executives to move away from the purely financial debates 
discussed earlier in this section. The Non Executive in the next quote summarises 
the feelings of many regarding the use of experts from non or different business 
backgrounds when he describes one such fellow board member: 
I also work with **** on that board and he is a huge asset. You would not think that 
this old, little guy from the Middle East who learned his trade as a grocer would have 
such a great perspective on things, but he does. He understands about the customer 
and stakeholders and the importance of driving that in the board. He is a really 
useful sounding board for us. 
NED 22 Harry 
In another instance a Non Executive described how having a highly capable 
individual with specific skills, helped him to overcome his own inhibitions about 
speaking out in the Boardroom. The Non Executive describes in the following 
example how his colleague changed the tone of the board: 
He proved to be very forceful and I was delighted because I very often found he was 
saying things which I was instinctively feeling but my voice on that would count for 
less than his because he had patently high level US corporate experience behind him 
which added weight to the points and he would pitch in some times quite forcefully 
saying "Looks to me like that we're just, whatever, and we can't go on doing this 
because... " and we were hearing things from him which I didn't recall hearing 
around the table until he joined. 
NED 10 Phillip 
Others described how they felt obliged to sit quietly and listen, rather than contribute 
when they perceived that someone was more experienced in an issue than they 
themselves were: 
They were very bright and very experienced and all us, myself included, were 
learning from them and eh if you are in the presence of somebody who has a lot to 
contribute you have to listen more than you talk. And I do that on other boards that I 
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am involved with. The areas where I have perhaps more experience than the other 
board members, so I'd probably tend to talk a bit more there. 
NED 20 Arnie 
Some of our Non Executives come from a very different place, they are young and 
very, very smart and sometimes you have to just listen and try to learn from them. 
NED 24 Wayne 
Although there was a strong consensus among the study participants, about the 
importance of such forceful individuals being present in the boardroom, some Non 
Executives did caution too much importance being placed in their contribution. 
They argued that although such forceful individuals could provide a useful input, it 
was also possible for their voices to drown out others, dominating the board to such 
an extent that useful contributions were lost from quieter individuals. 
In the next excerpt a Non Executive describes his perception that sometimes overly 
assertive board members with skills not specific to others on the board inhibit 
conversation in the boardroom, through not only assertiveness, but also the use of 
unfamiliar language. 
I think they (the other NED's) would be very quiet. So, you would get the stronger 
and more assertive people would always in any environment, always be more vocal, 
but it was exacerbated by language. 
NED 9 Geoff 
4.1.3f Role Experience: Detrimental Effects of Role Set Skill Diversification 
Although some Non Executives reported the success of the shift towards greater 
skill diversity in the boardroom, others were more circumspect, despite a general 
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agreement amongst those who took part in the study of an expectation that the 
boardroom should be skill diverse. Many believed that the reality of the role meant 
that those without a strong business background often found the role problematic, at 
least in the first few years of transition. One Non Executive who came from a very 
senior civil service background described how his expectations of the role measured 
up to his actual experience: 
I had only been working for three months or more, I stepped into this absolute blood 
bath and I thought that British boards were, you know, ladylike and it was all lies and 
sleaze and all of that, and about three months after that I joined ******** 
vegetarians keep out, and there was blood all over the tiles. I was really amazed I 
was truly amazed. 
NED 18 Joe 
A number of Non Executive Directors talked about the personalities of those who 
"make it" into the boardroom as often being very tough, these examples are 
indicative of their views: 
There are not a lot of the touchy feely kind of things and the people who got to the top 
often got there by harshness, by brutality, by single-minded focus and by not making 
mistakes. 
NED 4 Ray 
I must say that to get senior in almost any company it is not a nice progression, I 
don't think many people feel boy I am worthy. You know it's political. There are 
fewer and fewer jobs as you get near the top. 
NED 17 Vicky 
Feelings of intimidation emerged as a common theme across all of the Non 
Executive Directors who took part in the study, but it was particularly evident 
amongst individuals from non-business backgrounds. In the following excerpt a 
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Non Executive Director discusses her perception of how this problem effects 
contribution in relation to a number of boards that she sits on: 
A lot of people feel that if they haven't quite got the confidence in the boardroom, 
they seem to forget all their knowledge as soon as they walk in the room, and not 
realise that actually they've got a lot of basic knowledge, which they can tap into. 
It's just in a different context, they just need reminding about it from time to time..., 
they're always nervous about asking questions especially if they know somebody and 
they've been invited on to the board by the person they know. It immediately limits 
the sort of range and depth of the questions that get asked and makes due diligence 
that much more difficult but I think it's a very important aspect because that's where 
Non Execs have a problem. 
NED 13 Hanna 
Analysis of the research also revealed an interesting bi-product of skill 
diversification. Some Non Executives perceived that as a result of the need to use 
people with broader or different skills in the boardroom, the cost of employing Non 
Executives had increased. Many of the `new' Non Executive Directors were not 
perceived as being independently wealthy and so required substantial reimbursement 
for their services. A previous "rule of thumb" had been that board members should 
probably already be wealthier than the CEO in order to avoid any conflict of interest 
between the different parties. This is described in the following quote: 
Trying to spend more time on boards is causing people to be on fewer boards, 
because of the heightened liabilities. Conversely, where the financial packages for 
boards'didn't really matter for boards because everyone was a CEO making a zillion 
dollars, now they are looking at a broader base, so the compensation is starting to 
matter. There used to be an old dictum that said that if you don't earn more than the 
CEO then you shouldn't be sitting on his board so that you weren't unduly 
influenced. 
NED 3 Liza 
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4.1.3g Individuals Need for Training and Mentoring 
During the conversations with the study participants, many discussed their feelings 
of insecurity and lack of confidence particularly when faced with a group of 
individuals within the boardroom who they felt were somehow superior to them. The 
word "intimidation" came up on a number of occasions. This was particularly 
interesting as most of the interviewees who had spent their entire careers as leaders 
and people of prominence, almost unanimously felt they lacked the requisite 
training, particularly in terms of an understanding of the. financial aspects of the 
organisation. As one prominent Non Executive succinctly put it,, "you would be 
amazed at how intimidating it is" (NED 18 Joe). 
The comments below illustrate the feelings of many of the Non Executives who 
participated in the study: 
There were not often subjects where I felt I could really add anything. If we were 
talking about strategy, maybe I could say something or if we were talking about 
people maybe I would say something. But when we were talking about money, the 
balance sheet and financial statements I could not read them of course. I fell into the 
background of the board. It became very, very difficult to offer suggestions. These 
things were almost always, that 's almost always financial. 
NED 18 Joe 
I suppose, if I excuse myself here, it is well, you know, these guys must know what 
they're doing, you know, and they seem so convinced and so on. Who am I to say, this 
is heading for the rocks unless I've got a plumb line they don't have, but that I 
suppose that position is not peculiar. 
NED 10 Phillip 
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I don't think my board understood what their responsibilities were, their legal 
responsibilities. They have a three million pound deficit and that's their 
responsibility and I don't think that they understood that really. And only because 
they hadn't been told, they just lack understanding and also previously no real 
training for NED's. 
NED 23 Rachel 
Some study participants described how they had taken the initiative themselves to go 
out and get their own training, but even then were faced with some tension from the 
company as is described in the next excerpt: 
There is very little induction in any of them, you meet a few people, I have had to 
myself take the initiative and spend the day and look at how the accounts are done 
take a day to go and see a company and they are not very keen on that. 
NED 4 Ray 
Some Non Executives described how their lack of confidence in the matters being 
presented to them, led them to feel too intimidated to speak out, or to ask for help or 
advice from others in the boardroom: 
I was persuaded that I didn't understand their business, and I rather wish now that 
I'd perhaps consolidated a bit more with other non-executive directors on the board 
and perhaps talked a bit more sense with them. They certainly weren't stupid and I 
think everybody had their own misgivings about strategy... I couldn't believe how 
silently everybody sat. 
NED 7 Jane 
For many there was concern about where they should go for guidance, there is no 
professional body for the Non Executive Director. The UK's Institute of Directors 
was perceived by the British Non Executives as existing for the benefit of Executive 
board members. The study participants felt that they had no one to turn to when it 
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came to difficult dilemmas. Many hoped that they would be able to get guidance 
from other members of the board, and use them as sounding boards when they felt 
unhappy about something. However when talking about instances of actual 
behaviour on a number of boards, it became clear that the reality was that off-the- 
record conversations and telephone calls between Non Executives or between Non 
Executives and Managers were not generally encouraged by the CEO or Chairman. 
I think unless you seriously address the training, experience and indeed the resources 
many, many NED's made this point to me, and I would make it to you, which is that 
as a Non-Executive Director you do not have the resources at your disposal. You 
don't have accountants, lawyers, auditors, HR professionals. So that when as you sit 
with your remuneration committee hat on and somebody blinds you with science... 
Some people now are saying well, thank you very much, that's incredibly interesting 
but I now want to go and talk to my old 'mucken' at Hayes and find out what they 
think about this scheme. 
NED 7 Jane 
Although there was a general perception on the part of the Non Executives that there 
was a need for more training and advice to be made available to them, some study 
participants also highlighted that in addition to a lack of sources for such services, 
there was also a perception that it was difficult to teach the kind of skills that the 
Non Executives required. Further, the study participants argued that those 
companies that were offering training were not always equipped with personnel who 
had the requisite experience to understand the issues facing Non Executives working 
in such complex environments: 
We've been talking about training and things like that. But actually, at the end of the 
day when you go out and research what is there, and you suddenly think, you know 
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more on this than those people and how are you going to train people to have the 
confidence to challenge. It's a difficult one to get right. 
NED 13 Hanna 
The Non Executives discussed how they believed that much of their skill was 
developed through working with other Non Executives within different boards, 
through watching companied develop strategies and deal with various issues 
associated with running a large complex business. However, some study 
participants warned of the risk of using networks of board experience as the only 
source of information on good business practice, as is highlighted in the next 
quotation: 
There's no advice and counsel for non-executive directors and often what they do 
when they get together is actually spread bad practice - they don't spread good 
practice. "I'll tell you what old chap, I'll tell you what I've done in the past, and it's 
worked a treat " and you hear them spreading bad practice. 
NED 7 Jane 
4.1.3h Board Assessments and Job Descriptions 
It emerged from the research that very few of the study participants had ever been 
given any kind of job description during their time as a Non Executive Director; this 
was particularly surprising as all those that were questioned felt it would be a useful 
tool in fulfilling their roles. 
I have never gotten a job description; I mean what is the role? What's' your 
expectation, meetings and attendances? And then what you do with those things? No, 
I don't think it is as clear as it could be. 
NED 3 Liza 
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I mean it is good governance, like I think, the chairman and the chief executive 
should define who does what between the two, that doesn't happen very often. 
Having done it, you'd probably put it in the bottom right hand drawer and never look 
at it again, but I think it is, and it does pay, particularly when one or other or both 
are new, I think it does pay to have the discipline to do that. 
NED 15 Martin 
Others study participants talked about the general lack of feedback on their 
performance as a Non Executive which left them feeling unsure about themselves, 
not knowing if'their performance was satisfactory or if they needed to seek further 
training. The following quotes highlight the problem faced by the Non Executives 
in trying to measure their own performance: 
It's like trying to get feedback, you know (you) go along and see the Chief Executive. 
"Well how am I doing? " "Oh! Absolutely fantastic! We're so pleased with you. " 
"Thank you. Could I actually have something a bit more tangible than that? " "Very 
nice. " Then you start to think, 'Oh well! OK! I won't ask any more questions. ' You 
just end up having a general chat. But it's very d jjIcult. I think people are not very 
good at giving feedback. 
NED 13 Hanna 
Well in the self-assessment we don't ask them to share the results with us. We ask 
them to fill out this form, then review it themselves, and out of that determine any 
actions required to improve their performance. The board assessment though is 
public, the performance of the board as a team. 'Public' meaning we compile the 
data, we review it, and we talk about what changes need to be made to improve the 
performance of the board. 
NED 11 Barry 
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4.1.3i Expectation: Relationships with the Senior Management Team 
The relationship between the Non Executive Director and members of the Senior 
Management team other than the CEO provided a source of much debate for those 
who took part in the study; the general perception was that it was crucial to have a 
good relationship with Management. The Non Executives felt that having free 
access to managers was very important and provided them with a necessary link into 
the organisational structure; a Non Executive describes why she perceived that the 
relationship was important in the next example: 
I think to question inappropriate behaviour. I also feel that a board member should 
be eyes and ears I think for management other than the CEO. It should be an 
alternative funnel or an alternative source of contact that shareholders or employees 
have that is not through their own bosses. 
NED 3 Liza 
4.1.3j Experience: Relationships with the Senior Management 
Those who participated in the study were asked about their relationships within the 
organisation, most specifically with Executives other than the CEO and Chairman. 
The Non Executives believed that part of their role was to be accessible to others 
within the organisation. The study participants felt this was useful for two reasons: 
1. In case of a problem that an individual could not bring directly to the 
CEO (such as mismanagement by the Chief Executive). 
2. To provide the individual Non Executive with valuable insight into 
the organisation. 
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One Non Executive described the circumstances leading to the firing of the company 
Chairman and CEO, following a series of internal blunders that came to light after 
the Non Executive had been approached privately by the Senior Management team. 
I was on my way back from London and my wife rang me and said, "The Executive 
Directors are here. " I said, "Why? " "They said they've come to see you en masse. " 
It was the Executives that came to me and said, "We have no trust in the Chairman "; 
they'd lost their faith. Anyhow, the next day the Non Executives met because I mean 
really what the Executive Directors were saying was that it's up to you guys now. 
And we have to hear that that particular Chairman and CEO are out by the end of the 
afternoon. 
NED 6 Laurence 
The Non Executives believed that because of the limited time they themselves spent 
within the organisation, strong linkages to managers, although sometimes perceived 
as divisive, could be used to reveal invaluable insights into the health, strategy and 
commitment of the organisation and its members. However, despite the perceived 
advantages of such linkages, they emerged as being quite rare. Interviews with the 
study participants revealed that there was a perceived reluctance within the 
Executive to provide wider access to the organisation. Some of the study participants 
suggested that there was a need for the Board to have its own staff, to facilitate 
wider access to information and more formalised links into the organisation. This is 
highlighted in the following quote: 
There is great advantage in having a board where there are individuals present 
behind the scenes on a full-time basis to ensure that it runs smoothly and that 
everybody has the information that they actually need in an appropriate format. This 
can greatly reduce the tension between executive and outside members. 
NED 24 Wayne 
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Most of the study participants said that they had sometimes been suspicious that the 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO), for example, might have a different opinion on a 
given subject from that of the CEO. However, the Non Executives felt that the 
pressure to have unity would typically prevent the CFO from speaking out. When 
the study participants were asked if they would speak to the CFO outside the 
boardroom, most felt that the CEO would be unhappy about this. Although some 
felt it was a matter they might bring up with the Chairman, many were obviously 
intimidated at the prospect. Other study participants discussed their understanding 
that it was taboo for them to speak to Executives because of the discomfort this 
appeared to create for the CEO who seemed to feel very threatened at the prospect. 
Also emerging from the research was the Non Executives' perception that 
sometimes the Executive Board members could feel threatened by the presence of 
powerful and well-informed Non Executive Directors, the Non Executives perceived 
that it was sometimes difficult to make suggestions to the Executive team without 
being perceived as arrogant or "trying to teach them their own business". In the 
following excerpt a Non Executive describes this phenomenon and offers a strategy 
to overcome the problem: 
It is more a function of how the individual is respected by the senior executives and 
the other board members than what they know. It sounds like they are saying you 
should change your industry to the way my industry is, just inherently better, that will 
almost always have a push back mentality about it. If the person says "There is a lot 
I don't know about your industry, but I have watched in our similar industry as a 
major change is taking place and I just want you to be aware of it and if anyone in 
the management ranks would like to come to my company, you can meet with the 
people and I could bring the two parties together who might benefit from a change 
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that is happening perhaps in our industry that won't be your industry for four or five 
years but you could be on the ground floor with it. I am just making the opportunity - 
if you don't want the opportunity that is fine, if you do, I can set that up for you. " 
Now that is a very non-threatening approach saying I am trying to help you here but 
it is up to you. 
NED 19 John 
They don't quite like it they are not quite sure what you are going to say. They are 
not sure if you are going to upset the CEO or harass them or come back and tell 
tales, and nobody is quite sure about the NEDs. 
NED 4 Ray 
In the next section the Non Executives' perceptions of why there is sometimes little 
communication between them and the Senior Management team will be examined 
more closely. 
4.1.4 Summary Section One 
In summary, the emerging outcomes of the analysis of this theme would suggest that 
Non Executive Directors do not perceive that they are being properly utilised by 
their boards. Their view is that boards do not seem to be providing them with the 
tools that are necessary for Non Executive Directors to fulfil their roles effectively. 
Feelings of insecurity and intimidation, possibly due to lack of a clear role 
understanding and an inability to seek advice and guidance appear to be common 
amongst many Non Executives. Study participants did not feel comfortable about 
speaking out when they were unsure about issues or did not understand; they feared 
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being ridiculed by the wider group. The Non Executives perceived that the CEO 
might attempt to limit information and access to the organisation in order to 
maintain control of individuals in the boardroom. 
The following key sub themes emerged from this category: 
1. The Non Executives perceived that all boards were unique; however the 
analysis reveals that despite their uniqueness many issues are common. 
2. The planning and operation of board meetings in terms of the use of agendas 
did not meet with the Non Executives' expectations. For example, meeting 
agendas often concentrated on operational rather than strategic issues. 
3. Time was important to the Non Executives. Many were frustrated by 
perceived time wasting during board meetings. Some study participants 
believed that this could be overcome by using timed agendas, other study 
participants argued that agenda timing could be used to stifle debate and 
control outcomes. 
4. Some study participants believed that boardroom "staff' might help Non 
Executives to operate more efficiently. 
5. The Non Executives perceived that agenda information was often badly 
presented before meetings. They perceived that efforts to improve the quality 
of information presented to them would enhance their efficiency. 
6. Because the Non Executives report that they only spent limited time with the 
organisation, internal linkages were perceived by the study participants to be 
an effective way to gain useful insight into the health, strategy and 
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commitment of the organisation. However, they perceived that the CEO and 
Chairman of the board might discourage linkages with internal managers. 
7. The study participants perceived that it was important to feel comfortable 
and confident enough to confide in other board members, they believed that 
this was achieved by spending time in each other's company. Meetings held 
away from the Executive team from time to time, facilitated the creation of 
an atmosphere where the Non Executives could develop close relationships. 
However, the study participants perceived that the CEO sometimes 
discouraged such relationships. 
8. The study participants perceived that the Executive team sometimes felt 
threatened or even insulted by their suggestions. The Non Executives 
perceived that it was important to frame suggestions in a non-confrontational 
style. 
9. There was general agreement amongst the study participants that skill 
diversity in the boardroom was a positive thing. However, the Non 
Executives perceived that it was important that others around them should 
possess similar status in terms of their level of experience and external 
reputation. 
10. It was perceived by the study participants as important for board members to 
like each other, but also to have the right mix of individuals; some described 
it as comparable to putting together a dinner party. 
11. The Non Executives perceived that it was important to trust and respect their 
Non Executive colleagues. They needed to feel certain that they could rely 
on them to understand issues, when they themselves did not. 
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12. Many Non Executives described feeling isolated on the board with nobody to 
turn to when they had a problem. 
13. The language of the boardroom was perceived by the study participants to 
almost always be financial. Financial language was perceived to limit the 
nature of debate and exclude softer issues such as corporate responsibility. 
However the study participants perceived that the language of `risk to 
reputation' was becoming more widespread. The Non Executives believed 
that using risk to reputation was more inclusive of softer issues. 
14. Some study participants reported that it was sometimes difficult to 
understand complex financial issues that were presented to them. In such 
cases the Non Executives relied heavily on the assumption that others in the 
boardroom would understand for them. 
15. Industry-specific language and acronyms were also a problem for many Non 
Executives, particularly in light of new governance standards, which suggest 
that Non Executives should be from outside of the organisation's specific 
industry. Some individuals perceived that others used this language as a 
form of power over them. 
16. Many Non Executives felt embarrassed about speaking out when they did not 
understand. Providing a dictionary of terms at the table was considered one 
good way to overcome this problem. 
17. Job Descriptions and proper inductions were rarely provided to new Non 
Executives. This left them feeling unclear about what was expected of them 
within the group. 
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18. Many Non Executives perceived that they needed more training; the study 
participants reported that little training was made available by their 
organisations and some Non Executive therefore made private arrangements. 
However, there was a general perception among the study participants that 
not enough training organisations were available, and of those that were, 
some were not always equipped to deal with the Non Executives' unique 
needs. 
19. Most Non Executives were used to being in charge of businesses in the role 
of CEO and appeared to find it frustrating to function as part of a team where 
they were not the alpha player and had less control of events. 
20. The Non Executives did not perceive that they received adequate feedback 
on their performance. Those Boards that did carry out evaluations tended to 
use "self evaluation" which the study participants believed was not really 
useful in helping them understand how others perceived their performance. 
Table 4.1 below encapsulates the emerging themes from this section of the analysis: 
k 
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Table 4.1 Summary of Emerging Themes Section One 
Theme I Expectation 
Formal processes 
Level of 
Discussion 
Operationalising 
the Agenda 
Strategic 
Clear and concise, possibly 
timed 
Information Open transfer of information 
Exchange Important to meet away from 
Executives sometimes 
Need to spend time as group 
Organisational Use diverse skill set to manage 
Complexity complexity 
The Language of Financial language viewed as a 
the Boardroom common denominator 
Experience 
Commonly operationally/technically focused 
Doesn't utilise NED's individual capabilities 
Important discussions often take place away from 
boardroom 
Information overload 
Timing of agenda may stifle debate 
Timing of agenda may be used to manipulation 
outcomes 
Frustration at misuse of time 
Information not always freely available 
Controlled by CEO 
Suspicion that information not always made 
available or accurate 
Difficult to administer because CEO's rarely 
endorse 
Pre meeting dinners, other contact often inhibited by 
CEO 
Personal scenarios used to understand larger issues 
Resort to financial language as common 
denominator 
Rely on others to understand some issues 
Even individuals with financial background report 
some difficulty in understanding complex financial 
issues 
Soft issues such as corporate responsibility more 
difficult to discuss because of financial language 
Language may be evolving towards that of risk and 
reputation 
Language - the Different industries have their Executives enjoy using jargon and may use it as 
use of jargon own jargon power 
NED's don't always understand and are intimidated 
by jargon 
Availability New governance requirements Some NED's participate by phone due to 
necessitate more meetings. unavailability 
NED's cannot "read" individuals when they are on 
the phone 
Informal 
processes Trust, respect and 
The peer group communication are vital 
Creating team Important to feel part of 
togetherness cohesive group 
Afraid to speak out for fear of ridicule by group 
Feelings of isolation discouraged from talking to 
one another outside of meetings 
Page 158 of 400 
Relationships 
with senior 
management 
Provide important linkage into 
organisation 
Would like more away days 
Pre meeting dinners with Executive present 
Discouraged or controlled by CEO 
NEDs perceived as arrogant and trying to tell the 
Executives their "business" 
Capabilities 
Skill diversity in Fill knowledge gaps through Peer respect important 
the role set diverse skill set Provide fresh perspective 
May help others find their voice 
Detrimental Boards should have diverse role May not have requisite skills 
effects of role set set Leads to over-reliance on ability of others to 
diversification Need more training understand 
May feel intimidated by board culture 
Pushing up cost of NED's 
Training/mentori Support and advice from fellow Feelings of intimidation and inadequacy due to: 
ng NED's Insufficient training 
Nobody to talk to 
Dispense bad practice 
Board Inadequate clarity over role No job descriptions 
assessments and requirements Poor feedback 
job description 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
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4.2 Section Two: Perceptions of Boardroom Leadership 
Figure 4.3 Section Layout 
4. Introduction 
4.1 Role Set 
Interactions 
4.2.1 Subjective 
Expectations of 
Relationship 
with CEO 
CEO Relationship with Board 
Controlling the Board 
4.2.3 Section 
Summary 
4.4 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
4.2.2 Expectations 
of Relationship 
with the Chairman 
4.3 Primary 
Role Focus 
Chairman's Role 
Relationship Between Chairman & CEO 
Separate or Combined Role 
Role Experience 
4.2.1 Subjective Expectations of Relationship with Chief Executive Officer 
Section two of this analysis will examine the Non Executive Directors' relationship 
with the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the Chairman of the Board. When 
reading the analysis of this section it is important to bear in mind that the study 
participants tended to occupy different boardroom roles across a number of different 
organisations. The Non Executive Directors were able to provide accounts of their 
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experiences on multiple boards. For example it was not uncommon for a participant 
in the study to hold, at any one time, a position as a CEO in one company, Chairman 
in another and two or three Non Executive positions. This, it is argued, gave these 
individual Non Executives an extra dimension in their subjectivity. When 
discussing for example their perceptions of the behaviour of the CEO, they were 
drawn to mentally assess their own behaviours within that same role. 
Many of the Non Executives had also experienced different types of boards, from 
those with a separate CEO and Chairman to those with the two roles embodied in 
one individual. They described situations where the Chairman had effectively been 
running the company and situations where the CEO ruled without question or 
influence from the board. They even described situations where the personalities of 
the individuals in the two roles had, in their opinion, merged to the point where there 
was no room for the contribution of the Non Executive team. Consequently, there 
now follows a discussion of the emerging themes around the Non Executive 
Directors' perceptions of the effect of the CEO and Chairman on their role and 
contribution. 
4.2.1.1 Chief Executive Officer's Relationship with the Board 
As the Non Executives talked about their expectations of their relationship with the 
Chief Executive it quickly became clear that this was, in their view, a highly 
complex relationship and relied not only on the skill and personality of the CEO but 
also the inter-relationships with the Chairman and the Non Executives. The 
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personalities and skills that each brought into the boardroom was perceived to have a 
profound effect on the resulting role and contribution of the Board members as a 
role set. Many used familial terms when describing the relationship between the 
Board and the CEO, father and child, husband and wife, the dinner party. One Non 
Executive went so far as to describe it as a polygamous marriage with the CEO - as 
the husband trying to keep his many wives happy and under control. 
Some Non Executives talked about the perceived importance of having a CEO who 
looked up to and respected the Non Executive Directors. The study participants felt 
that it was generally advantageous for the Non Executives (father figure) to be older 
than the CEO. The study participants believed that a CEO would find it easier to 
take advice from those they perceived as having more experience. One Non 
Executive described her own experience in the role of a CEO herself: 
I had some NED's but they weren't independent and they weren't older than I was, 
and they hadn't been there and done it before. And we made a lot of mistakes 
because all of us were learning. And if I ever had it to do over again the first thing 
I'd do is get some really experienced NED's who'd already done a buy-out of a 
business, run a big food company, who had really relevant experience.... It's 
ridiculous; you don't want anybody learning, I was learning, I needed somebody 
older who knows the ropes. 
NED 2 Anne 
Another Non Executive takes this point further as he tries to explain the importance 
of the CEO appreciating the value of the advice and guidance that he can acquire 
from the Non Executive team: 
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Unless the CEO has sufficient confidence in their ability to both advise the board and 
yet be supervised by the board, you have a difficult relationship there, and so 
depending upon their views, their compatibility, their self esteem, you may or may not 
have the ability to provide some of that education and some of that effort. 
NED 9 Geoff 
4.2.1.1a Character 
Emerging from the data were very strong perceptions from the Non Executives 
about the effect of character on the dynamics of the role set, particularly the 
character of the Chief Executive. Even though many of those who took part in the 
study were either currently or previously had been Chief Executives in their own 
right, they were not as a body very complimentary about the characteristics of the 
average CEO. The words "aggressive", "arrogant" and "robust" were commonly 
used by the Non Executives to describe their perceptions of the characteristics of the 
individuals in the Chief Executive's role. In the following excerpts, three Non 
Executives describe their personal perceptions of the Chief Executives with whom 
they have been involved: 
CEO's, we learn the skill of making things that stink smell good. That's part of what 
we are paid for. On the darkest day you say "But our strategy is right, we are 
committed to it we have got all the right people in place. 
NED 19 John 
CEO's are very arrogant, they are very aggressive, they have all the personality 
traits which would make them in fact lousy board members and yet everyone looks for 
CEO's instead of being a board member where you are consensus-building. A CEO is 
supposed to be visionary, aggressive, all the things that if you are on a board there is 
and inherent disconnect. 
NED 3 Liza 
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By the time they get to the CEO position, they tend to be quite, what's the word for it, 
robust, and they want to get their own way and they're determined to do so and you 
wouldn't want them there if they didn't. 
NED 7 Jane 
Although many of the Non Executives discussed the negative effects of overly 
domineering Chief Executives, it also emerged from the data that other personality 
traits could have a negative effect on the ability of the Non Executives to make a 
useful contribution. For example one Non Executive described a highly charismatic 
CEO who was so persuasive in his arguments that nobody, including herself, ever 
questioned his actions. She describes this in her own words in the following 
passage: 
Our previous CEO was an American, a very charismatic guy and consequently 
people didn't question him. I was talking to some execs afterwards and they said 
"Why didn't you say anything? " There are always difficult situations but it is your 
responsibility. 
NED 17 Vicky 
Another Non Executive described her experience with a Chief Executive, who she 
perceived tried to intimidate the board into not asking questions. In the following 
excerpt she describes his reaction when one of her colleagues asked a question about 
the effect on the company's workforce, of a proposal that the Executive team 
considered a "done deal": 
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(He) was irritated by the question, and even more irritated by the reply. The reply 
was that we didn't know, he didn't know, what the effect would be on unemployment. 
He hadn't even thought it was relevant. Actually the effect on unemployment was 
horrendous in that area and so what he did at that point unilaterally, not the board, 
was decide to put the whole bloody thing on the back burner, so he didn't close those 
things, what we did, was two years later, was to sell it. 
NED 7 Jane 
The study participants discussed their perception that the CEO needed to maintain 
control over the boardroom group and the information the group received. The Non 
Executives felt that there tended to be a certain amount of insecurity embodied in the 
very nature of the Chief Executive's role. The study participants also reported their 
perception that some CEO's were predisposed to certain controlling personality 
traits, which might lead such a CEO to adopt a controlling style with the board 
members. The vignettes provided by Non Executive Directors in the following 
excerpts provide an interesting insight into the common perceptions of the Non 
Executives about the CEO's they worked with: 
Don't you dare get in contact with a board member, oh they'll kill 'em, and I don't 
think that is right at all as a matter offact I mentioned to the CEO ... I said you know 
I want to spend a day a month on site so that management has an alternative, "Oh! I 
really need to think about that. " And I wanted to say well you don't really need to 
think about it, I need to think if I am going to listen to you because basically I can, 
you know, I don't want to pull rank, I don't want to do that. 
NED 3 Liza 
What are you going to do, if you got together with a couple of the other guys and you 
had a dinner and (CEO) found out about that, he'd have gone ballistic. He would 
have called you all in, one by one, and said did you have any concerns that he was 
unaware of, and he'd have made you feel absolutely frightful, I'm pretty 
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certain.... You wouldn't have dared speak out and I think all of us were terrified of 
him. 
NED 7 Jane 
The Non Executives often described scenarios where they were apparently paralysed 
into inaction by the personality of the Chief Executive. Almost all of those who 
took part in the study discussed times when they had not contributed in the 
boardroom because of feelings of inadequacy, 'despite feeling strongly about an 
issue. 
4.2.1.1b Pressure 
As the research progressed some of the reasons for the perceived behaviour of the CEO 
began to emerge. One Non Executive went to some lengths to try to explain why he 
perceived CEO's often feel the need to be in complete control of the board, to the extent 
where they may choose not to seek help even when they desperately need it: 
Here you have a secret ballot and a CEO with a job that's either going to prove him 
or finish him. He's put in some office like a rock, and he inherits this huge jury and 
the jury votes on him and he's got theoretically hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders but really it's the vast institutions sitting on billions of dollars. In a 
community full of hotshot, really smart analysts who are constantly ranking you, you 
are told that every six months you've got to produce. The pressure is that you'd 
better look back and everybody else's figures had better be worse than yours and 
certainly better than the last set of figures and in fact you're meant to slightly 
indicate what you expect those figures to be and then by God they had better be good. 
The pressure is huge to create big figures. 
NED 18 Joe 
The Non Executives described the importance of being able to "gently" push the 
CEO, they perceived that CEO's tended to focus on the positive parts of their 
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performance whilst glossing over any problems that they might be having, as is 
described in the next example: 
Very often Chief Executives rather want to talk about the past, particularly if it's 
rather good. But you've got to push them forward, "That's fine! Great deal! What 1 
are we doing to repeat it? " 
NED 6 Laurence 
It emerged from the data that the Non Executives perceived the need to provide the 
CEO with an environment where he would feel supported and able to come forward 
with a problem whenever it was necessary. Further analysis of this issue revealed 
that the Non Executives found this to be a very challenging issue for them to balance 
within their personal understanding of the role. They perceived that it was very 
difficult to reach a balance between being viewed as supportive and at the same time 
acting as the "hirer and firer". The next three comments exemplified the perceptions 
of many of those who took part in the study: 
I really think, for survival's sake, the smart CEO will look at a longer term. They'll 
look at the community too; they'll look at society. The smart ones will do that and be 
able to explain that to boards and have boards support them. I know it's not easy 
when you have stock out there and you have investors wanting you to create more 
value, all the time, more value. 
NED 12 Ruben 
In a way one role in the board is to stabilise things and to try and save the CEO even 
though you are sitting there almost like a congressional committee saying "Well, go 
figure. " To give the CEO a sense of support almost a kind of buffer a safe place for 
them to sit. 
NED 18 Joe 
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What is written in the press from day to day is here today and gone tomorrow; we 
have to keep paying attention to the underlying vectors for the success of this 
business. 
NED 10 Phillip 
The Non Executives believed it was very important that there was clarity in their 
role and also that of the Chief Executive. Intriguingly though, they also perceived 
there was routinely a lack of communication concerning what was expected of each 
individual within the team. This is illustrated in the next remark: 
It's a very delicate issue, at least it's been my experience, and it's been a very 
delicate issue in terms of the relationship between the CEO and the board and there's 
got to be some communication on what's expected, and it really depends on the 
quality of the relationship. 
NED 9 Geoff 
4.2.1.2 Controlling the Board 
4.2.1.2a Meetings 
There was a great deal of debate among interviewees about the effect on the board 
and particularly the relationship with the CEO of so-called "informal sessions", 
where the Board of Directors meets away from the Chief Executive. Some study 
participants felt that the use of informal meetings was divisive and made the CEO 
feel extremely uncomfortable, particularly if such meetings were not planned in 
advance. This in turn, the Non Executives perceived, could lead to poor or short- 
term performance within the organisation. Because the CEO might become inclined 
to seek short-term profits at the expense of the long-term health of the company in 
order to protect his job, rather than looking at the long-term stability of the 
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organisation. The Non Executives talked at length about the importance of a "safe 
haven" where the CEO could make long-term decisions without the ever-looming 
threat of the City hanging over him. 
It emerged that some study participants perceived that because Non Executives had 
the same responsibilities as the full time Executive Board members, sessions should 
always be open to all members. Others study participants felt that it was important 
for the Non Executives to meet away from the full-time Executive members on a 
regular but planned basis, particularly when discussing succession planning. There 
was, however, general agreement among the Non Executives that the CEO would 
always try to discourage meetings where he was not present. In the next excerpt a 
Non Executive who also works as a CEO describes his feelings about the Non 
Executive Directors in "his" boardroom. 
You can't have Non Executive people having the opportunity to swoop in, you know, 
four, six, seven times a year, make decisions about strategy and then not be held 
accountable for the execution or the success or failure of those strategies. It just 
cannot be. 
NED 11 Barry 
Although formal meetings without the presence of the CEO were reported as not 
often encouraged, pre meeting dinners were very common but usually with either the 
CEO and/or Chairman in attendance. These were described by the study participants 
as less formal than the board meeting and were designed to allow more time to 
discuss matters, although interestingly these dinners often still had a formal agenda. 
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We used to meet as Non Executives before every dinner before the board meeting. 
The CEO never liked it, but there is a very strong argument that you should do that. 
NED 15 Martin 
4.2.1.2b Chief Executives' Appointment Preferences 
Emerging from the data was an interesting dilemma, the Non Executive Directors 
perceived that above all else it was important they should all "get along" with each 
other and be able to operate as a team for the benefit of the organisation. However, 
those who took part in the study believed that the CEO had a strong preference for 
inviting other Chief Executives to sit on "his" board which, as we have already 
discussed, may lead to a slanted group of personality types within the team. Many 
of the Non Executives mused at the contrary nature of this imbalance. 
What most Chairs are looking for is the Non Executive Director who's been a Chief 
Executive somewhere else, but who's now become a tabby cat. They don't want 
someone who's going to come in and throw their weight around because that of 
course is not the role and in fact many, many chairs have complained to me about 
Chief Executives coming onto their board and creating hell, because as you say, they 
are going to dominate the proceedings. 
NED 7 Jane 
Another Non Executive candidly explained where he perceived the reason for this 
preference amongst Chief Executives came from: 
Funny thing that I've observed, I haven't been able to put my finger on it but there's a 
club, there's something that exists where CEO's don't like to get rid of CEO's, and I 
don't think CEO's like to criticise other CEO's nor be criticised. And so there is 
probably some unwritten rule around their interaction. 
NED 5 Brian 
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Some of the Non Executives also perceived that the CEO might feel threatened and 
intimidated by a very experienced new member, particularly one who had a set of 
skills not possessed by others on the board. 
I would say it's as challenging, maybe more so, challenging for the CEO when you 
bring in a new outside director because maybe he is from a very different place. As 
well as quite challenging to the new director himself and the balance of the board. 
NED 14 David 
Integrating the new member, the study participants perceived, often required hard work as 
well as a clear understanding of the role requirements of both parties. 
4.2.2 Expectations of Relationship with the Chairman 
The Non Executives previously described how they believed that a young CEO with 
an older group of board members was ideal, because they perceived it was easier for 
a younger person to take advice. The Non Executives felt they had more to offer in 
terms of their greater experience to a younger "protegee". In line with this thinking, 
the Non Executives perceived the importance of having an older chairman who 
would not feel the need to "compete" with the Chief Executive. 
We are quite lucky, the CEO is quite new and a young fellow. The Chairman is 65 
and very experienced I think that because of the age difference it works very well. 
There is no competition between them, which I have seen can cause problems. They 
work very well together and the Chairman is very supportive of the board. 
NED 8 Thomas 
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The Non Executives expected that the CEO and the Chairman should have very 
different roles. They perceived that the CEO should run the business and the 
Chairman should run the board. There was a strong feeling among the study 
participants that the Chairman should be someone the Non Executives could come 
and talk to if they were worried about something, without fear of reprisals from the 
CEO. To achieve this they felt that the CEO and Chairman needed to be clearly 
separated from each other. The sentiment of the majority of study participants is 
captured in the following remarks: 
The CEO manages the business and the Chairman manages the board, I mean that's 
the first thing, the management of the board. To make sure that the board performs its 
proper function, its proper function relative to the Executives, so that you've got the 
right balance between the two. 
NED 15 Martin 
The Executive Director or the Senior Manager has to see that the Chairman is 
actually a person apart from the CEO. No particular attachment to the CEO. 
NED 18 Joe 
Although the Non Executives perceived the importance of a clear distinction 
between the role of CEO and that of Chairman of the Board, they also believed that 
it was imperative that these two individuals should have a strong relationship with 
each other. It was perceived as crucial that the CEO should feel able to call upon the 
Chairman when he felt unsure about an issue or just needed someone to `mull' 
things over with. This is captured in the next two excerpts: 
At a senior level you have to have an ability to work well with those around you. I 
think making sure that the Chairman and CEO work well together is probably the 
most important relationship. 
NED 17 Vicky 
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The key thing is the relationship between the Chief Executive and the Chairman, 
which has to be a sharing really of values and approach, and general philosophy I 
think towards the business or towards the organisation and if that doesn't work 
properly then it's absolutely evident I think throughout the whole organisation. 
NED 23 Rachel 
A number of Non Executives pointed out the importance of having a Chairman who 
understood the organisation so that the Executives were not having to constantly 
explain things to him. However it also emerged from the interviews that there was a 
major caveat here. Although the Non Executives believed it to be advantageous to 
have a Chairman with experience of the industry and specifically the company itself, 
they argued that it was dangerous to move a retiring Executive, particularly the 
CEO, into the Chairman's role. The explanation that follows is typical of those 
received during the research: 
Let's say I am ready to retire and they say OK you retire from CEO to Non Executive 
Chairman and then we bring the new CEO in and he runs the company. But here is 
what happens, everything the new CEO wants to do or change is directly a shot at the 
Chairman who has to sit there at the meeting and almost defend himself for how we 
got into this situation that he feels so strongly needs to be rectified. 
NED 19 John 
Other study participants described situations where the CEO had taken over the role 
of Chairman at retirement and had continued to manage the company instead of 
allowing the new CEO to do his job. 
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Well the CEO has been getting a bit more petulant. He is starting to get a bit fed up 
with people asking him and challenging him. He is quite an arrogant guy in his own 
way. He is very charming... The Chairman is sometimes overcompensating for being 
the former CEO; it is still very clearly his strategy. The new CEO has not actually 
emerged from underneath, although he has been in place for three years 
NED 4 Ray 
4.2.2.1 The Chairman's Role 
There was strong feeling among the Non Executives that when there was a 
separation between the role of CEO and Chairman, the Chairman should be in 
charge of the board, freeing the CEO to get on with the job of running the business. 
This is illustrated in the following comments: 
A good Chairman is invaluable to the success of the board; they should be a 
facilitator to the board and a friend to the CEO. The role should not be too dominant 
but create open and free discussions. 
NED 16 Roberta 
I think it's the Chairman's role to manage the board, agenda and so on. 
NED 6 Laurence 
The subtlety of the role distinctions between that of the CEO and Chairman were 
highlighted on a number of occasions during the research by the study participants, 
emphasising the fact that all boards are very different and their characters dictated 
by the experience and characters of those within the boardroom role set. One Non 
Executive pointed out that the combined code in the UK requires that a distinction 
between the CEO and Chairman be written down. He commented on the difficulty 
of writing such a statement: 
(It's) quite difficult to put down on paper sometimes because there may be 
differential, the chemistry may be different and therefore you want to play to the 
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strengths. So, if you have a Chairman who has huge industry connections and the 
new CEO who doesn't, then the Chairman should continue to push the industry 
connections whereas the CEO is doing what he has been hired to do. Um, so it's not 
a simple line down the middle saying that side the Chairman, that side the Chief 
Executive. It will vary a bit. But no, the Chairman shouldn't become a proxy Chief 
Executive. 
NED 6 Laurence 
In general the Non Executives believed that the Chairman should be their first line 
of contact with the board and that the ability of the Chairman to manage this 
relationship was critical to the successful use of their contribution: 
I think it has a lot to do with the behaviour of the CEO and Chairman. The Chairman 
often asks people for an opinion and encourages us to speak out. I think that really 
makes a difference, people feel that they can make a point. 
NED 8 Thomas 
The help and advice of the Chairman was considered to be particularly valuable 
when first joining a board, as it was perceived as giving the Non Executive an 
insight into the tone of the board that he was joining. One Non Executive described 
a tip that he received from a Chairman when first joining a very prominent board. 
The Non Executive now passes this advice on to new board members of the boards 
on which he sits: 
I always remember when I was first appointed to (the board), the then Chairman at 
the end of the interview, he said, well he said, "May 1 offer you one bit of advice on 
joining the board? " I said, "Yes. " He said, "I've always found it helpful if new 
Directors don't speak for three meetings. " 
NED 6 Laurence 
Although not contributing for any period of time might appear to be a rather bizarre 
suggestion, many of the study participants perceived that it was important only to 
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provide input where necessary. As one Non Executive put it "The board does not 
meet for your personal edification. " 
Although all those who took part in the study agreed that the Chairman ought to 
provide a valuable resource for the Non Executives to make their own contribution 
to the board, many study participants spoke of negative experiences with different 
Chairmen over their careers: 
In the two years when he and I overlapped I managed about two or three minutes in a 
bar with him once. That was all. He just ran away from it all. He had the social 
manners of a goat and he just didn't want to get involved. Any Minister came and he 
was there. But dealing with his board members, getting them together and using 
them, and directing them into jobs that they could do, he just had no idea. Dreadful. 
NED 4 Ray 
I said something about how hard it was to work with the former Chairman because he 
so trivialised women and he was such an abusive type of person and that while to my 
face he was like, well you know we were so lucky to get someone so smart and all this 
baloney, I always felt like he discounted what I had to say. And this guy said, "Eh, 
you know once you joined we already had high level people. I am a little lawyer from 
Grand Island and you know that is the same way he treated me ". I always felt like he 
would listen to me and then discount it - and I thought maybe it's not gender specific. 
NED 3 Liza 
The comments of the study participants above highlight the importance of having a 
Chairman with "people skills". Their words are typical of many stories that 
emerged from the research. It was common for the Non Executives to feel 
discounted by the Chairman and CEO to the point where they perceived themselves 
as unable to function at all in the boardroom. The next quotes highlight the level of 
demoralisation that some Non Executives have on occasion reached: 
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I really find my self almost immobilised by my own had attitude or my own 
distortions. l find myself quite immobilised in that way. 
NED 4 Ray 
I felt completely ineffective. 
NED 7 Jane 
4.2.2.2 Relationship between the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer 
The effect of the Chairman and CEO emerged as a consistent theme during the 
interviews. Many Non Executives seemed to be intimidated by the CEO, particularly 
if the Chairman was seen to be very involved with the day-to-day business of the 
organisation rather than just the management of the board. The Non Executives 
described situations in which the Chairman and CEO were perceived to have formed 
a "double act" in their attempt to control the board, rather than seeking advice from 
it. Such a situation is described in the next quotation: 
He (the CEO) ended up in a kind of Butch and Sundance combination. They were a 
pretty impressive in combination, and because they so much identified with each 
other, they tended sort of to bypass us. In truth, this is all in truth, they would bypass 
the board in fact. Not that the board necessarily would cough to this. 
NED 18 Joe 
The Non Executives were almost unanimously of the opinion that the Chairman ` 
should lead the board and the CEO the company. However, they described a number 
of situations where this did not happen. Quite frequently the Chairman was 
perceived as effectively trying to control the company rather than just the board. 
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The difficulty, of course, is that although it has to be a very close partnership, there 
also has to be sufficient distance because part of the role of the Chairman is to hold 
the CEO to account and so that at times of course can present a slight conflict. 
NED 23 Rachel 
The presence of an overly controlling Chairman appeared to have a major effect on 
the team dynamic. For instance, one Non Executive recounted an occasion when her 
(very dominant) Chairman believed that she would vote against a multi billion-dollar 
deal into which he had put a great amount of energy. When it came to the vote the 
Chairman went around the table one by one asking each of the 13 other board 
member yes or no, leaving the individual with acknowledged reservations until the 
very last, as the individual put it "crushing my vote". 
Another study participant who, coincidently sat on the same board, recounted the 
same deal, with similar misgivings about its outcome. This Non Executive was so 
overwhelmed by the force of the Chairman's argument that he didn't even raise his 
doubts with the board. A factor that came through very clearly, and was discussed in 
detail in section one, was the importance particularly to the Chairman of having 
consensus in board meetings, a number of interviewees commented on the desire to 
avoid any kind of split in the board, which may explain the controlling behaviour of 
some Chairmen. 
Despite the Non Executives' perception of the problems of having an overly 
controlling "hands on" Chairman, it also emerged that some perceived the need for 
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their Chairman to push their CEO harder, particularly when there appeared to be a 
lack of strategic direction. This is captured in the next excerpt: 
In my view (the CEO has) an insufficient capacity to take a strategic view and he was 
very much a hands-on man. He would come with the sense that because we were 
doing it, it must be right and if you've got that sort of guy, you've got to have a 
Chairman who is actively challenging him all the time to look for the other strategic 
path and I think it failed at that level and because it failed at that level, it failed at our 
level too. 
NED 10 Phillip 
4.2.2.3 Separate or Combined Role? 
Many of the Non Executives in the study had experienced working on boards with a 
combined Chairman and CEO and also boards where the two roles were separated. 
There were mixed feelings among the study participants about the efficacy of both 
designs. Few Non Executives believed that either was wholly effective. There was, 
however, a general agreement that the nuances of personal characteristics were what, 
in the end, made a difference between a successful board team and an unsuccessful 
one. 
The majority of those who took part in the study perceived that there needed to be 
someone other than the CEO, to whom the Non Executives could talk, if not a 
Chairman then a Lead Director. Some study participants discussed the importance 
of the CEO having the time to actually run the business. They argued that if the 
CEO were also acting as Chairman, the time he had available for managerial duties 
would be greatly reduced. The next excerpt summarises the opinions of many of the 
Non Executives: 
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I have never believed that the Chairman and the CEO should be in the same person, 
they are two completely different roles. The CEO should absolutely be an active 
voting board member, get nominated and voted by shareholders, so one vote just like 
everybody else but sitting at the end of the table should be either a Lead Director or a 
Chairman of the board and the Chairman needs to be someone who is comfortable 
and familiar with the business that this company is in, so that the CEO does not have 
to spend a lot of time explaining to that person "Here is the deal. " 
NED 19 John 
The Non Executive Chairman plays a vital role here, providing stability and aiding 
communication between the CEO and the board. 
NED 16 Roberta 
Some study participants highlighted the difference in focus that could be created 
through the use of two separate individuals in the roles of CEO and Chairman. The 
Non Executives argued that the CEO was naturally focused on short-term profits, 
whereas a Chairman has greater freedom to look at longer-term issues and the 
overall tone, reputation and sustainability of the organisation: 
Chief Executives will be, perhaps, more reluctant to set those tones than the 
Chairman because the CEO could see it as just a cost on the company and therefore a 
negative to his bonuses. 
NED 6 Laurence 
A few Non Executives, who were all interestingly Chief Executives themselves, 
believed that the two roles were best combined into one person. They argued that 
the CEO was ultimately responsible for the company's results; they perceived that a 
Chairman was often given authority without real responsibility, which they believed 
to be inappropriate. This was a particularly perplexing line of argument as all board 
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members have equal responsibility for the company's performance. They explain 
their beliefs in the next two comments: 
I've had the opportunity to wear every hat. I've been CEO when I wasn't Chairman, 
I've been CEO and Chairman, I've been Chairman when I wasn't CEO. I've had all 
hats. Frankly I think the best one is the combination of CEO and Chairman. And the 
reason for that is that you have (responsibility). You don't have the responsibility as 
Chairman, you are not engaged in the ongoing management. 
NED 1 Warren 
I think that the trade-off is back to that issue of accountability - who actually owns the 
results. We have a unified Chairman and CEO in one person and the positive of that 
is that it is crystal clear to all parties who owns the strategy, who owns the 
performance, who's accountable and who is in power. And so, things like speed of 
decision-making, clarity of communication, those things are enhanced by having that 
unified power base. 
NED 11 Barry 
Many of the Non Executives advocated the use of a Lead Director, whether a 
separate Chairman was present or not. They perceived that the role provided a useful 
buffer between the board and the Chairman and CEO in times of crisis. 
A senior independent director should be there as, in a way, a custodian of the 
shareholders' trust - somebody they can approach if they have concerns that have not 
been reconciled with the Chairman and Chief Executive. They should only go to the 
senior independent director when they feel they are getting nowhere, otherwise you 
create, you get divisiveness again. 
NED 6 Laurence 
We have a Lead Director that is appointed, so one of the outside directors, not an 
Executive, plays the role of lead and is the primary liaison between management and 
the board. And I think some of the values of having a separated Chairman are picked 
up in that Lead Director role. 
NED 11 Barry 
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4.2.2.4 Role Experience: Creating a Positive Environment 
The study participants perceived the importance of receiving encouragement and 
positive reinforcement from both the CEO and the Chairman. The Non Executives 
described how they felt that they worked harder and felt more capable and confident 
to offer help and guidance when they believed themselves to be valued by the CEO 
and Chairman. The comments of the next two Non Executive Directors are typical 
of those of the study participants in general: 
Well, I think it has a lot to do with the CEO and Chairman. They really make an 
effort to ask us all for our opinions, encourage us to speak out and that really makes 
a difference. 
NED 8 Thomas 
The CEO was a maestro... he found a way, as the communication expert he was, to 
make each board member feel valued and it's a typical thing that you see, you tend to 
do more. Step forward you volunteer. 
NED 3 Liza 
4.2.3 Summary Section Two 
Emerging powerfully from the research was the perceived effect of the CEO and 
Chairman on the ability of the Non Executive Directors to make an effective 
contribution to boardroom activities. The Non Executives discussed in great detail 
their perceptions of the role of these two key members and their effects on the 
dynamics of the boardroom role set. 
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The following sub themes emerged from the analysis concerning the perceived role 
of the CEO and Chairman: 
1. The Chief Executive's relationship with the board was perceived by the 
study participants to be highly complex. The ability of an individual CEO to 
relate to the board was perceived to directly affect the ability of the Non 
Executive to contribute. 
2. When a separate Chairman was in post the Non Executives perceived that the 
Chairman should manage the board so that the CEO could concentrate on 
managing the business. These roles, the study participants perceived, should 
be supported by clear job descriptions to avoid misunderstandings. 
3. The Chairman's role was perceived by the study participants to involve the 
complex balancing of relationships, both with and between the CEO and 
other Board members. 
4. Age was considered by the Non Executives to be an important factor in the 
dynamic of the relationships in the boardroom. It was perceived as being 
advantageous to have a CEO who was younger than the rest of the Board and 
a Chairman who was older than the CEO. 
5. Moving a retiring CEO into the role of Chairman was considered to be 
dangerous, because it was perceived by the Non Executives to impair the 
ability of the new CEO, and lead to divided loyalty and alienation within the 
Boardroom role set. 
6. It was perceived that Chief Executives were predisposed to be overly 
domineering and controlling and thus frequently stifled the Non Executives' 
ability to make a useful contribution. 
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7. CEO's were perceived by the study participants to be inclined to populate the 
boardroom with other Chief Executives, because they possess similar 
personality and experience attributes to their own; this may to lead to a 
dysfunctional role set. 
8. The CEO was perceived by the Non Executives as being under constant 
pressure to maintain and improve corporate results. The Non Executives 
believed that part of their role should be to protect the CEO from the short- 
term market. - 
9. As a result of the constant pressures facing the CEO, the Non Executives 
perceived that he might attempt to gloss over bad news. The study 
participants believed, therefore, that it was necessary to "gently push" the 
CEO from time to time. 
10. The Non Executives perceived that the communication of expectations 
between the Chief Executive, Chairman and the rest of the Board was 
essential; despite this they perceived that there was little attempt to provide 
information. 
11. Meeting away from the CEO was considered by the study participants to 
provide a useful opportunity to discuss delicate issues, particularly 
succession planning. However, the Non Executives perceived that their Chief 
Executives did not always approve of, or encourage, such meetings. 
12. Although most of those who took part in the study believed in the separation 
of the roles of Chairman and CEO a few Non Executives argued that the 
joint role created clearer lines of responsibility and communication. 
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13. Separation of the role of CEO and Chairman was perceived by the Non 
Executive Directors as a way of encouraging long-term sustainability, 
because the study participants believed that although the CEO might be 
expected to focus on short-term profitability the Chairman may be more 
inclined to take a longer term view of the business. 
In summary, the emerging outcomes of the analysis of this theme suggest that 
ensuring the CEO and Chairman are able to function as team, with distinct and 
separate roles that are explicitly understood by the whole role set, is essential. What 
is more, the CEO and Chairman need to appreciate and also communicate the value 
of the contribution of their Non Executive Directors. In the following model 
emerging themes are represented to show the study participants perceptions of the 
effect of the CEO and Chairman on the role and contribution of the individual Non 
Executive Director. The model highlights the importance of creating a positive 
environment within the boardroom, where the CEO and Chairman actively recognise 
and reinforce the value of the contribution of the Non Executive team: 
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Figure 4.4. Perceived Effect on Contribution of the CEO and Chairman 
Value 
Encourage --º Contribution 
Inform 
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Ignore 
-j 
-º Inaction 
Intimidate 
Source: Compiled by the author 
If Non Executive Directors perceive that they are considered a valuable resource 
they are likely to contribute fully in the boardroom process. Creating an environment 
where the Non Executives feel valued was perceived by the study participants to 
require reflexivity, particularly on the part of the Chairman. Table 4.2 below 
outlines the emerging themes from this section of the analysis. 
Table 4.2 Summary of Emerging Themes Section Two 
Theme Expectation Experience 
Relationship with Look up to and respect NED CEO may intimidate NED's 
CEO CEO should run the business NED's often felt undervalued in the relationship 
not the board May try to control information flow to NED's 
Discourages personal relationships among role set 
members 
Encouragement from CEO may enhance motivation 
to contribute 
Character Arrogant, robust, aggressive CEO's may intimidate NED's into passive 
behaviour 
Charismatic CEO's sometimes have the same effect 
CEO's need to feel in control 
Pressure Under constant pressure from CEO may gloss over bad news - NED's need to 
markets "gently push" 
NED 
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Meetings 
CEO Preferences 
Informal sessions away from 
CEO are useful for team 
building and succession 
planning 
Wants other CEO's with similar 
backgrounds on the board 
Relationship CEO should ideally be younger 
between CEO than the Chairman 
and Chairman CEO needs to respect and trust 
the Chairman 
NED's need to see the 
Chairman as separate from the 
CEO 
Combined CEO Neither combined or separate 
and Chairman considered wholly satisfactory 
Relationship with Older and respected Available 
Chairman to and facilitator for NED's 
Clearly separate from CEO 
Should not be competing with 
the CEO but share values and 
philosophy 
Role of Run the board 
Chairman Set the agenda 
Must understand the business 
Encourage NED's to speak out 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
NED's should provide a safe environment for CEO 
to make long-term decisions 
CEO's are uncomfortable about informal session 
Some argue that everyone has equal responsibilities 
so everyone should be present 
May lead to slanted group of personality types in 
team 
CEO's don't like to criticise other CEO's 
CEO may feel intimidated by individuals who have 
expertise beyond their own 
When CEO/Chair relationship is too close NED's 
sometimes find it intimidating to approach the 
Chairman 
CEO and Chairman might work together to control 
the board 
Personal characteristics key to success 
Without separate roles there needs to be a lead 
director 
CEO's time reduced if running board and company 
Combined role leads to clarity of responsibility and 
chain of command 
Less likely to consider social factors because CEO 
tends to be more profit focused than Chairman 
Sometimes individuals moved from CEO to 
Chairman on retirement which creates a power 
struggle and confuses role boundaries for team 
Sometimes aloof 
May discount or trivialise NED's perspective 
Some consider that Chairman has authority without 
responsibility 
May try to run the company as well as the board 
Ability of Chairman to manage relationships is key 
Chairman will always try to avoid a split board 
Chairman needs to be able to push the CEO 
Chairman may be more sensitive to social and 
reputational factors 
Page 187 of 400 
4.3 Section Three: Primary Role Focus 
Figure 4.5 Section Layout 
4. Introduction 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
The Non Executive Directors who took part in this study were asked to articulate 
their perceptions of the Non Executive role. Responses focused primarily on three 
key aspects of the role, characterised as: 
  Controller 
'  Archetype 
  Boundary spanner 
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Within these specific roles the subsequent analysis will firstly explore the Non 
Executive Directors' perceptions of their expectations of their role. This is followed 
by an analysis of emergent themes pertaining to their perceptions of their experience 
of the actual role. 
4.3.1 Role: Controller 
A common expectation emerging from the study participants was that their role as a 
Non Executive Director would endow them with a certain degree of power and 
control within the boardroom. The Non Executive Directors described two 
functions of their role, which afforded them perceived control: 
  Hirer and Firer 
  Patroller 
4.3.1a Role Expectations: Hirer and Firer 
The Non Executive Directors perceived that an important part of their role was to 
provide leadership in times of major crisis; for example, to act when it became 
necessary to dismiss the CEO or Chairman of the company. Although there was a 
consensus that such an event was quite rare, possibly only happening once or twice 
in an entire career, it was generally considered to be a defining element of the 
overall role. The comments that follow highlight the strength of this belief: 
Number one job of the board is to hire and fire the CEO. It's something you work on; 
it's like a marriage. It's one of those things where you may not completely agree on 
everything, but it is true you'd better communicate. 
NED 1 Warren 
Page 189 of 400 
The whole job of a good board is to be able to fire the Chairman. 
NED 2 Anne 
Ensuring the succession is a classic job description. 
NED 3 Liza 
4.3.1b Role Experience: Hiring and Firing 
The Non Executives discussed their expectation that they would have a certain 
degree of control in the boardroom. The study participants envisaged themselves as 
having a patrolling role and felt that being able to hire and fire the CEO and 
Chairman was a crucial part of their raison d'etre. However, despite the study 
participants' expectations of power and control in the boardroom, their accounts of 
actual behaviour in and around the boardroom would suggest that their experiences 
of power and control differed somewhat from those expectations. Emerging from the 
data was a strong impression that the Non Executives often experienced feeling 
powerless to act when they believed that something needed to be changed. 
The Non Executives described at length the importance of showing accord and 
working together with others in the boardroom in order to achieve positive 
outcomes. The study participants discussed how they sometimes felt 
disenfranchised from the hiring process by the Chairman and CEO. The CEO and 
Chairman were perceived by the study participants on occasion to hire new board 
members who represented their own personal interests, with little real consultation 
with the rest of the board. This is encapsulated in the next excerpt: 
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The chairman has briefed the head-hunter, seen the people. It was his view of the 
balance. The nomination committee has just nodded it in. Actually I haven't even met 
the guy. We haven't been consulted. I told them to get on with it. 
NED 4 Ray 
The above comment also highlights the frustration that feeling disenfranchised from 
the decision-making process can create for the individual Non Executive. As Ray 
puts it "I told them to get on with it. " This will be discussed in detail in the next 
chapter. 
The study participants discussed the problem of vested interest in the board 
preventing the Non Executives from acting in the capacity of `hirer and firer'. A 
common situation involved a retiring CEO being moved into the role of Chairman 
and subsequently manipulating the board to prevent their own and their allies' 
removal. More than one study participant discussed situations where attempts to 
remove a very elderly Chairman had failed because board members feared the 
repercussions of challenging him. One Non Executive described the kind of power 
that he felt the Non Executives needed to have, in order to be successful, as follows: 
They have to have the power and privilege of questioning the decisions of the 
company without risk. 
NED 5 Brian 
4.3.1c Role Experience: Hiring and Firing Enablers 
It emerged that when the Non Executives did find a way to work as a cohesive 
group, they reported that they did have the power to make the changes they believed 
were necessary. One Non Executive discussed how en masse the company's senior 
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executives had come to him and told him that they had lost faith in the Chairman 
and CEO. By the next day the Non Executive had taken the views of all his 
colleagues. In the excerpt below he recounts the subsequent conversation with the 
Chief Executive: 
(The CEO said) "I think we've got a board meeting in ten days. I think we can 
discuss it then. "I said, "Well we actually have called a board meeting for 4.30 this 
afternoon. " (This was at 2.30. ) "Everybody will be there. " 
NED 6 Laurence 
The study participants suggested that it was much easier to make difficult decisions 
when you could rely on those around you to provide support particularly, as in the 
above example, in times of crisis. The Non Executives further discussed how it 
helped if there were Non Executive Directors present on the board who the rest of 
the board perceived to be powerful in terms of their capabilities. The next two 
comments highlight this observation: 
I'll tell you who was effective. He just had to say something at a meeting and the 
chairman respected him, he was a heavy weight in the City. He had a lot of influence, 
and a lot of sway and 1 think I saw him change things. 
NED 7 Jane 
The Non Executives can (challenge) if they are very powerful people. 
NED 4 Ray 
4.3.1d Role Expectations: Patroller 
The Non Executive Directors' expectations were that their role as `patroller' was 
complex. The study participants perceived that it would involve balancing role 
behaviour between that of the receptive and knowledgeable counsellor, providing 
support and a `safe place' for the CEO to take long-term decisions, and that of the 
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supervisory -agent, ensuring the Executives were performing their roles in an 
appropriate and satisfactory manner. 
4.3.1e Role Experience: Patroller 
In line with the Non Executives' expectations it emerged that the Non Executives' 
experience of their role as `patroller' was seen to be both complex and difficult. 
Participants discussed the problems they perceived in acting as both patroller and 
advisor. The Non Executives perceived that to execute their patrolling role they 
needed to be able to function as an effective group. The study participants argued 
that they often lacked the requisite understanding of complex organisational issues 
necessary to adequately patrol the Executive team. The study participants frequently 
reported having to rely on others to understand issues, which they did not understand 
themselves. This was discussed in more detail in section one of the analysis, but is 
highlighted here by the following selection: 
It's just impossible, without actually having the time to really sit down and think 
about something to actually work out what's going on and you therefore have to rely 
sometimes on other people around you to understand things 
NED 2 Anne 
I consider myself to be very financially literate, but I still find it difficult to 
understand the more abstracted financial stuff... luckily there are a few people on the 
board who really do understand all this, which makes it easier for the rest of us. 
NED 8 Thomas 
The Non Executives' perceived lack of understanding of complex organisational 
issues was further exacerbated because they perceived that the Executive team 
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members would not always present the board with all the information on an issue, 
but would instead skew arguments to suit their own personal agenda. 
4.3. If Role Dilemma 
It emerged that the Non Executives often felt torn between their role of `patroller' 
and that of mentor and advisor to the Executive team. The study participants talked 
about the need to protect the CEO from the pressure of the market, in order that he 
could concentrate on the long-term success of the organisation. The study 
participants perceived that if they were regarded as existing purely to monitor the 
Executive board members, the Executives would not feel able to seek advice when 
there was a problem. Thus, balancing the roles of patroller and mentor was viewed 
as highly problematic. The sentiment of many of the respondents/informants is 
captured in the next example: 
They should be a patrolling influence in the boardroom to ensure that there is good 
conduct in the way in which the business is being run - that's why I use the word 
patrolling because I think policing is about enforcement. Patrolling is about 
monitoring. I think the policeman role is a very divisive role. You don't want to 
create division; the codes are going too much the policeman route.... there was never 
really emphasis on the leadership role of a board, which is very critical. Not that the 
board itself is the leader but they should be encouraging leadership and they should 
be encouraging growth and prosperity of the business. 
NED 6 Laurence 
The study participants also described the importance of making the CEO feel 
comfortable enough to be completely honest with the board. The study participants 
argued that if the Non Executives became too policing in their approach to the role, 
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the CEO might try to avoid bringing issues to them that could influence the Non 
Executives' perception of the CEO's management ability. One participant clarified 
the point as she explains that although patrolling the behaviour of management was 
an important part of the role, she also perceived that if a Non Executive were to 
move too much towards the enforcing role, management might not then feel 
comfortable enough to discuss issues openly. 
I don't think it should be total policing, you get to a point if you have an incident in 
the company that causes bad feeling. Once you start policing your role, any kind of 
strategy and policy really goes down the tube. 
NED 3 Liza 
4.3.2 Role: Archetype 
The Non Executive Directors perceived that an important part of their role should be 
that of `archetype' or `role model', primarily for the CEO and other Senior 
Executives, but also channelling through the Chairman and CEO out into the wider 
organisational and community context. The study participants believed that in so 
doing they were able to set a clear tone for appropriate organisational behaviour. 
Four elements provided the basis for this role: 
  Strategic guide 
9 Setting the tone 
  Mentoring/advising 
  Encouraging best practice 
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4.3.2a Role Expectations: Strategic Guide 
All the Non Executive Directors who participated in the study considered providing 
strategic guidance as a major part of their role. The study participants perceived that 
their contribution was most useful for determining high-level strategy and that 
becoming excessively operationally focused was not generally very helpful. The 
collective sentiment of those who took part in the study is captured in the following 
remark: 
I think they should help in the moulding of strategy. Probably the strategic thinking 
has to come from the CEO but the Non Executives should be prodding, if they think 
the strategy is not challenging or is not enough and reining it back if it's a bit too 
ambitious. They should be amending the strategy from their experience and it should 
be clear if the executive is going down the wrong road. 
NED 6 Laurence 
4.3.2b Role Experience: Strategic Guide 
Despite the Non Executive Directors' expressed desire to keep debate at strategic 
level, discussions with the study participants about their actual experiences in and 
around the Boardroom revealed their frustrations about the extent and depth of this 
strategic involvement. The following examples highlight the study participant's 
frustration: 
We would debate over the colour of the napkins for the annual event. That's just not 
the role of the board, so my focus has always been to try to get the board strategically 
focused. 
NED 9 Geoff 
We have got relatively little information. It is a very simplistic strategy. We have not 
had any strategic discussions in the year and a quarter since I have been on it and 
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that is one of the things we are supposed to look after the strategy... Being a NED is 
now increasingly technical. 
NED 4 Ray 
The issue of board meetings being used to deal with operational issues was advanced 
by many of the Non Executives. The study participants believed that all too often 
boardroom debate, instead of concentrating on strategic issues, became too detailed 
and operational. The Non Executives perceived that quite often the Executive team 
failed to differentiate between their management meetings and the meetings of the 
board, which in the eyes of the Non Executives should be completely separate. This 
was discussed in greater detail in section one, but the following quote highlights 
their dilemma: 
It feels a bit to me like a kind of slightly enlarged meeting of the Group Executive 
Committee at which it happens to be the case that Non-Executive Directors are 
present, a kind of continuation of certain types of senior management discussion by 
other means... the sense is not well enough implanted in the minds of the Chairman 
and the CEO and some of the Executive Directors that the role of a Board is different 
from the business of running the company. 
NED 10 Phillip 
It also emerged, that many of the Non Executives did not feel that they could fully 
engage in boardroom debates. Study participants did not believe they had enough 
access to the organisation to give them the capability of understanding it adequately. 
Further, there was a perception amongst the Non Executives that modem 
governance practice meant that Non Executives should have little or no knowledge 
of the industry sector, which left some struggling to cope with the technicalities of 
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industries in which they had little or no knowledge or experience. This point is made 
very starkly in the next two excerpts: 
They're not allowed to actually know anything about the industry that you're in. 
Right? They're smart, they're educated, they're experienced, but they cannot be 
customers, they cannot be suppliers, they cannot be executives or even former 
executives in the recent past. 
NED 11 Barry 
Even though a board does not, should not, get involved in the day-to-day kinds of 
activities, they have to know what's going on. And you cannot even deal with your 
policy kinds of things if you don't understand what's happening in your company, in 
your industry... How can we put a stamp on the strategic direction if we don't 
understand? 
NED 12 Ruben 
4.3.2c Role Expectation: Setting the Tone 
Setting the tone was perceived as an important element of the role of the Non 
Executive. It was perceived as a subtle concept, which according to the study 
participants, should involve both the way they work in the boardroom and also the 
image that they radiate to the wider organisation and its environment both personally 
and through the senior management team. 
I think the directors literally set a tone. Maybe if I had to pick one, that is it, they set 
a tone with the management team. It is that confirmation role that is significant, and 
they really have to work on that to try and achieve that confirmation. 
NED 1 Warren 
You've got to set a tone and it has to come from the top. It has to come from the 
board and the CEO. If it doesn't happen with the CEO, it doesn't happen with the 
board or vice versa. It's probably going to trickle down into the organisation. It's 
going to trickle out into the community. 
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NED 12 Ruben 
The Non Executives who took part in the study believed that their ability to set the 
tone came through the second two aspects of the role of archetype: Supporting and 
mentoring the senior executives and encouraging them to utilise `best practice' 
within the organisation. 
4.3.2d Role Experience: Setting the Tone 
Study participants were asked to discuss why their boards had made certain key 
strategic choices, which might not necessarily be viewed as directly linked to 
organisational profitability. For example, one study participant worked on the board 
of an insurance company. The Board of Directors had instructed the company's 
employees to always pay personal health claims, unless there was a very strong case 
not to; or the Non Executive for the food distribution company whose board insisted 
that all food from a batch be destroyed if there was even a remote possibility of a 
problem. When the study participants were questioned about their own boards' 
choices, many gave the same answer, that quite simply "It was the right thing to do. " 
It was commonly perceived by the Non Executive Directors that the company owed 
much of its long-term success to this understanding of "the right thing to do" and 
that this is what in essence the board provided for the organisation. 
We did it because it was smart, it was the right thing to do. But I'll tell you in 
hindsight it was smart. Because we've had a lot of good feedback from people who 
said, boy they do care. You can't buy that, you have to do that, you have to work on 
that. It was just the right thing to do. 
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NED 12 Ruben 
Although the Non Executives reported that individual projects were rarely discussed 
in the boardroom, an emerging phenomenon was the board members' belief that 
they set the `tone' for the organisation. This was particularly true in those 
organisations where the Non Executives were encouraged to become more deeply 
involved with the organisation and make contact with the lower echelons. One Non 
Executive described how a manager would simply know how to react to a given 
situation because of the reputation that the company was built upon, and which was 
encouraged by the Board. This was commonly described by the study participants 
as simply an understanding of "the right thing to do. " 
Emerging from the data was a perception among the study participants that the 
presence of individuals in the boardroom with strong views on corporate 
responsibility issues, or previous experience of the importance of reputational 
factors such as corporate responsibility, enforced the value of good practice within 
the board more widely. This is described in the next excerpt: 
I mean the whole issue about Non Executives, whether they're setting the tone, 
whatever role they're doing, it's always down to the individual and how they 
personally interact with others who may or may not have come from similar 
backgrounds. It's all about personal interaction. 
NED 13 Hanna 
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4.3.2e Role Expectation: Mentor/Advisor 
The Non Executives discussed their perception that they should be able to provide 
`friendly' advice to the CEO and Senior Executives; the study participants viewed 
this activity as an important part of their expected role. Mentoring the full time 
executives was perceived as being an informal activity, which might be expected to 
take place `off line' outside of the boardroom setting, as the Non Executives in the 
next two examples illustrate: 
Basically they are advisors. That's what the job is and that's what the Non Executive 
Directorship is. It's really an advisor it's not an actor. 
NED 2 Anne 
I suppose the third is a mentoring role, which doesn't necessarily happen in the 
boardroom but it happens outside. If there's a finance man on the board the Finance 
Director has somebody he can sort of go and talk to. 
NED 6 Laurence 
4.3.2f Role Experience: Mentor/Advisor 
The Non Executives expected that an important part of their role should be as 
mentors and advisors to the board and senior management team. Analysis of the 
research would suggest that the Non Executives did act in the capacity of mentor 
and advisor to the CEO but that they had only limited access to other full time board 
members and very little access to senior managers who were not actually members 
of the board. In the next example the Non Executive talks about the discomfort he 
perceived the management felt at his and his fellow Non Executives' suggestion that 
they should have wider access to the company's managers: 
Well I don't know why, and it's just a good example of an innate institutional 
suspicion. Obviously you don't want your Non-Executive Directors being too clever 
by half and just getting in the way of the cogs of the management. I accept that 
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totally. But I do think that what is provided by means of Non-Executive Directors is a 
resource that is not sufficiently well used. 
NED 10 Phillip 
As the study participants expected, much of their advising/mentoring role appears to 
take place away from the main Boardroom. This is illustrated by the Non Executive 
in the next excerpt: 
It is to be an advisor to the CEO, an off line advisor. One thing that is misinterpreted 
a lot is that certain people don't speak up a lot in a boardroom and so some people 
say "Oh God! They have no value. " Then you come to find out, you talk to the CEO, 
this is the person that they call three or four times a week off line and say "What do 
you think about this? " 
NED 3 Liza 
Many of the Non Executives found that one of their most fulfilling roles was, in fact, 
that of an off line advisor to the CEO. Some discussed "popping in" to. see the CEO 
for a chat or having a quiet dinner with the CEO. This is exemplified in the next 
quotation: 
I spend more time, have more influence talking to the CEO outside. I have lunch with 
him every so often. I say "Look you are behaving badly in this, you are really getting 
up our noses by your defensiveness" and so on, "I can understand it but you are not 
helping yourself by doing it. "I personally try to influence outside rather than at the 
meeting because I am not a great meeting person really. 
NED 4 Ray 
4.3.2g Frustration 
For many study participants there was a degree of frustration at their seeming 
inability to influence the behaviour of the board. The Non Executives provided 
examples of situations where they felt they had offered good advice to the Executive 
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team, which they then perceived had been ignored or treated with outright contempt 
by the senior management. This feeling of powerlessness affected the study 
participants to such an extent that they questioned their role as a Non Executive and 
even talked about their desire to leave the role behind. 
I have been watching this board trying to influence the shape and the seasonality of 
the business and the packaging of all the 70% of the profits into the last month which 
is going to catch us one year - we know it is going to catch us but we have not been 
unable to influence the management to do much about it. We are doing all that we 
can. But we haven't actually changed it because we all know that we are going to get 
caught one year, and we will all look like absolute idiots because we promised the 
City we would sort it out. 
NED 4 Ray 
4.3.2h Self-Awareness 
Some Non Executives discussed their discovery that they themselves could be the 
cause of intimidation within the group. One very high profile Non Executive, who 
was brought onto the Board of a company that had started as a small concern and 
within five years become a global brand, discussed the discomfort that he perceived 
other board members might have felt, at least initially, from his presence on the 
board. He perceived that his attempts to mentor and advise the board might easily 
be misconstrued and that his high profile might in itself make some board members 
too intimidated to contribute: 
I think it's tough for everybody. It is hard for the new board member because 
obviously you are trying to learn some of the intricacies of the company. You are 
clearly trying to develop and learn some of the intricacies of the boardroom and the 
flip side of this is the existing directors who are familiar with some of the subjects 
that you might bring up, but most of them by the sheer depth of experience 
(necessary) will not have dealt with some of those points in the past. Whether you are 
seen as threatening to some of those people, then possibly yes! 
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NED 14 David 
4.3.2i Role Expectation: Encouraging Best Practice 
The Non Executives believed that the dissemination of so-called best practice went 
beyond the realm of pure governance or strategy formulation. This element of the 
Non Executive role was perceived by the study participants as ensuring that 
organisations went beyond the letter of the law in ensuring good practice in all 
elements of the organisation's dealings with its environment. The following quote 
emphasises this belief 
I think you have to look at managing the whole corporate governance dimension of 
the company and ensuring that is doesn't just obey the letter of the law and keep out 
of trouble, in a sort of defensive sense but actually you know, positively shapes the 
agenda and the activities of the board, along the lines of best practice. That is very 
important. That is a very large element within the responsibilities. 
NED 15 Martin 
4.3.2j Role Experience: Encouraging Best Practice 
The Non Executive Directors believed that part of their role was to encourage best 
practice within the boardroom and also in the wider organisation. Some individuals 
discussed personal agendas to, for example, encourage greater diversity in the 
boardroom. Many of the female study participants discussed their plans to persuade 
their organisations to encourage more female entrants into senior management 
positions. 
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I said I am really disappointed to see that there are no women in senior management 
and we really don't have any kind of pipeline. I really need to put in place a mentor 
programme. 
NED 3 Liza 
The interviewee in the above case and other female study participants described how 
they tried to encourage greater diversity in the organisation, but often perceived 
resistance from the board. Many women Non Executives also described their fear of 
being stereotyped if they spoke up about women's issues in the boardroom. 
I can keep pushing but then it's like are you pushing for the right thing. You know 
you have a cause of your own, and you don't want that, because that is totally 
demoralising. 
NED 3 Liza 
It would be too easy to become stereotyped as single issue; I don't want that. 
NED 16 Roberta 
These women Non Executives generally reported that they were almost always the 
only females present in the boardrooms in which they worked; they perceived that 
they lacked wide ranging support from the Boardroom team, and many talked about 
feeling isolated within the role set "outside of the club". One woman described her 
perception of the way her board viewed her as "almost like, a sassy blonde teenager" 
(NED 7 Jane). This was despite her international experience and presence on some 
of the most powerful boards in the world. A male interviewee, who made the 
following observation, confirmed this perception: 
The other problem I've noticed with a lot of women Non-Executives is that they often, 
even if they feel strongly about something on a board, they won't say anything, 
because they are worried that they'll be perceived as simply banging the table, 
because they are a woman. 
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NED 6 Laurence 
Some Non Executives had more success in spreading good practice. One study 
participant discussed how he had spent months researching best governance 
practices for an organisation for which he was CEO. He then realised that he could 
apply that knowledge to another board on which he was a Non Executive. 
I really felt that we could benefit by becoming a little more clued up and getting down 
on paper and coding some of our ways of operating. 
NED 14 David 
This interviewee perceived that he was viewed by the rest of the board as someone 
with a huge amount of experience, beyond that of other members whom he viewed 
as talented and highly capable but, as yet, less experienced than himself. He 
perceived that his voice carried more "weight" and his suggestions to improve 
corporate governance were accepted in full. 
It emerged very strongly from the research that the perceptions of others within the 
boardroom role set influenced the ability of the individual to contribute to board 
proceedings. For example one Non Executive talked about a colleague who was 
considered by the rest of the board to be highly capable, made a suggestion that the 
company needed to be more aware of social responsibility issues. The CEO didn't 
agree with the Non Executive in question but the other Non Executives supported 
him forcing the CEO to rethink his strategy: 
Most of the Non-Executive Directors said 'No! Wrong! We do have to pay attention 
to this. ' 
NED 10 Phillip 
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Phillip's experience is in stark contrast to many of the female study participants 
who, as described above, perceived that they received little support from the rest of 
their boardroom role set. This particular dynamic of Non Executives working 
together to achieve specific goals emerged consistently throughout the analysis as a 
key to successful contribution. 
Although many Non Executives were able to provide positive vignettes about their 
and other's attempts to spread good management practice, it also emerged that some 
had experienced less positive incidents where they perceived that bad management 
practices were being spread through the network of Non Executives, as is described 
in the next excerpt: 
Often what they do when they get together is actually spread bad practice; they don't 
spread good practice. I'll tell you what, old chap, I'll tell you what I've done in the 
past, and its worked a treat, and you hear them spreading bad practice. 
NED 7 Jane 
The study participants perceived that Non Executives often relied heavily on other 
board members for information pertinent to their role. They perceived that Non 
Executives often lacked formal training opportunities, leaving them with little option 
other than to rely on the wisdom of their Non Executive peers. 
4.3.3 Role: Boundary spanner 
There was general consensus among the Non Executive Directors that they had been 
recruited into their Non Executive positions because of certain skills, experiences or 
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external contacts which they had been able to acquire within other organisational or 
life settings, prior to their board appointments. They believed that these skills could 
be used by the organisation to enhance organisational effectiveness by filling 
competence gaps internal to the organisation. Three skills provided the elements for 
this role: 
  Providing external connections 
  Representing constituents both internal and external 
  Giving a broad perspective/alternative view point 
These will now be discussed in detail below: 
4.3.3a Role Expectations: Providing External Connections 
Because the majority of Non Executive Directors already had highly successful 
careers outside of the host boardroom, they believed that they came equipped with a 
unique set of business contacts and a network of associates which might otherwise 
be difficult for the host organisation to replicate through its own internal resources. 
Many Non Executive Directors expected that providing external contacts for the 
organisation would be an important part of their role. Several assumed that this was 
the key reason for their recruitment to the board of certain companies, as the 
following quote demonstrates: 
My previous life has left me with many contacts, both in the military and in politics, 
both in the UK and also overseas. I think we can be fairly certain that many of the 
companies to which I now give my services were very interested in those linkages. 
NED 18 Joe 
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The Non Executive Directors believed that they were able to offer useful insights 
and perspectives into events happening outside of the organisation. These 
perspectives ranged from information about complex technical issues, to 
understanding specific industries, to analysis of global economic power shifts and 
the likelihood of civil wars. The study participants perceived that the real skill came 
from being capable of translating these complex issues back to the specific 
organisational context within which they were employed as Non Executive 
Directors. The general consensus among those interviewed is exemplified in the 
next comment: 
Your contribution is unlikely to be an expert in the company's business, the 
mainstream, but it's trying to bring other influences and dimensions and so on into 
the company, and relate the company to its outside world. 
NED 15 Martin 
4.3.3b Role Experience: Providing External Connections 
As described above, providing external connections was cited by some Non 
Executives as the major reason for their appointment to the board; the study 
participants clearly expected that these connections would be in some way exploited 
by the host board. Interestingly, despite this expectation on the part of the Non 
Executives, there was general consensus that these connections were rarely exploited 
once the individual was in post. One Non Executive went as far as to offer to act as 
a `roving ambassador' for the company in the rarefied circles in which he travelled. 
In his words the CEO and Chairman would say ""Oh! That's a good idea. " but 
nothing ever happens"" (NED 10 Phillip). Another study participant described a 
fellow board member who had unique connections in an Eastern block country but 
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wasn't invited to attend or even informed when the executives went to visit many of 
the individuals whom he knew personally. Others described more positive results 
from these external connections as in the following excerpt: 
They (the organisation) organised and pulled off the capital campaign. I mean the 
staff were huge. There was no way you can suggest that they weren't, and so it was a 
team effort by any stretch. But the outside directors had the contacts. The staff 
people had the ability to follow up, but the outside directors had the contacts. 
NED 9 Geoff 
Study participants who did report successful use of their skills often discussed their 
contacts with individuals within the host organisation; they described how formal 
channels of communication existed and board member away days were utilised to 
align the host company's strategy with the capabilities that the individual Non 
Executives could offer. 
The study participants perceived that they were in a unique position to advise the 
company on a range of issues, relating to their personal skills and experience, in 
addition to providing external connections and insight. Many described. the 
advantage they felt was gained by sitting on a network of boards. They believed that 
the skills they learnt in one organisation were often applicable elsewhere and in this 
way they were able to connect their boards to the external environment. This is 
described in the next example, which articulates the experience of many Non 
Executives in the study: 
I have always seen working on boards as a complement to the other work that I am 
doing in that it provides me with new experiences and opens me to situations in 
business that I would not otherwise encounter. I am often thinking about other 
businesses that I work with when I am in a board meeting and how what we are 
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dealing with there could be applied elsewhere. But it is a two way street obviously of 
course because of the executive role sitting at board level. 
NED 17 Vicky 
The Non Executives believed that their perspectives tended to be different from 
those of the Executive board members, namely they were not dominated by the 
desire to make their annual bonus in quite the same way as the CEO and the 
Executive team. Despite this, the Non Executives did not perceive that their 
external connections were effectively utilised. 
4.3.3c Role Expectation: Representing Constituents Both Internal and External 
Some Non Executive Directors felt that part of their role was to relate the company 
back out to its constituents, particularly institutional shareholders, and then to take 
the views of those constituents back into the boardroom. These views are 
summarised in the following statement: 
Non-Executive Directors as a tribe, ought to be able to hear major institutional 
investors voice their concerns about the company, let's say once a year at a formal 
meeting, not just picking it up in social parties, so that the Non-Executive Directors 
can cram that into their own approach to Board matters more generally. 
NED 10 Phillip 
One Non Executive Director provided an excellent example of how he felt that a 
Non Executive Director should present himself in the boardroom in this particular 
role: 
(they should) not only deal with the other board members, but occasionally go out to 
the external world and just see what is going on,... "I am a bit concerned, it looks 
like Wal-Mart's about to get into the wholesale grocery business; if they do it's going 
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to change it completely. I am reading about it in publications but we have never had 
any discussion at all about this. " That is, where you get this protection to 
shareholders to say are we minding the business correctly. 
NED 19 John 
4.3.3d Role Experience: Representing constituents both Internal and External 
As discussed above, the Non Executive Directors who took part in this study 
expected to be able to confer with organisational stakeholders such as employees 
and institutional shareholders. However, analysis of the interviews revealed that 
although the Non Executive Directors fully expected to have some kind of access to 
these groups, access was, in fact, rarely made available to them. In the following 
example, one Non Executive reports his attempts to get to know the company's 
institutional investors: 
I said to him (the CEO) "What should I do about making myself known to him and 
getting to know some of the major institutional investors? " and he looked at me and 
his face froze and he said "You're not to go near them" and I said "Why not? " and 
then our senior Non Executive Vice Chairman of the Board, said "Well this is a very 
touchy matter this, it could lead to all kinds of misunderstandings. " 
NED 10 Phillip 
Despite their perceived lack off success in gaining access outside of the boardroom 
to other constituent groups, it also emerged from the data that the Non Executive 
Directors still perceived that spending time with internal stakeholders, particularly 
employees and customers, could have a profound effect on morale, making people 
feel wanted and valued within the organisation. 
If I have a Non Executive director go into a plant in the remote part of the State or 
they come into a customer office and they sit down in the phone centre with the 
management and they talk to them about issues, those are events that those people 
will remember for decades. And it reinforces principally a very important role. It's a 
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non-managerial role but it's still high policy role. It's not direct support as much as it 
is confirmation. 
NED 1 Warren 
Although organised site visits may provide the Non Executive Director with very 
useful insight, there was a strong suggestion from the study participants that these 
visits were normally highly supervised and tightly controlled by the Chief 
Executive. One Non Executive who is also CEO of another company explained his 
perspective as a CEO on such requests for access: 
I just appointed two new non-executive directors, and one of the first things I've told 
them is they have complete contact with the executives. But, I would hope to be kept 
informed. Because I don't think you want them doing it but if they are, if they want to 
go and see apart of the business, they can do it with the executive who is responsible 
for that. I don't feel I necessarily have to be there. We know what's happening. 
Likewise with the executives, I encourage them to talk to the non-executives. But 
again I'd say to them, you know, keep me in he picture. 
NED 6 Laurence 
Some study respondents described boards where a few employees would be chosen 
to attend board dinners. This, the Non Executives perceived, provided them with 
some limited insight into the abilities of those within the organisation: 
They take five or six employees to each board meeting to have dinner and have them 
sit with the board and chat to other board members. I think it gives the board 
members some feel for the quality of the people. 
NED 5 Brian 
4.3.3e Role Expectation: Giving Broad Perspective/Alternative View Point 
Several of the study participants expected that part of their boundary-spanning role 
would involve educating the Executive team about the organisation's wider 
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responsibilities, and how the behaviour of the board members and that of the 
organisation was perceived by outside constituencies. 
The expectation among those who took part in the study was that Non Executives 
should be able to take a broader view and see beyond the short-term profit-oriented 
demands confronting the CEO and the Executive team. 
I do believe that a social element is needed in order to do the best job for your 
customers, the corporation you're with, or whatever; you have to look at the broader 
picture. I think those who have that realisation are more inclined to have viewpoints 
in board meetings, to have or foster or to encourage a broader social view. 
NED 12 Ruben 
4.3.3f Role Experience: Giving Broad Perspective/Alternative Viewpoints 
The above analysis identified that the Non Executive Directors expected there to be 
differences in the boardroom between their own perspectives and those of the CEO 
and the Executive team. The Non Executive Directors perceived that they would be 
able to bring a broader, more long-term strategic perspective into boardroom 
'deliberations. Analysis of the research revealed that this does appear to take place. 
In the following account a Non Executive Director, who also works as a CEO 
elsewhere, recounts the difference in his own approach across the two different 
roles, as follows: 
I think it's fair to say that there is an undue amount of pressure and focus on short- 
term results. I can tell you as a CEO that I feel like my responsibility is far beyond 
the current quarters. But I feel that the current quarters are the mile markers. You 
know the milestones that are important indicators as to whether or not the strategy is 
being validated or not. As a board member, on the two boards that I sit, we typically 
focus on longer-term issues. We think in terms of years as opposed to quarters. So 
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one, two, three year, sort of horizons, and every once in a while we'll think even 
longer term. 
NED 11 Barry 
One Non Executive talked at length about the growing desire among boards to 
provide guidance regarding corporate responsibility issues to their organisations and 
how he felt that this momentum was spreading through Non Executive Directors 
from one organisation to the next: 
I won't say networking, but that's just it. It multiplies in the community. So I think it 
is important. And I think it is growing. I think there is more of a definite feeling for 
more than just making a profit developing. I 
NED 15 Martin 
The data suggest that Non Executive Directors have a dual role in developing 
responsible corporate practices. Firstly, Non Executive Directors may encourage 
ethical practice through their own primary understanding of constituent needs, and 
secondly, they may learn new behaviours and strategies from their peers whilst 
working in the boardroom which they can then transplant elsewhere. This is 
highlighted in the next comment: 
It's really best practice sharing. I take things back from those meetings that I put to 
work here. 
NED 11 Barry 
4.3.3g The Need for a Business Case 
Interestingly, it also emerged that despite the study participants' understanding of 
the importance of a wide range of organisational constituents they also revealed that 
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they believed their responsibility as a Non Executive Director was almost 
exclusively to shareholders. 
The shareholders, they are the most important group, why else is the business there... 
This company has been around for 25 years. They are profitable but not in a dot com 
kind of way. They are very stable - the people who invest are in it for the long-term 
for a reliable return. It's a certain kind of investor that invests here. I guess there 
are also the employees but really it's the investors isn't it? 
NED 8 Thomas 
The study participants believed in the primacy of the shareholder. They also 
believed unilaterally in the importance of using the `business case' in all 
organisational decision-making. There was a 
'strong 
expectation amongst the study 
participants that all boardroom decisions should have a solid grounding in the long- 
term financial success of the organisation. The following comments highlight this 
expectation: 
I think that there needs to be a business case. I don't think that organisations are 
there simply to serve the public. But I think that, I think there is some advantage to 
be gained from being responsible. 
NED 11 Barry 
Most issues which involve corporate responsibility are considered like any other 
decision and taken on a purely business case. 
NED 9 Geoff 
4.3.3h Balancing Demands: Short- vs. Long-Term 
Despite the willingness of some Non Executive Directors to encourage long-term 
strategic and social thinking within the boardroom many reported resistance, 
particularly from the CEO who, as predicted by the Non Executives themselves 
often found it difficult to appreciate the value of strategies that did not provide swift 
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financial returns. The Non Executives perceived that they were sometimes faced 
with a dilemma themselves when it came to balancing the long- and short-term 
because of the way in which their own remuneration packages were arranged. The 
following quote highlights the perceived tension between long-term sustainability 
and short-term profitability: 
The board has to have that viewpoint (long-term) and be willing to stand up to 
shareholders and say, you know it's best for the company not to have the gain rate 
now. And that's where a CEO really needs some protection from the board. 
Unfortunately the boards, many times, want the short-term gain too because they 
have the stock options or the stock. 
NED 12 Ruben 
There was a general consensus amongst all those who took part in the study that the 
organisation's main (if not only) responsibility was to its shareholders. In spite of 
this view there was also a perception that the primacy of the shareholder was rapidly 
shifting. The Non Executives perceived that they were now expected to take a much 
broader constituent approach than they had had to do previously. The next two 
excerpts discuss the changes that the Non Executives have become aware of in their 
role as board members: 
I'm sure boardroom tables today will envy their forebears that could so clearly just 
keep their shareholders in mind and just steam towards that point, increased 
dividends, and capital appreciation of the equity that was the single goal. No more, 
but how simple it was. 
NED 7 Jane 
There was no discussion of anything other than the financial impact of something. I 
guess if reputation came up, I can only once remember employees being mentioned, 
in ten years in that boardroom.... in a rare moment of Non Executive intervention that 
was effective (someone) asked what effect on unemployment that would have in north- 
east Scotland. And nobody knew. 
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NED 10 Phillip 
4.3.3i Balancing Demands: Reputation 
A strong perception emerged from the study participants about the importance of 
maintaining corporate reputation. However personal reputation was also perceived 
to be very important to the Non Executives. Personal, reputational issues made the 
Non Executives much more sensitive to factors outside of the organisation, which 
might affect their standing as good board members and therefore their own future 
employment opportunities. The holistic nature of reputation, in turn, led the Non 
Executives to believe in the importance of corporate social responsibility 
particularly in relation to an organisation's employees and customers - `licence to 
operate' was a term that arose on a number of occasions. The difference that the 
Non Executives expressed between their own understandings of the responsibilities 
of the organisation and the views which they perceived to be held by the CEO are 
highlighted in the next passage: 
Well, the minute you talk corporate social responsibilities, the average CEO wants to 
be sick in his hat. He sees it as a break shoe, sees it as an impediment, whatever 
you're going to tell him about it, it's going to be an impediment to profit. It means 
you can't go mine at three cents an hour in Papua New Guinea or wherever. Mostly 
it's not in their nature to consider that the company has a role in society, other than 
to reward shareholders, give them that simple objective and they can understand that. 
NED 7 Jane 
4.3.3j Balancing Demands: Profitability 
The apparent difference in perspective between the Full-Time Executive and Non 
Executive board members appears to have resulted in an almost unanimous dislike 
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for the actual term "corporate social responsibility". The Non Executives perceived 
the team to be unclear and lacking in a workable definition, this is highlighted by the 
Non Executive in the following example: 
Corporate social responsibility is a horrid term, I suspect it'll keep evolving.... in the 
new company we are going to have a committee, a board committee that looks at this 
area, we are not going to use CSR as a title. 
NED 15 Martin 
This confusion about the meaning of the term corporate social responsibility 
emerged as stemming from the Non Executives' understanding that the role of the 
Board is primarily to protect the shareholder. Hence, unless a business case can be 
clearly presented for corporate social responsibility it becomes a route for, as one 
Non Executive put it, "giving away company profits". The language of risk to 
reputation- emerged as being more commonly used in the boardroom and a number 
of Non Executive Directors felt this was a language that was much easier for them to 
understand and act upon. 
This was a good example of something that we were doing for social responsibility, 
but I told everybody "Make no mistake about it this is not a social project. This is a 
project, we are going to increase our market share and that is what this is all about. " 
NED 20 Arnie 
One board went as far as to call their corporate social responsibility committee, the 
committee for risk and reputation. By using this term board members were able to 
discuss corporate social responsibility issues as hard `financials' rather than as a soft 
difficult-to-pin-down problem. 
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4.3.3k Balancing Demands: Language 
When first discussing issues of corporate social responsibility with many Non 
Executives, it appeared that this `financial speak' led to social responsibility issues 
being marginalised, or left off the agenda completely. However as interviews 
progressed, it became clear that although such issues were not discussed at a moral 
or ethical level, they were certainly discussed in terms of risk to reputation. Indeed 
the Non Executives perceived that the sheer complexity of the issues facing many of 
the large organisations with which the study participants worked, forced the debate 
more into that of reputation as is expressed in the following passage: 
You cannot put mange tout in (the supermarket) if they have been picked by children 
of six with blisters on their feet. Your customers don't want to know about all this, but 
if they were to know about it they would be deeply unhappy. "And that's an ethical 
issue, " we said. And they said "Don't give us ethics. What are ethics? What's right? 
Those children might be supporting orphaned siblings. " Quite right they were. So, we 
knew the issues were complex, but put it in terms of risk to reputation and they can 
deal with it. 
NED 7 Jane 
It also emerged that the Non Executives perceived that once a reputation for being a 
responsible company was established, board members fought very hard to protect 
and nurture it. In the following example a Non Executive from a company with a 
long history of social action describes his perception: 
You want to protect it (reputation) and therefore our target is to stay in the top 
quarter, not to be the top. 
NED 6 Laurence 
Additionally, the study participants perceived that the use of reputation made certain 
ethical decisions straightforward. Some Non Executives related the case of Johnson 
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and Johnson, where the decision was made to remove all products from the shelves 
after a sabotage incident led to worries about contamination. The study participants 
perceived this as "a decision that made itself'. The reputation of the company as a 
good and ethical provider of a safe product made the decision an easy one, there was 
only one "right thing to do". 
Sure you're in business to make a profit, sure you're in, but you're also in business to 
stay in business and to contribute to society with a product, with more than a product, 
you have a social obligation as well. 
NED 12 Ruben 
The Non Executives also reported that several of their companies were in the 
process of setting up board level committees to deal with issues of corporate social 
responsibility, mainly at the behest of Non Executive Directors who brought 
experience of the importance of these issues from outside the organisation. 
The board is run in an extremely serious fashion. It discusses a lot of issues. It was 
one of the first boards anywhere to set up a committee on safety towards the 
environment, a particularly sensitive area and just takes it very, very seriously 
NED 18 Joe 
The study participants explained that most committees dealing with issues of 
corporate social responsibility were not formally referred to as corporate social 
responsibility committees, but rather tended to contain words like `risk', `reputation' 
or `safety'. 
We don't have a committee called that (CSR), we have a remuneration committee and 
an audit committee, oh yes we do have a risk committee. 
NED 8 Thomas 
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We're going to call the new committee, the risk and responsibility committee. 
Because we've got to look at it, and my attitude is, since I'm on the chair of that 
committee, is that the agenda should be driven off what are the risks, and particularly 
the non-financial risks to the company, and a lot of them are licence to operate, 
reputational risk and so on, some of them are more immediate risks, so safety will be 
the number one, probably the number one item on the agenda of every meeting. 
NED 15 Martin 
4.3.31 Role Experience: Networks to Enlightenment 
Analysis of the interviews revealed that despite the lack of enthusiasm emanating 
from the CEO and the Executive team for social policies, when the Non Executive 
Directors acted as a team and worked together to show how important an issue was, 
they could have a serious effect on the strategy of the organisation. In the following 
narrative a Non Executive working on the board of a global manufacturing company 
describes how he and his fellow Non Executive Directors forced the Board to 
recognise the importance of wider issues: 
A number of us have been feeling, myself for one, but also to take another case in 
point, our senior Non-Executive Director, ... that we were not giving sufficient 
attention to this as a growing area of concern for investors and indeed governance 
and indeed the public more generally in the age when the globalisation of capitalism 
is under fire and it was actually quite interesting, again, the initial reaction by the 
Board, including I would say the Chief Executive, tended to be more "This is kind of 
froth, you know, this is all a complete blind alley, this corporate social responsibility, 
this is not what business is about, it's one of these elaborate con tricks. " And most of 
the Non-Executive Directors said "No, wrong, we do have to pay attention to this, it 
is a growing area and we need to get our act a bit more convincing. "... So what you 
had there is a growing importance being attached at least to the public perceptions of 
(company name) taking seriously corporate social responsibility and in fact I think 
that is translating into, you know, attitudes more generally in the company. 
NED 10 Phillip 
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From this account also emerges the discovery that, when individuals who sit on the 
boards or work closely with these already "enlightened" companies, they appear to 
bring that knowledge and enthusiasm into the host organisation and educate the 
other board members of its benefits. It appears to be within these companies that 
board level social responsibility committees are being established. 
4.3.3m: Role Experience: Mutual Benefits of Boundary Spanning 
It emerged from the data analysis that many Non Executive Directors were not only 
able to offer contacts and good practice skills to the host organisation, they were 
equally accruing these skills themselves from those around them in the boardroom, 
and then taking them back to employ in other organisations for which they worked. 
I have been impressed and to be honest I have already started to apply it elsewhere, 
even down to some quite subtle things like watching the behaviour of the chairman, 
things that I hadn't thought of before but I see how well they work and I am using 
them in many of the companies I work with now. 
NED 8 Thomas 
It's as tactical as creating contacts for them to explore specific issues or 
opportunities, and it's as strategic as, you know one was considering offering some 
sort of special financial services to help facilitate the sale of hardware and it's 
something that we had been involved in at (company name) for 6 or 7 years relative 
to the sale of computers. And so I put our team in contact with their team to discuss 
whether or not there's a crossover here and you know can they leverage our 
knowledge there, so, those sorts of issues. I take things back from those meetings that 
I put to work here. 
NED 11 Barry 
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These examples illustrate powerfully the complex nature of the boundary-spanning 
role. Not only are the Non Executives able to offer help to the host board from their 
own companies but they also describe learning in the host organisation and taking 
that back to their own organisations. The individual in the final preceding quote 
went on to explain exactly why, as a full time CEO, he makes the time to also work 
as a Non Executive Director: 
Every meeting I come back with a list of notes of things to either suggest or look into. 
So, you know, the whole rationale for me of, why would an active CEO sit on the 
boards of other companies? The whole rationale for me has to be because it makes 
you a better CEO and allows you to do a better job for your shareholders. 
NED 11 Barry 
4.3.4 Summary Section Three 
Emerging from the data was a significant gap between the Non Executive Directors' 
expectations of their role and their actual perceived experience. For example, study 
participants expected that they had been employed because of their previous skills 
experience and connections to the outside environment. Many however discussed 
their perception that these skills were not being properly utilised by the board. This 
left some individuals feeling frustrated and disconnected from the role set. The 
study participants had expected to be in a powerful position to influence boardroom 
and wider organisational behaviour but, instead, experienced feelings of 
powerlessness and dissatisfaction. 
It was perceived that powerful individuals, both in term of reputation and support 
within the group, were most likely to be successful in making a contribution to or 
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changing corporate practices. Many individuals perceived that their contributions 
were ignored; particularly the women in the study, and this caused them to feel 
disempowered and alone within the role set. 
The following model exemplifies the effect on the Non Executive contribution of 
boardroom culture. The model shows how the Non Executives' personal 
capabilities in terms of skill, experience and reputation within the role set, allow 
them to partially fulfil their role. However, the Non Executive's propensity to 
effectively optimise their role requires a cultural environment within the boardroom 
which supports mutual action and uninhibited information flow; the individual needs 
to feel supported and valued by the whole group starting with the CEO and 
Chairman. 
The analysis also suggested that the Non Executive Directors were sometimes able 
to play a role in influencing corporate responsibility. This appears to be achieved 
when they are able, through their personal capabilities in terms of past experience, 
reputation and standing in the group, to influence the behaviour of the CEO and 
Chairman. Typically, those individuals who were associated by the group with 
issues of responsibility through their work elsewhere assumed leadership in such 
issues; others with less experience in the issue then became confident enough to 
enter the debate. 
The Non Executives' personal understanding of their role as custodians of the 
shareholder, typically caused them to encourage the use of a "business case" 
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approach when making decisions. Figure 4.6 below illustrates the Non Executives' 
contribution to corporate responsibility issues. The model depicts their role in 
corporate responsibility as being that of influencer rather than decision-maker. They 
appear to try to influence the behaviour (set the tone) of the CEO and Chairman in 
corporate responsibility issues as opposed to those issues being brought to the Non 
Executives for approval by the Executive Team: 
Figure 4.6 Ability of Non Executives to Effect Corporate Responsibility 
Skills 
Knowledge & Affiliated 
Role Character Organisation 
Understanding Reputation 
Personal Personal 
Reputation in + " 
Beliefs! 
Role set apa 111 L $ Social Norms 
NED 
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CEO/ CSR/ 
Chairman Corp Policy 
Source: Compiled by the author 
The following sub themes emerged from the analysis concerning the perceived gap 
between role expectations and role experience: 
1. The Non Executives had expectations of three main characteristics, which 
they believed formed the basis for their role. These were controller, 
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archetype and boundary spanner. The study participants' actual experiences 
of the role were often misaligned with these expectations as follows: 
a. Individuals expected that they would have a certain degree of power over 
boardroom proceedings but in fact found that they often felt intimidated and 
powerless. 
b. Individuals expected that a major part of their role was to "hire and fire". 
Many reported that in reality the Chairman and CEO controlled job 
appointments with little discussion. However when the Non Executives 
worked as a cohesive team they were able to make a "difference". 
c. The Non Executives discovered that they often lacked the requisite 
understanding of complex organisational, issues necessary to always 
adequately control the Executive Team. 
d. The Non Executives perceived that part of their role was to patrol the 
Executives' behaviour but discussed the difficulties that they experienced in 
trying to balance patrolling, with their role of mentor and advisor. 
C. The Non Executives perceived that they were able to act as role models to 
the board by mentoring and encouraging best practice, and through this set 
the "tone" for the wider organisation. 
f. The study participants perceived that part of their role was to encourage best 
practice; some had personal agendas such as encouraging greater board 
diversity. However, some Non Executives reported not following through 
with their ideas because they feared that their suggestions might be 
trivialised by other board members. 
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g. The Non Executives expected that the board should deal with high-level 
strategy. However, individuals often felt frustrated because meetings became 
too operational. 
h. Some Non Executives discovered that their main value was outside of the 
main boardroom acting as an "offline advisor" to the CEO. 
i. Many study participants felt that their attempts to make changes had been 
ignored; this left them feeling isolated and frustrated. 
j. Some Non Executives perceived that they had been employed because of 
their external connections, but that these connections were rarely (if ever) 
used by the host organisation. 
k. The Non Executives perceived that a critical part of their role was to act as a 
link for the organisation between its internal and external environment. 
Despite this, the study participants often felt that they were being excluded 
by the CEO and chairman from making outside connections, particularly 
with shareholders. 
1. The Non Executives expected to have good access to organisational 
constituents, but their actual experience was that access was not made 
available to them. When access was granted it was highly controlled by the 
Chief Executive. 
m. When Non Executives did manage to access employees they perceived that 
this had a positive effect on employee morale. 
In addition to the emergence of a misalignment between the study participants' role 
expectations and their actual experience of the role, several other sub themes 
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emerged from the analysis of the Non Executives' perceived role. These are 
summarised below: 
1. The study participants believed that they accrued skills in the Non 
Executive role that they were then able to practise elsewhere. However, 
some individuals argued that boards often spread bad management practice 
as well as good practice, presumably because of a lack of education. 
2. The perception of power in the individual, in terms of reputation and/or 
influence, is often crucial if the individual wishes to instigate change. 
3. The Non Executives perceived that their perspectives tended to be 
different from those of the Executive board members, that is to say they 
were not dominated by the desire to make their annual bonus in quite the 
same way as the Chief Executive. 
4. Many Non Executives believed that there was a growing importance being 
attached to corporate responsibility issues in the boardroom. Despite this, 
most believed forcefully that their primary responsibility was to 
shareholders only. 
5. When Non Executives learn good corporate responsibility practices in one 
organisation they are likely to transfer it into others. They did not, 
however, like the term corporate social responsibility (CSR), which they 
associated with "giving away profits". They generally perceived that it was 
necessary to prove a business case for all projects. 
6. The language of risk and reputation provided a more useful vehicle for the 
board to discuss issues of corporate responsibility. 
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7. There was a perception among the Non Executives about the importance 
of maintaining corporate reputation. This they linked to their personal 
reputation, as any bad publicity in their organisation was likely to affect 
their long-term earning capacity. 
8. Moving a retiring CEO into the position of Chairman can antagonise the 
feeling of powerlessness and disengagement among the Non Executives. 
In summary, the emerging outcomes of the analysis of this theme suggest that Non 
Executive directors perceive that they should have a valuable role. However, the 
study participants often encountered large gaps between their expectations and their 
role experiences. This led to high levels of frustration and sometimes alienation 
from board proceedings. 
The Non Executives believed that they had an important role to play in ensuring 
corporate responsibility. Study participants perceived that their understanding of the 
organisations' long-term goals differed from those of the Executive, who, they 
argued, tended to be motivated more by short-term profit. Nevertheless, the study 
participants' understanding that their main responsibility was to shareholders guided 
them always to look for a business case in projects before they were accepted. Table 
4.3 encapsulates the themes emerging from this section of the analysis: 
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Table 4.3 Summary of Emerging Themes Section Three 
Theme Expectation Experience 
Controller Influential Limited power unless highly regarded by 
peers 
Hirer and Firer Power with NED's Power with CEO/Chair 
Patroller Encourage openness and Information difficult to understand or 
honesty unavailable. 
Complex balance between controller and 
mentor 
Archetype Role Model Limited depth of involvement 
Restricted influence 
Strategic Guide High level strategy Overly operational focus 
Setting the tone Encourage responsible Try to encourage the "right thing to do" 
behaviour throughout 
organisation 
Mentoring/advising Provide friendly advice to Off line advisor 
Executives Frequently feel disregarded 
Encouraging best Go beyond the law Personal agendas 
practice May influence if held in high regard by 
peers. 
At times encourage bad practice 
Boundary spanner Provide external Rarely encouraged to use external skills 
competencies 
Relating Internal & Translate complex issues Provide alternative perspective/bring new 
External back to the organisation insight through work with other boards 
Environments 
Providing external Exploit external connections External connections inadequately 
connections to the benefit of the exploited 
organisation 
Representing Ally to shareholders Discouraged from talking to shareholders 
constituents both Improve org. morale through occasional 
internal & external contact with employees 
Giving broad Encourage long-term Encourage long-term practice through the 
perspective - perspective "business case" 
alternative view Observe and transplant responsible 
point practices 
Encourage positive reputation 
Source: Compiled by the author 
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4.4 Chapter Summary 
Many themes have emerged from this analysis of the role and contribution of the 
Non Executive Director. Clearly their ability to provide any kind of contribution is 
heavily influenced by the nuances of the boardroom environment in terms of their 
own and their colleagues' experience, ability, personality and the overall culture of 
the specific boardroom. 
In particular, the Non Executives' level of contribution was perceived by the study 
participants to be affected by the behaviour of the Chairman and CEO, as well as the 
perceived power and reputation of the individual Non Executive within the 
boardroom role set. In addition to these factors the Non Executive Directors' ability 
to influence corporate responsibility issues appeared to be further influenced by their 
roles outside of the organisation through the network of organisations and 
individuals with which they boundary span. 
It emerged that many Non Executives felt poorly equipped to fulfil their roles within 
the boardroom; several study participants reported feeling intimidated by other 
members of the boardroom role set, in particular the CEO and Chairman of the 
Board. The complex nature of large organisations made understanding some issues 
difficult. Their ability to understand organisational issues was further impeded by 
what they perceived to be information barriers between themselves and the rest of 
the organisation, as well as personal barriers between themselves and other members 
of the boardroom role set. 
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The Non Executives reported feeling isolated, with no one to turn to when they felt 
unsure about an issue. The study participants were frustrated by the lack of 
feedback and training opportunities made available to them. The Non Executives 
frequently had to rely on others within the boardroom to understand issues which 
they themselves did not understand, which sometimes led to issues going 
unchallenged by the board. The personal characteristics of the average Non 
Executive were perceived by the study participants themselves as preferring to hold 
alpha roles within the team and having large egos, which appeared to make it 
difficult for them to speak up when they did not understand, or disagreed with an 
issue because they feared ridicule by the rest of the group. 
The Non Executives perceive that because they were not tied to short-term profits to 
the same degree as the full-time Executive Board members they were, as a result, 
able to take a broader more long-term perspective. The study participants believed 
that part of their role was to educate the board about wider issues. However, it 
emerged that Non Executives also believed that their primary (if not singular) 
responsibility was to the organisations' shareholders. With this in mind, the Non 
Executives were predisposed to influence corporate responsibility practices through 
the shareholder lens by encouraging the use of a business case approach when 
decisions had to be made, and by considering risk and reputation rather than simply 
"social good". 
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In the next chapter we will return to the literature for a deeper analysis of the 
findings presented here in chapter four. 
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Chapter Five: Exploring the Emerging Themes 
5.0.1 Introduction 
This chapter develops the key emerging themes that were first presented in chapter 
four. The purpose of this chapter is to explore the individual perceptions of the Non 
Executive Directors who took part in the study, and relate these back to existing 
theory. The complex analysis presented in chapter four will be further developed, 
whilst still using the Non Executive Directors' own words to illustrate specific 
instances in order to preserve their original meanings and perceptions of their role 
and contribution. 
It is generally accepted that interpretive research poses a difficult challenge for the 
academic researcher in that, unlike positivistic approaches, its characteristics are 
more complex (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). Ensuring the transparency, logical 
sequence and development of evidence in the presentation of the research data is a 
key factor in overcoming such criticisms (Scandura and Williams, 2000). Allowing 
the external reader a clear picture of the route a researcher has taken in drawing their 
conclusions is important (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Therefore the design of this 
chapter will build on the complex analysis presented in chapter four, to explore the 
key emergent themes identified in the in-depth analysis. 
Due to the integrative and contextual nature of the study the theoretical 
underpinnings of the research span a number of established research fields. The aim 
of chapter five will be to provide an indication of the contribution of this study to 
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existing theories in terms of supporting, challenging or adding to our current 
knowledge. 
An important remit of this research was to gain an understanding of the role of the 
Non Executive Director in influencing issues of corporate responsibility. It is 
argued that understanding the dynamics of the Non Executive's ability to influence 
corporate responsibility issues comes through an understanding of the overall ability 
of the Non Executive Director to make a contribution, within the context of the 
boardroom environment. Therefore, as in chapter four, in the spirit of integrative 
research, this issue will be discussed within the context of the emergent themes as 
opposed to as a separate concern. The integrated design of this chapter is illustrated 
in figure 5.0. 
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Figure 5.0 Outline of Chapter 5 
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Leadership 
5.3 Primary Focus 
of the NED Role 
CEO Relationship with NEDs 
Controlling the Board 
Feeling Undervalued 
Role Experience 
Cognitive Conflict & Group Cohesion 
Summary 
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Summary 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
5.0.2 Theoretical Implications of the Emergent Themes 
The very nature of the methodology used in this research has produced a study with 
many possible avenues of investigation. The purpose of such an open approach was 
to explore as broad a perspective as possible; this was considered particularly 
appropriate, given the largely uncharted nature of the phenomenon (Pettigrew, 
1992). A narrower perspective may not have uncovered the many contextual 
nuances of the Non Executive Director's role, would have narrowed the possible 
routes of enquiry and may not have provided a satisfactory answer to the research 
questions. Under different circumstances and using different respondents, the 
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results of this research might prove to be quite different. Further studies are required 
before a more generalisable theory can be developed. 
5.0.3 Emergent Themes 
Chapter four identified three key emergent themes from the comprehensive and 
complex analysis of the perceptions of the study participants, these were as follows: 
1. Non Executive Director's role set interactions. 
2. Non Executive Director's relationships with the Chief Executive Officer and 
the Chairman of the Board. 
3. Non Executive Director's primary role focus. 
Within each of the above themes there were a number of sub themes that further 
explain the dynamic nature of the Non Executive Director's role and contribution. 
In order to preserve the clarity of the research process for the reader, these three 
themes will now be briefly reintroduced. 
In section one, theme one explores the Non Executive Directors' perceptions of the 
effect of the nuances of their Boardroom role set upon their ability to make a 
contribution. Two types of interaction were identified in chapter four: formal I 
interaction governed by the normative conventions shaped by members of the role 
set, and individual interaction based on relationships with and perceptions of 
individual members of the role set. The Non Executives voiced feelings of insecurity 
and intimidation. The study participants discussed their discomfort about speaking 
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out when they did not understand or perceived that a strategy was wrong. The Non 
Executives described their fear of being ridiculed by the group and their perception 
that others within the boardroom also kept quiet because of their `oversized egos'. 
In section two, theme two reflects the effect of the Non Executive Director's contact 
with the Chief Executive and Chairman on their individual role and contribution. 
Emerging forcefully from the data was the Non Executives' perception of the 
importance of their relationship with these two key players. Many Non Executives 
discussed circumstances where they had felt intimidated and undervalued by the 
Chief Executive and Chairman. Successful Non Executive contribution emerged as 
being strongly correlated with the ability of both the Chief Executive and Chairman 
to provide a positive environment for the Non Executive. 
In section three, theme three represents the individual Non Executive Director's 
subjective understanding of their primary role within the boardroom. Chapter four 
identified three key role characteristics of the Non Executives; the controller, the 
archetype and the boundary spanner. The study participants discussed their 
perception that their skills were not properly utilised by the board. Furthermore, 
analysis of the interviews revealed many large gaps between the expectations of the 
study participants and their actual boardroom contribution. Many study participants 
perceived that their contributions were ignored, thus causing them to feel 
disempowered and alone within the boardroom role set. It emerged that the study 
participants perceived that for a Non Executive to successfully influence boardroom 
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behaviour, required an individual with strong personal capabilities, as well as the 
support of the boardroom role set. 
The rest of this chapter will be divided into three parts. These three sections each 
address an individual theme along with its implications in terms of supporting, 
challenging or adding to our current knowledge. Following each section the analysis 
will summarise the outcomes of the preceding analysis and draw some initial 
conclusions regarding the emerging phenomenon. Additional discussion of these 
themes will then take place in chapters six and seven. A summary of the themes that 
will be discussed in the remainder of this chapter is presented in table 5.1 below: 
Figure 5.1: Emergent Themes 
Chapter Five: Emergent Themes 
Theme One Theme Two Theme Three 
Role Set Interactions Relationships with 
-º 
Primary Role Focus 
Chief Executive 
and Chairman 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
5.1 Section One: The Consequences of Interactions Within the Boardroom 
In order to understand the behaviour of the Non Executive Director within the 
corporate board, it is first useful to understand the relationship that the individual 
perceives he has with others within the group. Many theorists have called for 
research which explores the contextual variables within the board of directors but 
few studies to date have explored it (Letza et al., 2004; Kakabadse et al., 2001; 
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Dalton et al., 1999; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992). The integrated 
design of this section is illustrated in figure 5.2 below. 
Figure 5.2: Section Layout 
5.0.3 Emergent Themes 
5.2 Boardroom 5.3 Primary Focus 
Leadership of the NED Role 
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Summary 
5.1.5 Section 
Summary 
5.4 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
In the following section, the emerging themes from the analysis presented in chapter 
four will be discussed and related back to theory, in order to facilitate better 
understanding of the dynamics which influence the Non Executives' role within the 
boardroom team environment. 
Some of the research presented here relates back to studies based on small groups. 
Boards differ from other organisational work groups in terms of size and most of the 
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work groups which have been examined previously average five or six members 
(Forbes and Milliken, 1999). However, Boards of Directors average thirteen 
members (Monks and Minnow, 1985) and unlike most work groups they only 
operate episodically. Full board meetings may only be held as few as seven times a 
year (Monks and Minnow, 1985). Further, most work group members are full time 
members of the organisation whereas boards are made up primarily of part-timers 
making the relationship of directors to the board one of only `partial inclusion' in the 
organisation (Weick, 1979). 
5.1.1 Diverse Boardroom Environments 
The study participants perceived that all boards are different, in terms of their group 
personalities, processes and size; which is in line with the findings of Kakabadse et 
al. (2001). This theme is exemplified in the next quotation: 
Every board, completely different, very unique and some are social, some are almost 
anti-social, some pure business others less so. You've got some boards that are not a 
function of efficiency. You have boards that are a function of necessity or you have 
conflicting investors, and you have contentious environments where you have almost 
antagonistic type directors -I don't get involved in any of those. 
NED I Warren 
Kakabadse et al. (2001) in their study found that because of the unique nature of 
each board environment the learning curve for new members was extremely steep. 
This is borne out in the findings of the current research. One very experienced study 
participant believed that it could take some years before a Non Executive could truly 
begin to understand the workings of an organisation. 
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I probably think you've got to really be on a board a minimum of three years before 
you are really confident to say you know the business. But probably the most 
effective directors are very often those who have been there longer than nine. 
NED 6 Laurence 
Despite the perceived inconsistencies between different corporate boards, many 
study participants reported facing the same kinds of issues and pressures in their 
boardroom roles. 
5.1.2 Boardroom Information Processes 
Lorsch and Maclver (1989) suggested that CEO's might try to use the boardroom 
agenda to minimise dissent amongst other members of the board. This current study 
highlighted the suspicion that many Non Executives felt, regarding the use by 
CEO's and Chairman, of board meeting agendas to control outcomes and limit the 
discussion of contentious issues. The study participants described how agendas were 
sometimes manipulated by using time constraints, putting contentious issues at the 
end of the day when people wanted to go home and by limiting the prior availability 
of information (or sending out copious amounts of data) on agenda items. This 
finding of the current research confirms Pass's (2004) proposition that it may be 
difficult for Non Executive Directors to make informed decisions because of "lack 
of information, misinformation and cover-ups" (Pass, 2004: 59). The following 
excerpt highlights the problem that the study participants perceived they sometimes 
faced when trying to make a contribution in the boardroom. 
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They time the agenda, what I have seen done by design, is that anything that is real 
controversial gets pushed to the end So your plane is ready to leave so they can push 
something through. So you don't focus on it. 
NED 3 Liza 
For many study participants their main concern about the agenda was bad 
management. Although the Non Executives clearly felt that the agenda was used on 
occasion to purposefully manipulate outcomes, the Non Executives were also highly 
frustrated by simple bad agenda management and the poor transmission of 
information prior to board meetings. Many study participants described how 
meetings became too operationally focused; they also described the frustration that 
they felt when discussions became unfocused and dragged on for too long. This is 
highlighted in the next excerpt. 
They prattle on. It's quite ill disciplined and we're not quite so good at using meal 
times for actually pursuing business discussions in my view 
NED 10 Phillip 
Aram and Coehn (1983) found that the amount and also the integrity of information 
available to the Board of Directors was controlled by the company's internal 
Executives. However they posit that although information must flow from the 
Executive to the board, when it is not forthcoming it is the responsibility of board 
members to establish policies and guidelines for effective information flow. The 
responses of the study participants, would suggest that some Non Executives do 
attempt to influence the availability and quality of the information they receive, as is 
clear from the next quotation: 
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I said I would like the agenda changed I would like board meetings to happen as 
follows. I don't want a 3000 page bullet book that everybody reads and is then read 
to us again at the meeting. I mean they used to get where they were just ridiculous, 
so I said no more of that and then I said I want a contact to reach a decision and I 
want a priority it should be like a political briefing book where you talk about "this is 
the issue, this is the background on the issue, this what we are doing, this is 
management's recommendation, this is the downside of it ", that type of a structure. 
NED 3 Liza 
However, many Non Executives seemed to tolerate poor practices rather than 
attempt to change them. A number of individuals described their perception that the 
board meetings they attended were more like management meetings. 
It feels a bit to me like a kind of slightly enlarged meeting of the Group Executive 
Committee at which it happens to be the case that Non-Executive Directors are 
present, a kind of continuation of certain types of senior management discussion by 
other means. 
NED 10 Phillip 
Some of these Non Executives described how they had initially attempted to change 
boardroom behaviour, but had perceived that their suggestions had not been acted 
upon. In fact, as Cohan (2002) argues, even when Non Executives do ask the right 
questions, they are not always given the correct answers. In the following excerpt it 
is clear that the Non Executive is very frustrated by his inability to influence 
behaviour: 
We know it is going to catch us but we have not been able to influence the 
management to do much about it......... we will all look like absolute idiots because 
we promised the city we would sort it out. 
Ray NED 4 
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In the USA it may well be the case that some Non Executive Directors have 
previously been able to take a submissive approach to the discovery of material 
facts. A leading case on the issue of directors' duties (Cohan, 2002) from the 
Delaware Supreme Court rejected a claim on behalf of shareholders, that a Board of 
Directors has a duty to ensure an adequate internal monitoring system. The court 
found that directors are entitled to rely on the "honesty and integrity of their 
subordinates" and "that only a sustained and systematic failure of the board to 
exercise oversight" could lead to proof of liability (Graham v Allis-Chalmers 
Manufacturing Co., 1963). Of course, with the arrival of Sarbanes Oxley (2002), 
Non Executive Directors in the USA will no longer have this kind of protection from 
prosecution. 
5.1.2a Availability 
The study participants reported that because of various external commitments some 
board members were frequently only present at meetings via telephone or video 
links. This created problems for both the absent party, who described feeling 
disengaged from the proceedings and also for those individuals who were present at 
the meeting. The next two quotes highlight the study participants' concerns: 
To me, you can do interim meetings that way for quick decisions and quick issues, but to have a 
meeting that way? I have not found that to be very valuable. We have to do a lot of it we just have 
meetings on the telephone and you find that if you really want participation you won't get it. Well 
they're doing e-mail. You know they're doing e-mail, not concentrating on the meeting. And you 
can't see their body language. 
NED 9 Geoff 
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Phone board meetings are inferior. You have a meeting and then you have one or 
two board members sitting on the conference call. That happens in all meetings 
that's very common here. We discourage it; we do what we can to discourage it. 
Since Sarbanes Oxley (2002) it'll happen more often. The legislation means more 
requirements for board meetings but one of the goals is, you want engaged, capable 
people and their schedules generally are not that flexible. 
NED 1 Warren 
These excerpts highlight a number of important factors; firstly the importance of 
being able to `read' the behaviour of others in the boardroom. The study 
participants talked at length about the need to be able to trust those around them and 
to be able to rely on them to be fully engaged in the process. As their comments 
imply, this is difficult to ascertain when some members are not physically present in 
the meeting. 
The excerpts also reveal the dilemma facing many organisations. Boards need 
committed capable Non Executive Directors, but such individuals are in high 
demand and may not always be available for every meeting (Baum and Byrne, 1986) 
but Remp (1974) found that when individuals are not physically present for a 
meeting they are twice as likely to report not having the opportunity to express their 
views. Balancing the highest flying individual against the one who can turn up for 
meetings presents somewhat of an impasse. 
/ 
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5.1.2b Time 
Lorsch and Maclver (1989) noted in their study of Board of Directors that not 
having adequate time was one of the most common reasons that Non Executive 
Directors give for not being able to effectively perform their duties. The study 
participants in this current research also described their perception of having 
inadequate time to fulfil their various roles. Mace (1986) argues that boards often 
fail to realise their potential contribution, due in part to their failure to even "do the 
homework" needed for understanding the organisation's problems. 
The study participants described the problems that they faced in terms of constraints 
on their time. Many of the Non Executives worked on a number of different boards, 
as well as being full time CEO's within very large organisations; they were very 
busy people (Schaffer, 2002). Balancing their Non Executive commitments was 
perceived as difficult (Mace, 1986). Some study participants described reading the 
pre-meeting notes in the car on the way to the board meeting. A few study 
participants candidly described feeling so frustrated with the sheer volume and poor 
quality of the information with which the company provided them, that they chose 
not to read the notes at all. In the next excerpt a disillusioned study participant 
describes how a culture of not reading the pre-meeting papers had developed in his 
organisation. 
I will just wing it, because frankly that one is a piece of cake. I used to spend a lot of 
time, but now I just think that it is a waste of my time, because I am the only one that 
does. 
NED 4 Ray 
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The cultural effect within the group, suggested by the above comment adds weight 
to Schaffer's (2002) argument that established norms of board conduct may dictate 
the Non Executive Director's role. Even the most enthusiastic individual may 
eventually be worn down or even ostracised by the group (Westphal and Khann, 
2003) for exerting more than the prescribed level of effort. 
5.1.3 The Language of the Boardroom 
Individuals discussed how they had, on occasion, not spoken up when they were 
unsure or unhappy about an issue. This may because individuals perceive asking for 
help is an admission of uncertainty or dependency or even an indication that they are 
incompetent (Rosen, 1983). The Non Executive discussed the challenges that they 
sometimes faced in terms of the language that other group members adopted in the 
boardroom. Two themes relating to language were common across all of the study 
participants - the first was the use of financial language, the second the use of 
jargon. These two emerging themes are discussed next. 
5.1.3a Financial Language 
The study participants perceived that the majority of the work carried out in the 
boardroom involved the use of complex financial language. For those study 
participants without a strong background in finance the use of financial language 
was sometimes highly problematic. Indeed, even those Non Executives who self 
reported that they were "numbers guys" revealed that on occasion they had not been 
able to understand the financial information that was presented to them The study 
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participants described how often because of time constraints, or the sheer 
complexity of the issues, they had not completed the necessary homework to fully 
understand the issues that they were debating. 
In addition to the difficulties some Non Executives perceived that they faced in 
terms of understanding the complex financial language, studies suggest that an over- 
reliance on the use of financial-based indicators may not allow even the financially 
astute Non Executive Director to assess the more subtle qualities of the decisions 
that management are taking (Baysinger and Hoskinsons, 1990; Schaffer, 2002). 
When faced with complex financial information, the study participants often 
described assuming that other Non Executives would understand the issues under 
discussion. As a result, rather than speaking out and asking for further clarification, 
when a Non Executive did not understand information they often kept quiet, in the 
hope that others would make a correct assessment. Unfortunately some study 
participants also described how their belief in the ability of other Non Executives 
had sometimes led to matters not being properly debated as is highlighted by the 
study participant in the next excerpt: 
It is d jJIcult I consider myself financially literate but just talking about derivatives for 
example is really, really hard. I have to really think about these things and when you 
have to then sign them off that is really scary. I sometimes sit in a board meeting and 
think I don't understand this and I will look at the woman sitting next to me who is 
nodding intelligently and I think well at least she knows what's going on she 
understands so that is alright, and then we will get out of the meeting and I will say 
did you get all that and she'll say well no not really. oh ohh. 
NED 22 Harry 
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Many of the study participants discussed how they would like the Board of Directors 
to be able to hold discussions that were not based purely around the financial aspects 
of the business. However the study participants perceived that because of their lack 
of insider knowledge, and the limited time that was available to them, it would be 
difficult to work outside of their current financial remit (McNulty and Pettigrew, 
1999). 
The Non Executives often perceive that they are deprived of the information they 
felt necessary to adequately make a contribution to the boardroom debate. 
Eisenhardt et al. (1997) found that management teams who lacked adequate 
information, resorted to pointless debate over opinions. This in turn led to 
interpersonal conflict resulting in a reliance on narrow historical measures, such as 
profitability, rather than trying to understand what was actually happening within the 
organisation. 
The descriptions provided by the Non Executives in this current research add 
significant weight to Eisenhardt's (1997) argument. The study participants evidently 
perceived that they were forced to rely on financial data, because they lacked a 
broad understanding of the organisational context, and the time and training 
necessary to assimilate quickly. Interpersonal conflict and the stifling of debate by 
dominant individuals was commonplace. The effect of interpersonal conflict on the 
Non Executives' ability to contribute will be discussed further as this chapter 
unfolds. 
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5.1.3b Boardroom Jargon 
It emerged that many of the Non Executives had experienced problems with the 
language used by other members of the board, particularly the Executive board 
members. The study participants perceived that others in the boardroom sometimes 
used acronyms and industry-specific terms as a source of power when addressing the 
Non Executives in boardroom sessions. This use of language, to exclude some board 
members might be described as a form of social control (Westphal and Khann, 
2003). 
The study participants described how difficult and intimidating they perceived it was 
to ask for clarification of terms that they did not understand, for fear of appearing 
incompetent and uninformed. Ashford and Northcraft (1992) found that managers 
did not seek feedback from their superiors because they worried about appearing 
uncertain or too dependent. Similarly, Allen (1977) found that engineers did not 
seek ideas from others because they feared that they would be viewed as 
incompetent. Emerging from this research were similar findings about the ability of 
Non Executives to ask for guidance from their fellow board members. Study 
participants appeared to worry about looking incompetent, and were obviously 
intimidated at the prospect of admitting that they did not understand. This is 
highlighted in the next three excerpts: 
Well you know it is an old cliche but there are no stupid questions, but that is not true 
there are a lot of stupid questions ... you walk into the 
boardroom and you realise that 
the board is not meeting for your education and your edification. 
NED 18 Joe 
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They will not get into anything where they are going to show themselves up, so ego 
becomes a major issue. 
NED 4 Ray 
Nobody would picture him (an NED) as shy or easily intimidated but what you do see 
is the intimidation does lead to this, veryfew people will ask questions, because they 
don't want to be, you know they have been successful, in the real life all of a 
sudden... You know... sounding stupid, mispronouncing, someone is going to laugh 
at you. The truth is, it is the same on the board, and people won't ask a question 
NED 3 Liza 
Jackson et al. (2003) found that an Executive's fear of exposing weakness was the 
most important reason for the failure of Executive development plans. Some study 
participants discussed how they had instigated the use of a boardroom `dictionary' to 
overcome the problem of individuals feeling too intimidated to speak out. In the 
next quotation a Non Executive describes the use of a `dictionary' in a boardroom in 
which he worked: 
We had a little dictionary of grocery industry terms, the book was available on the table. 
So if someone was giving a talk, rather than interrupt they would just look at the book. 
But you know it was like ten pages, and it just set out the language. Most importantly we 
were saying don't be embarrassed, obviously someone didn't get it or we wouldn't have 
the ten pages already produced. So feel comfortable to use it. 
NED 19 John 
The use of a dictionary precluded the Non Executives from having to speak up and 
ask for clarification of terms, or more commonly, saved them from having to sit in 
an `embarrassed' silence, because they didn't perceive that they could speak up and 
ask a question without looking foolish. The dictionary might be useful on two levels; 
firstly it evidently means that the individual no longer has to worry about speaking 
Page 253 of 400 
out when they don't understand; but secondly, it also signals to individual team 
members that they are probably not the only person around the table with a problem 
of understanding. 
5.1.4 The Power of the Group 
The study participants perceived that it was often difficult for Non Executives to 
speak up on issues they felt strongly about; particularly when they were not sure that 
the other Non Executives would support them. This may be as a result of what 
Westphal and Khann (2003) describe as `social sanctioning'; these authors found 
that boards use social controls to pressure members who do not do conform to what 
the majority want. Techniques include ignoring the comments of the delinquent, not 
inviting them to important meetings and talking about things with which the 
delinquent is not familiar. 
This current research uncovered similar results to those of Westphal and Khann 
(2003). However, the approach used in the current study allowed for richer 
descriptions of the phenomenon. Westphal and Khann (2003) used questionnaires 
and some short scripted telephone interviews. Through the use of deep 
conversations, sometimes over several hours, study participants in the current 
research project were able to relax and feel comfortable enough to reveal the issues 
that made them feel most vulnerable. 
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The use of jargon, which has already been described in this analysis, might be 
viewed in some cases as a form of social control. Westphal and Khann's (2003) 
idea of social sanctioning may go some way towards explaining the perceptions of 
some Non Executives that their contribution was ignored, or their opinions not asked 
for, even about issues upon which they might well be considered an expert. 
Jane's account of the behaviour of the rest of the board when she voted against an 
important deal is a classic example of a board's attempt at social control: 
I was seriously unhappy with deal and the way which my vote had been taken, and the 
way those chauvinists, sat on the board and let that vote happen without a word of 
support, didn't even refer to it, total sense of denial about the whole thing. The whole 
thing was never discussed until about two years later when the deal went wrong. 
NED 7 Jane 
Westphal and Khann (2003) found that those directors who experienced social 
controls in one boardroom, were less likely to step out of line on other boards with 
which they worked. In this way through learned behaviour the corporate director 
network as a whole is able to control the behaviour of its members in favour of the 
retention of power for the benefit of the corporate elite and sometimes at the expense 
of constituents generally. 
5.1.4a Mutual Attraction 
The ability of the Non Executive Director to perform his duties is likely to be 
affected by his interactions and relationships with others within his role set, Katz 
and Kahn (1978) found that work groups whose members are more attracted to one 
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another produce higher levels of member satisfaction, whilst Zaccaro and Dobbins 
(1989) discovered higher levels of commitment among work groups in which there 
was some attraction amongst members to each other. 
Other studies have found a linkage between work group attraction and reduced staff 
turnover (Jaros, 1995; Angle and Perry, 1981; O'Reilly et al. 1989). Low turnover 
is advantageous because although some turnover is a healthy and normal process 
within the boardroom, high levels of turnover amongst boardroom member are 
likely to lead to a loss of firm specific knowledge within the group (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Some study participants described boards on which they worked, 
where they perceived that everyone gave their very best effort all of the time, to the 
extent that individuals pushed themselves to undertake things that they hadn't 
previously realised they were capable of doing, as is highlighted in the next 
comment: 
All the other guys were CEO's of major companies but every single person was 
valued for what they contribute.... (I thought) I don't know enough to do this, and I'll 
tell you what I worked real hard to get up to speed. 
NED 3 Liza 
Within these boards the study participants reported looking forward to meetings, and 
felt that they were learning important lessons from those around them in the 
boardroom. The next three comments highlight the importance some study 
participants placed on working within a team with whom they share respect and 
mutual attraction: 
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The best one by far is the mining company, by several lengths, it has first class people 
and is just very serious about the board's responsibilities, very clear responsibilities, 
and I have learned a lot from their processes. 
NED 18 Joe 
I couldn't wait for board meetings. That's how much the wonderful chemistry was - 
wonderful fun. I tried very hard to figure out why I loved that so much, the chemistry 
in the room was terrific the level of the people, (it) was a very high level board in 
terms of the quality of the people. 
NED 3 Liza 
This in my opinion is the best board I have ever sat on... it is a real mixture of skills 
on that board and that is why it works so well. 
NED 22 Harry 
The study participants' perceptions of the benefit of mutual attraction are 
highlighted in the comments above; mutual attraction appears to increase the effort 
norms of its members (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Lorsch and Maclver (1989) 
found that directors who give enough time to their duties and seek out the 
information they need are better able to prevent and manage crisis and govern more 
effectively in times of instability. 
Shaw (1981: 213) described the attraction amongst group members as 
"cohesiveness". Katz and Kahn (1978) referred to it as "social integration". They 
argued that it was a multi faceted phenomenon reflecting the individuals' attraction 
to the group, satisfaction with other group members and social interaction amongst 
the group's members (Katz and Kahn, 1978). The findings of this current research 
-reflect these existing studies on work groups 
in their discovery that group 
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cohesiveness (Shaw, 1981) was perceived by the study participants to have a 
positive effect on overall group processes. 
5.1.4b Role Set Diversity 
The Non Executives discussed the need for greater skill diversity in the boardroom. 
The study participants described at length the problems they faced in dealing with 
increasingly complex and time-consuming issues. The study participants admitted 
that periodically they had to rely on their fellow Non Executives to understand 
boardroom issues, because they did not have the time, or capability, to understand 
everything that was presented to them (Cohan, 2002). 
Many study participants described how they valued working with individuals from 
different backgrounds to their own. The study participants reported that Non 
Executives from different backgrounds were able to bring new perspectives and 
fresh ideas into the boardroom. The new knowledge offered by such differently 
skilled individuals, allowed those already present to come forward on matters with 
which they had previously felt that there was a problem, but did not feel that they 
had the understanding or credibility necessary to challenge managements 
judgements. This phenomenon is highlighted in the next two quotations: 
He proved to be veryforceful and I was delighted because I very often found he was 
saying things which I was instinctively feeling but my voice on that would count for 
less than his because he had patently high level US corporate experience behind him 
which added weight to the points and he would pitch in sometimes quite forcefully 
saying "looks to me like that, we're just whatever and we can't go on doing this 
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because" and we were hearing things from him which I didn't recall hearing around 
the table until he joined. 
NED 10 Phillip 
I also work with (name removed) on that board and he is a huge asset you would not 
think that this old little guy from the middle east who learned his trade as a grocer 
would have such a great perspective on things but he does, he understands about the 
customer and constituents and the importance of driving that in the board he is a 
really useful sounding board for us. 
NED 22 Harry 
The finding of this current research, that diversity among group members, in terms 
of their previous experiences, was perceived by study participants as being in 
general a positive characteristic, was in contrast to most previous research. Some 
past studies have suggested that diversity amongst group members leads to increased 
member turnover due to lower levels of group cohesiveness (Shaw, 1981) and poor 
social integration (Katz and Kahn, 1978). The Non Executives who took part in this 
research valued fellow board members with career backgrounds different from their 
own as alternative sources of capabilities - for their skill diversity. Typically, 
participants in this study described the importance of other members of the group 
holding similar status in terms of their perceived reputation and capabilities, but 
value was also placed on the opportunities that having other members of the team 
with different, rather than the same experiences, could bring to the group. 
Interestingly, despite a perception on the part of study participants that diversity was 
important to a healthy board, the Non Executives still reported a lack of group 
cohesiveness and social integration in many of the host boards on which they 
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operated. This was viewed by the study participants as being a result of the 
insufficient time that board members were able to spend together and also the 
frequently divisive behaviour of a CEO or Chairman rather than because of the 
diversity of board members. The role of the CEO and Chairman in this context will 
be discussed in more detail in section two of this chapter. 
5.1.4. c The Role of Diversity in Encouraging Corporate Responsibility 
The study participants made it clear that they valued the ability of other Non 
Executives with strong diverse capabilities. Many described how individuals with 
different capabilities were able to bring fresh perspectives into the boardroom and 
were able to argue powerfully for changes in areas in which they personally had 
capabilities. This was particularly apparent when the study participants talked about 
influencing corporate responsibility practices within the organisations with which 
they worked. 
Several of the study participants described how they found it difficult to raise issues 
on which they intuitively felt concern, because they perceived that they lacked the 
capabilities to back up their arguments. There was a perception among the study 
participants that they might even appear foolish for bringing up "soft" issues in the 
boardroom where language was almost always financial in nature. Possibly due to 
"cultural" differences between life in the boardroom and that of other roles, Non 
Executive Directors from non-business backgrounds in particular perceived that it 
was difficult to make a contribution, even in those areas in which they considered 
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themselves equipped to do so. In the following excerpt a Non Executive Director 
discusses her perception of how this problem affects contribution in relation to a 
number of boards on which she sits: 
A lot of people feel that if they haven't quite got the confidence in the boardroom, 
they seem to forget all their knowledge as soon as they walk in the room, and not 
realise that actually they've got a lot of basic knowledge which they can tap into, it's 
just in a different context, they just need reminding about it from time to time... 
they're always nervous about asking questions especially if they know somebody and 
they've been invited on to the board by the person they know. 
NED 13 Hanna 
Another Non Executive discusses the problems he personally has faced as an 
individual with a corporate responsibility background, who endeavours to encourage 
other boards with which he works to consider wider social issues: 
There are some boards where, especially if you're new and you're not that informed 
and involved or you're not on certain committees and understand what's happening 
in certain areas, people are reluctant from a peer standpoint to create an issue..... 
(then there is the) kind of herd instinct "she's the leader follow" and that's true, I 
mean that happens occasionally. Firstly, sometimes people are all by themselves out 
there too. It gets very lonely we've all been there too, speaking of the issues and for 
whatever reason others don't want to hear it. 
NED 12 Ruben 
Other Non Executives described how when a Non Executive joins the board with 
experience of dealing with corporate responsibility issues and starts to raise 
questions about the company's policies in this area they themselves then feel 
confident enough to make a contribution to the issue. 
One of our senior NEDs, but who is also on the board of (high status company with 
prominent CSR experience), said that we were not giving sufficient attention to this as 
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a growing area of concern for investors and indeed governance and indeed the public 
more generally... the initial reaction by the board, including I would say the CEO, 
tended to be more 'this is kind of froth, you know, this is all a complete blind alley, 
this corporate social responsibility, this is not what business is about, it's one of these 
elaborate con tricks' and most of the Non-Executive Directors said "no, wrong, we do 
have to pay attention to this, it is a growing area and we need to get our act a bit 
more convincing". 
NED 10 Phillip 
The above responses may be explained in part by the work of Jones and Wortman 
(1973) who found that people align their beliefs with others who have a higher status 
than themselves, by Tetlock (1983) whose research suggested that individuals align 
their beliefs with those to whom they view themselves as being accountable, and 
also by Chattopadyay et al. (1999), who found that executives' beliefs are influenced 
by other members of their team. 
This current research suggests that before the arrival of the new influencing board 
member, the Non Executive had aligned his voiced opinions with his perceptions of 
the opinions of his existing colleagues. Upon the arrival of the new individual, with 
perceived high capabilities (and therefore high group status), and a perceived 
intuitively correct approach, supported by actual experience of the issues, the Non 
Executive may subsequently realign his position to fit with the new high status 
board member. 
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5.1.4d Powerful Individuals within the Group Setting 
Westphal and Khann (2003) argued that those with very high group status may not 
be subject to social controls to the same extent as lower status members; this 
argument is substantiated by the current study. The Non Executive Directors in this 
current research described their perception that certain high status members of the 
group were more able to raise difficult issues, than were the majority of board 
members. This is typified by the response of the next study participant who, as a 
- long-standing board member on some of the worlds best known boards, might well 
be considered a very high status/high capability individual by his fellow board 
members: 
(The CEO said) `I think we've got a board meeting in ten days. I think we can 
discuss it then ". I said, "Well we actually have called a board meeting for 4.30 this 
afternoon ". This was at 2.30.1 said, "Everybody will be there ". 
NED 6 Laurence 
The situation described in this excerpt suggests a Non Executive who is confident to 
make difficult decisions within a board that is populated by individuals who are 
prepared to stand with him under uncomfortable circumstances. Achieving this 
seems to be dependent on the perception of power (Westphal and Khann, 2003). For 
an individual to instigate a major change he needs to be perceived by other members 
of the role set as being in someway powerful, in terms of reputation and influence 
within the group. The next two comments highlight this observation: 
171 tell you who was effective he just had to say something at a meeting and (the 
chairman) respected him, (he was) a heavyweight in the city, he had a lot of 
influence, and a lot of sway and I think I saw him change things. 
NED 7 Jane 
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The Non executives can dissent if they are very powerful people. 
NED 4 Ray 
Despite the study participants' perceptions of the importance of powerful individuals 
within the boardroom, many Non Executives also described the problem of over- 
inflated egos and highly domineering individuals in many of the boardrooms in 
which they operated (Raber, 1989). Learning to work with such strong personalities 
was a skill that many of the study participants described having to learn. 
You know these boards don't suffer small egos. And generally, the people on the 
board are pretty demanding, board egos are important. You have to manage that. 
NED I Warren 
Being one of a group of individuals who were all used to viewing themselves as the 
alpha player in a team appeared to cause the Non Executives to sometimes feel 
embarrassed and intimidated in the boardroom setting - their egos made it difficult 
for them to speak out for fear of ridicule by the rest of the group. Overcoming this 
perception of intimidation and fear of ridicule, presents a rather unique problem for 
the board of Directors, as will be discussed in the next section. CEO's have a 
preference for CEO's from other organisations in their boardrooms. Creating a team 
from a group of people who may well have very similar personal characteristics, and 
who are used to being in charge and not being questioned, may well lead to a 
dysfunctional role set. The following comments highlight the problem faced by 
some of the study participants: 
You would be amazed at how intimidating it is! 
NED 7 Jane 
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I stepped into this absolute blood bath! 
NED 18 Joe 
It may be that such individuals have just never developed the personal coping 
strategies necessary for dealing with other dominant individuals - the dominator 
becomes the dominated. In this way the powerful CEO-turned-Non Executive looks 
around the room and sees thirteen other powerful dominant characters and feels 
uncharacteristically inhibited. 
5.1.4e Groupthink 
The study participants discussed their perceptions of the importance of having 
agreement within the boardroom. They described how the Chairman in particular 
would always try to seek consensus among the group (Eisenhardt et al. 1997: 84). 
This was interesting because although study participants described the need for 
consensus, they also frequently discussed their perception that they and other Non 
Executives did not agree with certain choices that the board had made. However, 
rather than addressing these issues, many study participants appeared to simply 
avoid dealing with the problem, which appeared to leave them feeling highly 
frustrated or caused them to switch off from the debate (Katz, 1959). One Non 
Executive speaks candidly about his own experience on a board that he perceives 
does not listen to its Non Executives: 
Well there is no pressure on you to bother really, just keep taking the cheques there is an awful lot 
of that, I mean I think 1 am doing that to some extent. 
NED 7 Ray 
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In the next example a very experienced Non Executive describes her experience of 
various boards over her long career: 
The funny thing about that group (the board), the 'hear no evil see no evil, the sort of 
three monkey thing', is they absolutely believe it. It isn't that they are doing that 
because they are lazy or fat or whatever, they are doing it because they believe it and 
I have been so fascinated by that myopia as to wonder am 1 missing something here 
and the only thing that I can think I'm missing is that they could be, in a funny kind of 
almost subliminal way, in a way, they don't understand how are they going to 
preserve this very fragile unity within the boardroom, so that they are almost like 
sleepers. They're just, they're just there and they are not doing anything but they are 
keeping everything on the board in a harmonious whole. 
NED 7 Jane 
The consensus seeking behaviour, which the study participants perceived, may be 
explained by `groupthink' (Cohan, 2002; Demp and Neubauer, 1992). `Groupthink' 
views consensus seeking as a method of reducing stress levels within the group 
(Janis, 1972; Janis, 1971). Members risk social exclusion from the group if they 
introduce stressful or conflicting information into the team; this leads to the 
suppression of information and ideas and cognitive conformity amongst team 
members (Westphal and Khann, 2003; Cohan, 2002: 284; Schwenk, 1989; Janis, 
1972). Ambiguous or complex information tends to be dismissed as unmanageable 
(Cohan, 2002). The Non Executive in the next quotation appears to describe some 
of the symptoms of groupthink, as she talks about the behaviour of her fellow board 
members when she voted against a very big deal, which her very domineering 
Chairman wished to undertake: 
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Those chauvinists, sat on the board and let that vote happen without a word of 
support, didn't even refer to it, total sense of denial about the whole thing. The whole 
thing was never discussed until about two years later when the deal went wrong. 
NED 7 Jane 
A second study participant who worked on the same board later substantiated this 
particular story. Interestingly all the members of this highly elite board were very 
capable, extremely successful individuals, none of whom might be expected to 
easily allow a proposal to be simply "nodded through". DeLamater, et al. (1969) 
described this type of behaviour as "functional commitment" where the individual's 
personal power and status are enhanced by maintaining the status quo. Sheard and 
Kakabadse (2004) argue that individuals will often work very hard to maintain their 
affiliation with a group, even to the point of doing things that they would not do as 
an individual, but as part of the team they form a separate identity. Similarly Janis 
and Katz (1959) argued that people, when part of a group, will overlook actions they 
would not tolerate for themselves as individuals. This may lead Non Executives to 
behave in an unethical way, even when they consider themselves to be highly ethical 
individuals in their own right (Sims, 1992). 
Janis (1972,1971) in his original works on groupthink argued that the phenomenon 
was predicted mainly through excessive cohesion within the group. However, the 
study participants in this current research did not generally report perceptions of 
strong cohesion - in fact many described the desire for closer ties between members 
of the group. However the lack of actual group cohesion does not negate the desire 
to belong, particularly when the advantages of membership are very high, Non 
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Executive Directors do not only benefit from membership of the subset of the single 
board of directors, but also from a larger set of social elite. Studies subsequent to 
Janis's early work suggest that other group dynamics may also lead to groupthink, 
including the desire to belong to the group, arrogance, overconfidence, bottom line 
mentality, rapid decision making, loyalty to a leader and promotional leadership 
(Baum and Byrne, 1986 McCauley, 1989; Sims, 1992; Esser, 1998). 
5.1.5 Section One Summary and Conclusions 
During the analysis of the Non 'Executive as a group within the boardroom, a 
number of important themes emerged. Feelings of insecurity and intimidation, 
possibly due to lack of a clear role understanding and an inability to seek advice and 
guidance, appear to be common amongst many Non Executives. 
The Non Executives perceived that their ability to contribute was impeded by poor 
information systems, the desire of the board's leadership to control information 
flows and the inadequate availability of time to understand issues properly. These 
factors may lead the individual towards apathy and ultimately withdrawal from the 
decision-making process. These issues, along with the enormously complex nature 
of many of the organisations they worked in, may have caused the Non Executives 
to use bounded rationality or cognitive nearsightedness to deal with complex issues. 
The use of bounded rationality in turn leads to a reliance on the almost exclusive use 
of difficult financial language during debates. Participants often described the use of 
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language, both jargon and financial, as a source of power and control in the 
boardroom. 
The Non Executives expressed their feelings of anxiety about speaking out when 
they were unsure about issues, or did not understand; they feared being ridiculed by 
the wider group. It emerged from the analysis however that high status members of 
the boardroom role set were more able to raise difficult issues than were the majority 
of board members. High status members are categorised as those with high 
capabilities and an external reputation for working on high status boards. In terms 
of corporate responsibility, high status members were able to introduce issues more 
easily, particularly if they had successful experience of them elsewhere. 
In-depth analysis of the perceptions of the Non Executive Directors who took part in 
the study suggests that some study participants may be describing the symptoms of 
groupthink within their boardroom environments. What is more, the emerging 
themes indicate that although a single factor can influence the ability of the Non 
Executive Director to contribute, it is much more likely that a complex dynamic of 
context-related factors work together, to either enable or inhibit successful 
boardroom contribution. 
Figure 5.3 represents the first in a series of models that will be presented in this 
chapter as an explanation of the perceived behaviour of the Non Executive Director. 
The model identifies the main drivers of groupthink within the board as described by 
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the study participant and shows how these are translated into symptomatic group 
behaviours. 
Figure 5.3: The Indicators and symptoms of Groupthink in the Board of Directors 
Symptoms 
Groupthink 
N.. d lo 
Compl. a 
Financial Epotlatkal Dominant Indicators 
Language L. ad. nshlp Individuals 
ý1On9 LO R. bt. d axial s. l D. bat. 
Compiled by the Author 
The next section of this chapter will examine more closely the impact of the board's 
leadership on the ability of the individual Non Executive to make a successful 
contribution. 
5.2 Section Two: Boardroom Leadership 
It emerged from the complex analysis presented in chapter four that the ability of the 
Non Executive director to make a contribution was deeply affected by the CEO and 
the Chairman of the Board. In order to bring clarity of meaning to the analysis, in 
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the course of this section the perceptions of the study participants will be re- 
examined in the light of existing theory. The design of this section and its 
integration into the rest of this chapter is illustrated in figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Section layout 
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5.4 Chapter Summary 
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of the NED Role 
5.2.4 Role 
5.2.5 Cognitive Experiences: 
Conflict and Strategies 
Group Cohesion for Success 
5.2.1 The CEO's Relationship with the Non Executive Director 
The Non Executives perceived that the Chief Executive did not always seek advice 
from them; this may be due to a fear on the part of the Chief Executive of loss of 
status. Allen (1977) found that engineers did not seek ideas from others because they 
feared that they would be viewed as incompetent. Furthermore Ashford and 
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Northcraft (1992) discovered that managers did not seek feedback from their 
superiors because they worried about appearing uncertain or too dependent, this was 
particularly true when the superiors were in a position to evaluate the manager. 
The Non Executive is in an interesting position although he is not the CEO's 
manager in the normative supervisor/subordinate sense of the role; he is nevertheless 
employed to supervise the CEO's behaviour. Non Executives are also employed to 
oversee the CEO's remuneration package; as such, the CEO is unlikely to wish to 
send signals of incompetence or uncertainty to those who will dictate his future 
earnings. The study participants talked at length about their perceptions of many 
large egos in the boardroom, CEO's may simply be afraid of being viewed as 
incompetent by the rest of the group. What is more, fear of change and exposing 
weakness was found by Jackson et al. (2003) to be a major cause for the failure of 
executive development. 
Those Non Executives who expressed the view that their CEO's were supportive, 
who went out of their way to seek opinions and encourage open participation, as in 
the next quotation, may be experiencing the CEO's strategy to reduce perceived 
personal risk, by creating a sense of security, friendship (Anderson and Williams, 
1996; Rosen, 1983) and trust (Mayer et al. 1995). 
I felt so important and I was by far career timing wise the junior member, all the 
other guys were CEO's of major companies but every single person was valued for 
what they contribute, and he (the CEO) found a way as a communication expert as he 
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was to make each board member feel valued and it's a typical thing that you see, you 
tend to do more, you step forward you volunteer, I shared. 
NED 3 Liza 
Tsui et al (1995) established that managers who seek feedback, even when it is 
likely to be negative, were viewed by their role set as being more effective. Seeking 
feedback may therefore be used by the CEO as an impression management tool 
within the boardroom. Westphal (1999) found that CEO's with strong social ties 
within the boardroom were more likely to ask for advice from other board members 
because, Westphal speculates, they perceive a lower level of risk in seeking advice 
from those with whom a friendship exists. 
Westphal's study used a positivistic approach, sending questionnaires to a large 
sample of directors. This current study adds to Westphal's work through the use of 
a qualitative approach. By exploring the perceptions of the individual Non Executive 
Director it emerged that there was significant reciprocity in the role of friendship in 
shaping boardroom influence. Not only are Chief Executives perceived as being 
more likely to seek advice within a safe trusting "friendly" environment but, as in 
the above quotation, Non Executives also appear to be much more likely to offer 
advice when they perceive themselves to be in an environment where they feel 
valued, trust and like each other. 
The value of having individuals who like each other and get along must be weighed 
against the problems that an overly cohesive group may create for itself in terms of 
groupthink (Janis, 1972; Janis, 1971). Many of the study participants described 
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situations where they had encountered what might well be classified as groupthink. 
Interestingly, however, these tended to be within boardrooms where individuals did 
not appear to get along well together; there were often high levels of mistrust and 
even malevolence amongst members of these boards, as is described in the next 
excerpt: 
I was persuaded that I didn't understand their business, and I rather wish now that 
1'd perhaps consolidated a bit more with other non-executive directors on the board 
and perhaps talked a bit more sense with them. They certainly weren't stupid and I 
think everybody had their own misgivings about strategy... I couldn't believe how 
silently everybody sat. 
NED 7 Jane 
The factor that correlated each of these boards was a highly domineering CEO or 
Chairman or both. In these circumstances study participants described feeling highly 
intimidated by the dominant party; they feared that they would look foolish if they 
spoke out on an issue and perceived that it was unlikely anyone else in the 
boardroom would support them. As a result of these perceptions most Non 
Executives working with overly dominating leaders elected to keep quiet, even when 
they feared that a strategy was flawed. Such behaviour reflects the conclusions of a 
number of authors who suggest that individuals will suppress the beliefs that they 
hold outside of the group setting in order to maintain the status quo within the group 
(Sheard and Kakabadse, 2004; Sims, 1992; Janis and Katz, 1959). 
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5.2.2 Controlling the Board 
The study participants spoke at length about their belief that CEO's tended to be 
overly domineering and controlling in their approach the board and other board 
members. The study participants also described their perception that their CEO did 
not like the Non Executives to speak to other board members, unless the CEO was 
himself present for the meeting. As one Non Executive put it "They would be 
regarded as disloyal... he'd (CEO) have gone ballistic. " NED 7 Jane. 
The Non Executives perceived that this desire to control was partly as a result of the 
CEO's own feeling of job insecurity, and partly due to the likely personality type of 
an individual who makes it to the top of a large organisation. The CEO's ability to 
dominate events in the boardroom may well be further enhanced by social 
constraints on the Senior Executives, who might feel inhibited about speaking out 
against their CEO or providing supplementary information to the board because of 
pressure to maintain their loyalty to "the boss" (Schaffer, 2002; Fama and Jenson, 
1983; Pahl and Winkler, 1974). The next excerpt describes the Non Executive's 
perception of the reservations of the Executive team: 
I would quite like to go and visit a couple of the companies; they (the executives) 
don't quite like it they are not quite sure what you are going to say. They are not sure 
if you are going to upset the CEO or harass them or come back and tell tales and 
nobody is quite sure about the NEDs. 
NED 4 Ray 
The study participants often described their perception that the CEO's with whom 
they worked tended to be highly egotistical. Many felt that they could not easily 
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criticise the company's management for fear of upsetting the CEO and creating 
friction in the boardroom. Demp and Neubauer (1992) in their international study of 
corporate boards found that all the directors that they interviewed in the UK and 
USA had experience of CEO's whose "personal influence, track record and national 
standing inhibited outside directors from challenging their proposals" (Demp and 
Neubauer 1992: 14). Cohan (2002) described how similar problems with overly 
egotistical company executives in the Enron Corporation led to its ruinous demise. 
The following remarks highlight the perceptions of study participants: 
CEO's are very arrogant, they are very aggressive; they have all the personality 
traits, which would make them in fact lousy board members. 
NED 3 Liza 
CEO's, we learn the skill of making things that stink smell good. That's part of what 
we are paid for. On the darkest day you say "But our strategy is right, we are 
committed to it we have got all the right people in place. " 
NED 19 John 
The centralisation of power towards a dominating CEO that the study participants 
described may generate high levels of interpersonal friction amongst group members 
according to Eisenhardt et al. (1997). Their research suggested that groups worked 
best when there are balanced power structures. Balanced power structures require a 
clear leader, but also that other group members are able to substantially influence 
decision-making. Similarly Pearce and Zahra (1991) found that participative boards 
with both powerful outsiders and a powerful CEO were associated with higher 
financial performance than other board types. Balanced power structures were 
rarely reported during this research. The study participants generally described their 
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perceptions of autocratic board environments that were controlled by a central figure 
in the form of either the CEO or Chairman. 
The study participants perceived that new governance regulations were forcing the 
boards on which they worked, towards more structural independence from the host 
organisations. It was not uncommon for many of the host boards to be populated 
entirely by outsiders, with the exception of the CEO. Many researchers have viewed 
this type of board independence as a positive way to protect the rights of 
shareholders (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). However many of the study participants 
reported that this separation of the board from its senior managers left the Non 
Executives entirely reliant on the information provided to them by the CEO. 
According to Westphal (1998) such information asymmetry is likely to reduce the 
overall power of the Non Executives. 
Eisenhardt et al. (1997) found that autocratic control within groups could lead to 
verbally aggressive behaviour amongst group members. This verbal aggression is 
reflected in the findings of the current study. Some of the study participants spoke 
with surprising venom about their fellow board members as is captured in the next 
three excerpts: 
I said "this is absolutely outrageous this organisation is dying and you guys are 
sitting around". I said something quite vulgar. 
NED 4 Ray 
He (Chairman) was such an abusive type of person. 
NED 3 Liza 
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I stepped into this absolute blood bath and I thought that British boards were you 
know, lady like! 
NED 18 Joe 
The above comments also highlight the feelings of powerlessness and frustration 
that many of the study participants appeared to experience in their roles. Non 
Executives, in their lives outside of the Non Executive role, tend to be highly 
successful dynamic people, who are used to being in charge, listened to and their 
opinions acted upon. However the study participants perceived that as Non 
Executives they often lacked the control over their environment which they 
perceived they had elsewhere. 
5.2.3 Feeling Undervalued 
The Non Executives' feelings of frustration and powerlessness were evident 
throughout this current research study. It emerged, on closer examination of this 
phenomenon, that as a result of these feelings of frustration and powerlessness many 
Non Executives sought apparent withdrawal from the line of decision-making. The 
next comment highlights this point: 
The chairman has briefed the head-hunter, seen the people. It was his view of the 
balance. The nomination committee has just nodded it in. Actually I haven't even met 
the guy, we haven't been consulted, I told them to get on with it. 
NED 4 Ray 
The above comment also highlights the frustration the behaviour of the CEO or 
Chairman can create for the individual within an autocratic power structure where 
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there is little `real' consultation. As the study participant puts it "I told them to get 
on with it. " This Non Executive has chosen to simply detach himself from the 
situation evidently because he feels that he has no power to do anything about it 
(Tsui et al. 1995). Despite this, Ray (NED 4) later discusses his feeling that the 
individual who was ultimately chosen by the Chairman for the new board position is 
not needed on the board and will in effect upset the "balance" of the team. 
5.2.4 Role Experience: Strategies for Success 
The preceding two points do raise a question, although the majority of Non 
Executives perceived the advantages of a separation of the two roles, many of the 
boards which were discussed during the research lacked a clear line of 
communication and control which may lead to some role ambiguity for the Non 
Executives (Katz and Kahn, 1978). 
The Non Executives appeared, in their descriptions of their roles, to be essentially 
adrift in their understanding of what was expected of them within the role set, and 
lacked the resources to reach out for help when they needed it. Clearly whether 
there is a separation of the roles or a joint Chairman and CEO it is important that 
individual board members have an understanding of who they should be talking to, 
when they have a concern. Whether embodied in a single individual or divided 
between two individuals, there appears to be a need for accessibility, openness and 
mutual respect that must come from the CEO and Chairman. Two Non Executives 
describe their positive experiences in the next example: 
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Well I think it has a lot to do with the CEO and Chairman they really make an effort to ask us all 
for our opinions, encourage us to speak out and that really makes a difference. 
NED 8 Thomas 
The CEO was a maestro... he found a way as a communication expert as he was to 
make each board member feel valued and it's a typical thing that you see, you tend to 
do more. you step forward you volunteer, I shared. 
NED 3 Liza 
5.2.5 Cognitive conflict and group Cohesion: Finding Balance 
Cognitive conflict is defined by Jehn (1995: 258) as "disagreements about the 
content of the tasks being performed, including differences in viewpoints, ideas and 
opinions". Cognitive conflict is believed to be most common amongst groups that 
are interdependent and face complex decision-making tasks. The complex and 
ambiguous nature of the issues facing the board that emerged from the analysis of 
this research, may lead members to develop different opinions (Forbes and Milliken, 
1999). However despite the Non Executives' perceptions of their own, and other 
board members', personal frustration that issues were not always dealt with in a 
manner which they found acceptable, many did not voice their conflicting opinions 
in the boardroom. 
Mace (1986) found that many board members respond to high levels of cognitive 
conflict by simply reducing their commitment to the group. This phenomenon also 
appears to be reflected in this current research in which many study participants 
reported that their perceptions of an overly domineering CEO or Chairman forced 
those with conflicting ideas into petulant silence. Such individuals generally chose 
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to zone out of debate in order to keep their personal frustrations in check. For 
example, one Non Executive commented on her attempts to contribute to a particular 
board: 
It was extremely difficult to make a contribution there that was either recognised or 
listened to, or understood. 
NED 7 Jane 
The study participants discussed the desire, particularly of the company Chairman to 
always reach a consensus and to do so as quickly as possible. Similarly, Eisenhardt 
et al. (1997) found that executives sometimes believe unrealistically that consensus 
is always possible; they argue, "Such a naive insistence on consensus can lead to 
endless haggling" (Eisenhardt et al. 1977: 84). 
In fact cognitive conflict is not necessarily a negative attribute within the 
boardroom; it can lead to the consideration of a greater number of alternatives and 
the proper scrutiny of ideas set forth by the executive management team. It is also 
likely to reduce the likelihood of groupthink developing within the boardroom team 
(Janis, 1972). One Non Executive expressed his perception of the importance of 
independent thinking within the group: 
The danger of everyone liking themselves and each other is that you can take the 
consensus without a challenge. (You) can head downstream and you are over the 
waterfall before you realise, you were so busy talking to each other, that you didn't 
hear the roar coming. If you had been a little more independent in your thought 
process someone would have said "what's that noise? " and they would have been 
quiet and they would have said "it sounds like a waterfall" and "maybe we should 
pull over and examine this before we go down the middle of the stream ". 
NED 19 John 
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Excessive social cohesion may actually reduce the ability of a group to effectively 
debate the issues at hand. Time is spent developing and maintaining relationships 
rather than seeking solutions and testing proposals (Schwenk, 1989; Sethi et al. 
2002; Cohan, 2002; Westphal and Khann, 2003 Sheard and Kakabadse, 2004). 
Some study participants discussed how the diverse nature of the skill and personality 
set within some boards with which they worked, led to wide and open debate about 
the issues the company needed to address; this is exemplified by the Non Executive 
in the next example: 
This in my opinion is the best board I have ever sat on by the way. There is a guy 
who is a nuclear engineer very bright guy, and he asks all the right and difficult 
questions... There is a women .... she is very bright but very difficult and rude she 
often says inappropriate things at board meetings ... she obviously has a unique 
insight... There is also a priest on that board he will always bring us safety and 
employee issues and the environmental stuff. It is a really mixture of skills on that 
board and that is why it works so well. I also work with (name removed) on that 
board and he is a huge asset you would not think that this old little guy from the 
middle east who learned his trade as a grocer would have such a great perspective on 
things but he does, he understands about the customer and constituents and the 
importance of driving that in the board he is a really useful sounding board for us. 
NED 22 Harry 
Despite the inconsistent opinions of those who took part in the study on the use of 
cohesion and conflict in creating the optimum level of effectiveness within the 
board, there was general agreement that it was important to trust your fellow board 
members. Study participants described the importance of being able to rely on 
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others within the boardroom. However, as previously described, an over-reliance on 
the ability of others may lead to inadequate scrutiny of the executives' proposals. 
The study participants in this current research revealed two words as being 
important in describing their perception of their desired relationship with others in 
the boardroom these were `trust' and `respect'. Their feelings on this issue are 
presented in their own words in the following passages: 
You have to be, in a way; happy to be on a board. And trust your colleagues is 
another thing. In a big business, you need sometimes to trust your colleagues because 
you can't know everything on everything. But if you know that another Non- 
Executive has perhaps looked at a certain part of the business and you can trust him. 
That gives you great comfort. 
NED 6 Laurence 
You need somebody. You do, you really need somebody who you can talk to and who 
you trust. 
NED 7 Jane 
The optimum board may be one that balances some cohesion against the ability of 
individuals to voice alternative opinions and dissenting views. Eisenhardt et al. 
(1997), describes such an environment as a balanced power structure. Balanced 
power structures require a clear leader, but also that other group members are able to 
substantially influence decision-making. A similar structure was also found to be 
optimum by Pearce and Zahra (1991) who describe such boards as participative, 
with both powerful Non Executives and also a powerful CEO. 
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5.2.6 Section Two Summary and Conclusions 
Emerging from the analysis were the study participants' perceptions of the 
domineering behaviour of many CEO's and Chairmen. The Non Executives 
perceived that some CEO's attempt to limit information and access to the 
organisation, in order to maintain control of individuals in the boardroom; this 
restricted the Non Executives' ability to properly evaluate scenarios and make a 
useful contribution. Furthermore, emerging from the analysis presented in sections 
one and two it appears that many boards may suffer from groupthink, which further 
restricts the Non Executives' ability to contribute effectively to debate. 
A small number of Non Executives portrayed boards in which the CEO played a 
more motivational role, encouraging positive behaviours by providing support and 
encouragement to board members, within an environment where individuals were 
valued for their unique capabilities. Within these boards study participants reported 
making extra efforts to achieve the personally challenging goals set by the board's 
leadership, such boards might be described as having a balanced power structure 
when compared with the subjugated boards which many study participants 
described. 
Figure 5.5 below illustrates the factors that emerged from the research as major 
influencers of Non Executive contribution. The dynamic nature of these influencers 
have the capacity to enable or inhibit potential contribution depending on how they 
are implemented within the contextual environment of the boardroom. These factors 
may operate together, to create functional or dysfunctional behaviour or a single 
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factor may be sufficient to upset the balance of the board impeding successful Non 
Executive contribution. 
Figure 5.5 Boardroom Leadership 
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The next section of this chapter will examine more closely the impact of the Non 
Executives' perceived role expectations in relation to their actual contribution to the 
board. 
5.3 Section Three: Primary Role Focus of the Non Executive Director 
From the complex analysis presented in chapter four, three key characteristics of the 
Non Executive Directors' perceived role expectations emerged; these were that of 
Controller, Archetype and Boundary Spanner. This section will re-examine these 
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key characteristics with reference to current theory and in the light of the analysis 
presented earlier in this chapter and in chapter four. The integrated design of this 
section is illustrated in figure 5.6 below. 
Figure 5.6: Section Layout 
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5.3.1 Controller: The power of the Non Executive Director 
The study participants revealed some interesting paradoxes between their 
perceptions of the Non Executive Director's role and their illustrations of actual 
behaviour in the boardroom. For example the study participants strongly believed 
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that one of their most important roles was that of hirer and firer (Demp and 
Neubauer, 1992), which corresponds with the observations of Pettigrew and 
McNulty (1998) whose qualitative study of the role of Non Executive Director 
suggested that Non Executive Directors believed that they had the power to hire and 
fire the Chief Executive. 
However, in contrast to Pettigrew and McNulty's (1998) study, many of the Non 
Executives interviewed for this research described situations where, despite strong 
sentiments among the Non Executive board members about the ineffectiveness of a 
Chairman or CEO, attempts to remove them were never made, because the Non 
Executives believed that they were powerless to make change. 
Much of the power and control that the study participants had expected to hold 
themselves was in fact controlled by the CEO and/or Chairman (Mace, 1986; Lorsch 
and Maclver, 1989). The findings from analysis of this current research suggest that 
this is in part because Non Executive Directors often lack internal structural sources 
of power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; Westphal, 1998), particularly in the form 
of inside knowledge. 
Eisenhardt et al. (1997) in their study of management teams found that in the 
absence of good data on internal and external issues, team members waste time on 
"pointless debate over opinions... self aggrandizement and ill formed guesses about 
how the world might be" (Eisenhardt et al. 1997: 79). This results in interpersonal 
conflict between group members. The study participants in this current research 
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were frequently unable to gather information about the organisation, except through 
the CEO (Aram and Coehn, 1983). In addition, the study participants perceived that 
it was difficult to develop relationships with internal managers, or other Non 
Executives within the host organisation. 
The Non Executives perceived that the CEO viewed personal contact between board 
members as threatening to his own position as the alpha member of the board, 
causing him anxiety about the security of his job as CEO. The Non Executives' 
inability to form close ties, particularly with other board members, left them feeling 
isolated within their role in the boardroom. Their isolation in turn, caused them to 
feel intimidated about standing alone (Alderfer, 1986) on any particular issue for 
fear that they would be ridiculed or excluded by the rest of the group. 
The study participants found that they had to rely upon their personal capabilities in 
terms of past experience, personal understanding and reputation in order to try to 
influence boardroom behaviour. However the study participants believed that it 
required more than just strong personal capabilities in order to consistently influence 
boardroom behaviour. It also required a supportive team culture, trust and respect 
amongst the individual board members as a group. Those Non Executives who did 
report successful removal of a CEO or Chairman described the perception of a 
strong team culture amongst board members. In some cases this culture was visible 
not only within the group of Non Executives, but also to the management team who 
consequently felt comfortable enough to approach the Non Executives when they 
themselves believed that there was a problem with the CEO and/or Chairman. 
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5.3.1a The `Patroller' or `Protector'? 
Comprehensive analysis of the study participants' understanding of their Non 
Executive roles within the boardroom, revealed conflicts in the enactment of their 
perceived duties that they did not feel had been satisfactorily resolved. The study 
participants described a major part of their role as that of a `patroller' protecting the 
shareholder from the self-serving behaviour of management. This is in line with the 
commonly accepted agency model of corporate governance (Eisenhardt, 1989). The 
following excerpt highlights the Non Executives perception of the importance of the 
patrolling role: 
As a director you can no longer afford to sit back and say go figure, I want to know 
what the managers are up to, I want to know how they made their bonuses. 
NED 20 Arni 
This emerging theme highlighted an area of some uncertainty for the Non Executive 
Directors. Despite a clear perception on the part of all those who took part in the 
study that the organisations' shareholders were the primary concern of the Non 
Executive Director, the study participants also clearly believed that ensuring a long- 
term future for the organisation was their central goal (Johnson and Greening, 1999). 
Although theoretically these two goals might appear to be aligned, closer 
examination of the contextual factors within any given organisation, might present 
the Non Executive with more complex judgements as to how they should conduct 
themselves within their role in the boardroom. 
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The short-term requirements of many institutional investors is now well documented 
(Lowengard, 1997; Johnson and Greening, 1999; Witherell, 2000). The pressure 
that the study participants perceived is placed by institutional investors on the CEO 
to perform towards short-term performance goals (Masi et al. 1997) was clearly 
articulated by the study participants, as is described in the next excerpt: 
Here you have a secret ballot and a CEO with a job that's either going to prove him 
or finish him. He's put in some office like a rock, and he inherits this huge jury and 
the jury votes on him and he's got theoretically hundreds of thousands of 
shareholders but really it's the vast institutions sitting on billions of dollars. In a 
communityfull of hotshot really smart analysts who are constantly ranking you, you 
are told that every six months you've got to produce. The pressure is that you'd 
better look back and everybody else's figures had better be worse than yours and 
certainly better than the last set of figures and in fact you're meant to slightly indicate 
what you expect those figures to be and then by god they had better be good the 
pressure is huge to create big figures. 
NED 18 Joe 
The conflicting signals that the study participants perceived that they received, in 
terms of the expectations of their wider constituents, caused them to question the 
purpose of their roles. The study participants perceived that the market might 
attempt to seek short-term gains even at the expense of the longer-term success of 
the organisation (Gilbert et al. 1988). The Non Executives believed that protecting 
the CEO from these short-term market pressures was an important part of their role. 
However, trying to balance the somewhat conflicting role of `patroller' of 
management behaviour with that of market buffer to the CEO created a degree of 
uncertainty and ambiguity for some of the study participants. Such behaviour might 
be viewed as more in line with the stewardship model of corporate governance 
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(Davis et al. 1997) than that of the agency model. This, combined with the pressure 
that individuals felt, to conform to the expectations of others in the boardroom to 
reach rapid consensus and avoid stressful disagreements, led to a high degree of 
frustration caused by both ambiguous conflicting role signals (Katz and Kahn, 1978; 
Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
5.3.1b Focus: Long-Term v. Short-Term Focus 
The study participants perceived that their own perspectives, in contrast to those of 
the full time executive board members, tended to be more long-term focused 
(Oliver, 2000; Johnson and Greening, 1999), and also orientated towards wider 
issues than just shareholder returns. This is in accordance with the work of both 
Wang and Dewhirst, (1992) and also Johnson and Greening, (1999) who found that 
Non Executive Directors recognise that their responsibilities encompass more than 
shareholders. The next respondent who works as a CEO in one organisation and as 
a Non Executive in two others captures the contrasting mindsets of a CEO and a 
Non Executive in terms of taking a long- or short-term perspective on organisational 
success. 
I think it's fair to say that there is an undue amount of pressure and focus on short- 
term results. I can tell you as a CEO that I feel like my responsibility is far beyond 
the current quarters. But I feel that the current quarters are the mile markers. You 
know the milestones that are important indicators as to whether or not the strategy is 
being validated or not. As a board member, on the two boards that I sit, we typically 
focus on longer-term issues. We think in terms of years as opposed to quarters. So 
one, two, three year, sort of horizons and every once in a while we'll think even 
longer term. 
NED 11 Barry 
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Although the study participants believed that their goal was the long-term prosperity 
of the organisation, they perceived this role as being framed within their 
responsibility as Non Executive Directors to the organisations shareholders. 
According to the stakeholder perspective, Non Executive Directors serve as 
representatives and guardians of a range of constituents (Harrison and Freeman, 
1999). However, Lorsch and Maclver (1989) found that there was typically little 
consensus during board meetings about accountabilities to various constituencies; 
they found that directors almost universally saw shareholders as their top priority 
(Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). Most of the study participants in this current research, 
although recognising the importance of constituent awareness, believed that the Non 
Executive's primary responsibility was to the shareholder and that as a result 
decisions should always be taken from the perspective of a return on investment. 
5.3.2 Role Archetype 
5.3.2a Strategic Guide 
McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) found that there was now more pressure on Non 
Executive Directors to become involved in strategy formulation. This is because of 
increased corporate governance requirements, which McNulty and Pettigrew 
believe, has led to an increase in the overall legitimacy of the Non Executive 
Director. The study participants in this current research generally believed that they 
should have an important role in moulding the strategy of the host organisation 
(Demp and l4ubauer, 1992). Study participants envisaged their role as that of 
Page 292 of 400 
guider of strategic action (Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Within this strategic role, the 
Non Executives described how the actual strategic thinking should emanate from the 
CEO and the Executive board members. 
The Non Executives perceived that their role was to draw on their own previous 
experiences to guide the executive team (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988), in order to 
ensure the successful implementation of corporate strategic action. These findings 
are broadly in line with the conclusions of other studies which have examined the 
strategic role of the Board of Directors (Tashakori and Boulton, 1983; Mace, 1986; 
Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; Johnson et al. 1996; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; 
Kakabadse et al. 2001). 
Although several of the study participants were able to provide some evidence of 
occasions when they had in some way been able to affect corporate strategy (Lorsch 
and Maclver, 1989), there also emerged an underlying feeling of discontent in many 
of the study participants' accounts of the Non Executive's role. The study 
participants clearly perceived that their skills and knowledge were often not called 
upon enough during board meetings (Forbes and Milliken, 1999), leaving them 
feeling under-utilised and subsequently undervalued. Directors are more likely to 
be involved in strategy if it is made an important part of the boardroom agenda and 
is accompanied by information sharing, open debate and is not dominated by the 
CEO (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). Analysis of the current research findings 
suggests that the study participants perceived that many of the boards with which 
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they were involved had problems in the way that information and debates were 
managed, and with leaders who demanded control of boardroom communication. 
5.3.2b Giving Counsel 
The Non Executives discussed their desire to encourage `best practice' within the 
organisations with which they were involved. Some described their frustration at not 
being listened to by others in the boardroom; in particular the female Non Executive 
Directors described feelings of tokenism. 
It was (hard) to work with the former chairman because he so trivialised women and 
he was such an abusive type of person and while to my face he was like well you know 
we were so lucky to get someone so smart and all this baloney. I always felt like he 
discounted what I had to say. 
NED 3 Liza 
Some male Non Executives also described their perception that they were viewed by 
others in the boardroom as being employed by the host board more for who they 
were, rather than what they had achieved and were capable of contributing to the 
debate as the following excerpt suggests: 
I was just therefor show as far as I am prestigious. 
NED 7 Ray 
The study participants talked about sometimes feeling that their opinions did not 
hold credibility within the group and their frustration at not being able to influence 
boardroom decisions. Hovland and Weiss (1951-52) in their study explored how 
low credibility sources are unlikely to influence the opinions of the message 
receiver, at least at the point where the message is transmitted. However, they 
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discovered that over time even those sources with low credibility were able to 
influence the perceptions of the message receiver. This is described as the `sleeper 
effect'. In the context of this study the sleeper effect may allow even those 
individuals who have low credibility within the role set to achieve some level of 
influence over time, but only if they are able to at least speak up and be heard by the 
group. 
The study participants often described feelings of frustration; they did not perceive 
that their Non Executive voices carried much weight in boardroom meetings. In 
contrast to their role inside the boardroom, however, many of the Non Executives 
discussed how they worked outside of the boardroom on an individual level with the 
CEO as a personal mentor and advisor. The study participants reported that much of 
their advising/mentoring role took place away from the main boardroom on a one- 
to-one basis with the CEO, possibly because this is less intimidating and 
confrontational for both parties. The Non Executive in the next excerpt illustrates 
this: 
It is to be an advisor to the CEO, an off line advisor. One thing that is misinterpreted 
a lot is that certain people don't speak up a lot in a boardroom and so some people 
say "oh god they have no value ". Then you come to find out, you talk to the CEO, 
this is the person that they call three or four times a week off line and say what do 
you think about this? 
NED 3 Liza 
The informal dialogue between the CEO and individual Non Executive was 
perceived by the study participants to be very important to their ability to influence 
boardroom outcomes. The study participants talked in detail about the conversations 
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that they had with the CEO outside of the boardroom, however the Non Executives 
also expressed their perception of the need to develop informal linkages outside of 
the boardroom with other members of the group. This, the study participants 
believed, would facilitate a deeper understanding of the organisational context 
(McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999). One-to-one mentoring outside of the boardroom, 
although useful, is likely to lead to even greater centrality and control of information 
flows to the singular advantage of the CEO. 
53.2c Setting the Tone 
According to both Pfeffer and Salancik, (1978) and Zahra and Pearce, (1989) boards 
play an important role in enhancing organisational legitimacy. Thompsen (2004: 
40) suggested that a companies board composition may influence organisational 
values, he posits that the "background, personalities and values of managers and 
directors is the most direct instrument for installing new company values". The 
study participants in this current research project discussed the problems that they 
face in trying to influence social responsibility behaviour within the large complex 
organisations in which they worked. The Non Executives described how often their 
only involvement with the company was on a once monthly or even two monthly 
basis, with little access to managers and often limited knowledge of the 
organisation's business (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998). The perceptions of many of 
the Non Executives is summarised in the words of the next study participant: 
It's difficult, very difficult for outside directors to influence that (CSR). And the 
reason is, to go back to your earlier point, in order to really do a good job there, they 
have to fully understand the full business. So if they don't understand the full 
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business it's very hard to deal with social responsibility because they don't 
understand the social value. Frankly that's one of the ones that you gel to last on the 
continuum. If you put financial and salary levels first, getting clear to the end would 
be social rights. So you would have to have a very knowledgeable board to have 
much of an effect on the social side. 
NED 1 Warren 
It emerged very strongly from the research that for a suggestion to be carried 
forward by the board, it required the presence of either an individual who was 
respected and viewed as highly capable by the board (Jones and Wortman, 1973), or 
a group of individuals who were prepared to act together to achieve their ends. In the 
specific case of social issues, a further requirement for constructive action was the 
presence of an individual who was viewed by the rest of the group as being 
knowledgeable (Chattopadhyay et al. 1999) in the area of social responsibility. This 
group perception tends to develops either through the implied reputation the 
individual has developed whilst working on other boards that were considered to be 
good corporate citizens, or through the NED's personal track record as an advocate 
of specific responsibility issues. 
In the following example, a Non Executive who was considered by the role set to be 
a highly capable member of the board, made a suggestion that the company needed 
to be more aware of social responsibility issues. The CEO didn't agree with the Non 
Executive in question but the other Non Executives supported him: 
Most of the Non-Executive Directors said 'no, wrong, we do have to pay attention to 
this'. 
NED 10 Phillip 
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This particular dynamic of Non Executives having to work together to achieve 
specific goals emerged consistently throughout the analysis, as a key to successful 
contribution. 
5.3.3 Boundary Spanning 
Zahra and Pearce (1989) argued that providing channels of communication with the 
external environment through boundary spanning was one of the key elements of the 
Non Executive Director's role. Boundary spanners are considered important 
because they can straddle the boundary between the organisation and its 
environment, gathering and then feeding back information about emerging issues, 
and also representing the organisation to its environment (Tushman and Scanlan 
1981; Wood 1994; Pava and Krausz 1997; Manev and Stevenson 2001) According 
to Pava and Krausz (1997: 340), only through an active stance on the part of 
boundary spanners can the organisation hope to fulfil its social responsibility 
mandate. 
Many of the study participants in this current research believed that they had been 
employed by their host boards because of their relationships and experiences outside 
of the organisation, this reflects the resource dependency literature which views the 
Non Executive as a boundary spanner (Geletkanycz and Hambrick, 1997; Daily and 
Cannella, 2003; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Boundary spanners bridging the divide 
between the organisation and its environment and feed back relevant information to 
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management (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). Friedman and Podolny (1992) argue that 
managers who are also boundary spanners frequently suffer from role conflict. 
Johnson and Greening's (1999) research found that Non Executive Directors are 
sometimes employed specifically to attend to certain constituent groups. However, 
it emerged from the analysis presented in chapter four, that in contrast to much of 
the previous research, the potential of the Non Executives to fulfil this role was 
rarely utilised by the host organisation and sometimes even actively discouraged. 
This finding contradicts earlier research which has argued that boards provide the 
link between managers and shareholders and the wider environment ( Fama and 
Jenson, 1983; Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Johnson and Greening, 
1999; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Meyer, 2000). This is highlighted in the next 
excerpt. 
I said to him (the CEO) "what should I do about making myself known to him and 
getting to know some of the major institutional investors" and he looked at me and 
his face froze and he said "you're not to go near them" and 1 said "why not? " and 
then our senior Non-Executive Vice Chairman of the board, said "well this is a very 
touchy matter this, it could lead to all kinds of misunderstandings. " 
NED 10 Phillip 
In addition to being discouraged from developing linkages with external 
constituents, the Non Executives also discussed their perception that despite 
sometimes being employed because of, for example, highly specific skills such as 
government or international contacts or knowledge of particular markets, these skills 
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were often left untapped by the organisations that employed them. This created role 
conflict characterised by feelings of frustration and devaluation amongst those Non 
Executives who experienced it. Their sentiments are captured by the following 
remark: 
I have always been disappointed that boards have not used my skills as an 
international businessperson. 
NED 22 Harry 
Emerging from the study was a strong perception of the Non Executive Directors' 
reluctance to offer their opinions within some boards, even when they related to 
issues with which they were very familiar. The analysis showed that this problem 
was particularly acute in those boards where contact outside of the boardroom was 
discouraged. To successfully perform boundary spanning some authors have argued 
that an individual must work equally inside and outside of the organisation 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1983; Manev and Stevenson, 2001). The Non Executives 
emphasised their perception that information was not always made available to 
them, that the information that was forthcoming was sometimes difficult to 
understand, and that access to key managers and even other board members was at 
times problematic. Without these internal linkages, the ability of the Non 
Executives to influence organisational behaviour would be limited in view of the 
work of Tushman and Romanelli (1983) and Manev and Stevenson (2001). As this 
study only explored the perceptions of the individual Non Executive Director, 
further work is necessary to test the full implications of internal accessibility before 
legitimate conclusions can be drawn on this particular point. 
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5.3.3a Balancing Constituent Demands 
The frustration that the Non Executives express may be due to role conflict, 
although some previous studies have suggested that senior managers may not suffer 
from role conflict problems to the same extent that lower echelons do ( House and 
Rizzo, 1972; Hamner and Tosi, 1974; ). Non Executive Directors are unique in that, 
unlike other executives, their roles put them in a position of only partial inclusion in 
relation to the host organisation (Weick, 1979). Non Executives perform multiple 
roles whilst receiving conflicting signals of success and effectiveness from the 
constituents they serve (Nandram and Klandermans, 1993). The groupthink 
phenomenon that the study participants describe, acts to inhibit the Non Executives 
from performing the roles that they perceive as expected of them by their wider 
constituents. This emerged from the analysis as leading to deep levels of frustration 
caused by the internalised role conflict that Non Executives appear to experience. 
The study participants discussed their belief that the Non Executives' primary 
responsibility was_ to the shareholders of the organisation. However, the study 
participants also believed that Non Executives had a duty to protect the interests of 
other constituents, in particular, employees, customers and sometimes the wider 
community. Weidenbaum (1986) argued that the desire of some directors to be 
more socially responsive might have led to confusion over where a director's 
ultimate responsibility belongs. 
Somewhat in contrast to their voiced belief that they recognised a wider 
stakeholding community, many study participants described board meetings where, 
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despite possibly serious implications for wider constituents, certain issues were not 
properly addressed and were sometimes not mentioned at all. Lorsch and Maclver 
(1989) categorised board members into three categories (see literature review): 
firstly, traditionalists who adhere strictly to a belief in the primacy of the 
shareholder; secondly, rationalisers who see the conflicts and feel the tensions 
inherent in their responsibilities in an increasingly complex world, however they 
rationalise them away; and thirdly, broad constructionists who openly recognise that 
their responsibilities encompass more than shareholders. If this attitude creates 
conflicts they recognise and deal with them (Lorsch and Maclver 1989: 39). Most 
of the participants in this current research seemed to perceive that they were either 
broad constructionists or rationalisers, but their discussions of their actual board 
experiences generally place them as either rationalisers or traditionalists. 
Very few study participants suggested through their accounts of actual behaviour 
that they could be categorised as true broad constructionists. Their accounts of 
boardroom events suggest that rather than deal with the conflicting opinions of their 
fellow board members or the domineering opinions of a particular CEO or 
Chairman, some Non Executives prefer to keep the status quo and avoid further 
conflict. This may be on a conscious or even sub conscious level as Kahn et al. 
(1964) suggest that individuals when faced with a cognitive discrepancy may 
actually avoid thinking about the information by disengaging. The following 
example suggests that this may be the route that some Non Executives take: 
I think that talking about constituents around the boardroom table is 
something that many boardrooms would have a difficulty in understanding 
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because, you see, they have gone around it rather cleverly and manipulatively 
which is probably the way that most boards would handle most issues, they'd 
say how can we kick it in the long grass or go round it another way. 
Jane NED 7 
The kind of behaviour described in the above excerpt may well be as a result of 
groupthink (Janis, 1971; Janis, 1972). Although individual Non Executives are now 
bombarded with information about their responsibilities to wider constituencies, 
they, as a group, may choose to ignore the issue because it creates stresses within the 
group. This is despite the Non Executive's clear perception of the importance of 
maintaining personal reputation, which for the Non Executive is the key to their 
personal future earning potential (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Wilson, 1985; 
Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
There are two things that move NEDs by and large, one is the risk to their personal 
reputation and the second is the whole corporate governance risk management type 
of thing. 
NED 7 Ray 
Non Executive Directors may consciously or subconsciously choose to ignore 
external pressures to behave in a certain way because of the importance of remaining 
part of the social set. Although having a reputation for being a powerful Non 
Executive might provide individuals with possible high status and subsequent high 
earning potential, it is argued that being viewed as someone who fits in with the 
social set and "toes the line" may also be a winning financial strategy for. the 
individual. 
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5.3.3b Dealing with Complexity 
It emerged from the analysis that the Non Executives often had little opportunity for 
discussing "soft" issues. Most of the board's work was carried out using financial 
language where the "bottom line" was viewed as the main indicator of success or 
failure (Eisenhardt et al. 1997). The study participants perceived that because of 
this, it was difficult to develop social strategies in the boardroom. The reason for the 
use of financial language within the boardroom is explained in the following 
quotation: 
They can talk about a vice president of engineering's salary, because they are 
comfortable doing that and they've done that for 25 years so they can handle that. 
But when it gets into understanding the production process in a company that is 
described often in board meetings with jargon that sometimes is security driven 
inside the company, that's a tougher thing for them to view. 
NED I Warren 
The highly complex nature of the boardroom environment and the requirement to 
quickly understand problems and reach difficult decisions led the Non Executives to 
operate within a bounded context, based on personal experience and easily 
measurable financial data. Many of the study participants discussed important 
decisions being made in the boardroom based on one board member's personal 
experiences of an issue. One Non Executive described how a whole range of 
consumer issues within one of the largest corporations in the UK were discussed as 
"Jane's mothers issues". 
I would take it into the boardroom and I'd say now look gentlemen, my mother, and 
this became a bit of a lark around the boardroom table. People would say now we've 
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got a new strategy, but shall we check it with Jane's mother. In a way Jane's mother 
became the customer. 
NED 7 Jane 
The NED's who took part in the study appeared to be describing a kind of bounded 
rationality (Cohan, 2002) or cognitive nearsightedness (Katz, 1959), that allowed 
them to cope with the complexity of the boardroom environment. Bounded 
rationality relates to the inability of human beings to obtain and understand all the 
information necessary to make a fully informed decision, and argues that we 
therefore make decisions based on our limited and incomplete knowledge of the 
world (Simon, 1957). The limitation of strategic options by group members is also a 
symptom of groupthink. Over-reliance on limited options and the use of the bottom 
line as the major indicator of performance may lead not only, to poor but also 
unethical decision-making by the group (Sims, 1992). 
5.3.3c Director Interlocks 
Interlocking directorates are widely considered to be a valuable way of co-opting 
external resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Director interlocks occur when a 
director of one firm sits on the board of another (Boyd, 1990). The responses of the 
Non Executive Directors who took part in this study would suggest that their links 
with other boards had a significant effect on their ability to contribute, and also the 
type of contribution that they were likely to make in the host board. This finding 
supports that of Nicholson et al. who proposed that a "significant part of the social 
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capital of a board comes through the person to person contacts that board members 
make" (Nicholson et al. 2004: 66). 
The Non Executive Directors appeared to be motivated to attempt to influence 
certain issues because of their connection with them elsewhere (Nicholson et al. 
2004). Further, this research suggests that their influence attempts are likely to gain 
credence within the group through the implied reputation of these other boards with 
which they are associated. For example, having linkages with a board with a strong 
reputation for social good places the individual in a better position to influence other 
boards on these same issues. 
However, the study participants reported their perceptions that although Non 
Executives were able to use interlocks to learn about new practices and current 
trends they also tended to pick up bad practices, which they then disseminated onto 
other boards with which they are involved. This is highlighted in the next comment: 
Often what they do when they get together is actually spread bad practice they don't 
spread good practice, I'll tell you what old chap, I'll tell you what I've done in the 
past, and it's worked a treat and you hear them spreading bad practice. 
NED 7 Jane 
Non Executive Directors may easily learn bad behaviours as quickly as they learn 
positive ones, particularly as, according to the study participants, there are few 
sources of legitimate educational opportunity available to them. 
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Useem (1984) and Lorsch and Maclver (1989) both discussed how executives used 
interlocks to "scan " the business environment for the latest innovations in business 
practice, later Haunschild and Beckman (1998) found that director interlocks 
influenced firm acquisition activity. It emerged from interviews for this research 
that a range of strategies were likely to be influenced by the linkages between 
individual Non Executives working within different organisations. Specifically, the 
likelihood of host firms adopting corporate responsibility practices appears to be 
influenced by the experiences of individual Non Executives working within other 
boards where such practices are already successfully in use. The next quote 
exemplifies the effect of the Non Executive working in multiple boards on the host 
organisation: 
I have always seen working on boards as a complement to the other work that I am 
doing in that it provides me with new experiences and opens me to situations in 
business that I would not otherwise encounter. I am often thinking about other 
businesses that I work with when I am in a board meeting and how what we are 
dealing with there could be applied elsewhere. 
NED 17 Vicky 
It emerged from this current study that Non Executives with interlocks between 
firms with high credibility may, as a result, be assigned greater credence within the 
host boardroom team. This enhanced credibility might improve the ability of the 
individual Non Executive to effectively perform boundary spanning activities. As 
suggested by Tsui (1984) and later by (Tsui et al. 1995), other team members' 
perception of an individuals effectiveness may facilitate the individual's ability to 
perform his role creating a "positive spiral of performance and reputation" (Tsui et 
al. 1995: 1528). 
Page 307 of 400 
Some authors have argued the importance of boundary spanners generally, in 
encouraging corporate responsibility practices within organisations (Frederick, 
1978; Pava and Krausz, 1997). This research highlights the boundary-spanning role 
of the Non Executive Director. The study suggests that when Non Executives have 
gained experience of the treatment of social issues in other boards and are viewed as 
having strong capabilities by the rest of the host board they may be able to influence 
corporate social responsibility practices. 
5.3.4 Improving Board Effectiveness 
5.3.4a Skills, Training and Facilitating Capabilities 
The study participants generally perceived that having diverse skills in the 
boardroom was highly advantageous to the overall effectiveness of the group. 
However Kakabadse et al. (1998) found that simply placing highly capable 
individuals onto a team will not in itself make a team, work effectively. Time, good 
management and the right mix of individuals are essential for long-term success. 
Turning a group of highly capable individuals into a dynamic team that understands 
each other's and the organisation's needs, takes time and commitment from the 
group, its leadership and the wider organisation. At the organisational level some 
study participants described boards that had their own staff. One individual 
described how a board with which he worked assigned each board member with a 
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"staffer". This individual ensured that the board member was up-to-date, had what 
they needed and generally facilitated the role. 
They (the staff) did the agendas and they did the follow up memorandums and they'd 
schedule the next meeting... determine if there were follow up items we hadn't done 
yet, try to do it more quickly. Um, and then make sure that all the other people who 
had follow up items weren't going to be embarrassed when they came to the meeting, 
we would call them and if they hadn't got it done, we'd try to help them work it 
through. 
NED 9 Geoff 
The latter comment describes a board that appears to have strong internal linkages 
between the Non Executives and the company's management team. Simple 
awareness of the capabilities of those in the boardroom may be an obvious, but 
frequently missing, first step towards exploiting the Non Executive Director's 
capabilities. Forbes and Milliken (1999) argued that just because individuals have 
specialised skills and knowledge, the availability of this expertise within a group 
does not guarantee its use. 
There was a general perception amongst the Non Executives who took part in the 
study that more training and advice needed to be made available to them (Pierce, 
2001). Some study participants also highlighted that the problem was not simply a 
lack of sources for Non Executive training services, but also that it was difficult to 
teach the kind of skills that the Non Executives required. The study participants 
perceived that those companies that were offering training were not always equipped 
with personnel who had the requisite experience to understand the issues facing Non 
Executives working in such complex environments: 
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We've been talking about training and things like that. But actually, at the end of the 
day when you go out and research what is there, and you suddenly think, you know 
more on this than those people. How are you going to train people to have the 
confidence to challenge? 1t's a difficult one to get right. 
NED 13 Hanna 
This lack of external resources may mean that boards of directors need to look 
amongst their own number for training. The analysis of this research suggests that 
Non Executives already use their boardroom experiences to develop their skills. 
Recognising this, and possibly through a board facilitator developing in-house 
training strategies, may be the best way forward. 
Additionally, the recognition of a missing capability in the boardroom may lead to 
the employment of a new member. The analysis of the research findings presented 
in the last chapter would suggest that when a new person joined a board with a 
superior understanding of an issue than those already present, the new individual's 
ability to speak out, gave others the courage to then enter the debate. This type of 
boundary spanning mentor appears to be valuable in that not only are new skills 
brought to the initial host board, it would also appear that when Non Executives 
witness a strategy which they like on one board they are likely to transfer it to other 
boards within their network. 
The Non Executives perceived that one caveat to this type of boundary spanning 
mentoring (as has already been discussed in section one) was that it was as easy to 
spread bad practice, as it was good. This is exemplified in the next comment: 
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There's no advice and council for non-executive directors and often what they do 
when they get together is actually spread bad practice they don't spread good 
practice, I'll tell you what old chap, I'll tell you what I've done in the past, and its 
worked a treat and you hear them spreading bad practice. 
NED 7 Jane 
5.3.4b Board Assessments and Job Descriptions 
It emerged from the research that very few of the study participants had ever been 
given any kind of job description during their time as a Non Executive Director; this 
was particularly surprising as all those that were questioned felt that it would be a 
useful tool in fulfilling their roles. This lack of any formal understanding or 
explanation of the expectations of those around them may go some way towards 
explaining the bewilderment that many Non Executives report in their attempts to 
make a contribution to their host organisations. 
I have never gotten a job description; I mean what is the role? What's your 
expectation, meetings and attendances? And then what you do with those things, no I 
don't think it is as clear as it could be. 
NED 3 Liza 
I mean it is good governance, like I think, the chairman and the chief executive 
should define who does what between the two, that doesn't happen very often, having 
done it, you'd probably put it in the bottom right hand drawer and never look at it 
again, but I think it is, and it does pay, particularly when one or another or both are 
new, I think it does pay to have the discipline to do that. 
NED 15 Martin 
The simple provision of a job description for board members may go a long way 
towards reducing role ambiguity for the Non Executive Director (Katz and Kahn, 
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1978). This, in conjunction with an annual away day to re-evaluate the purpose of 
the board, could provide a starting point for more effective group behaviour. Once 
individuals are clear about their role within the group they may then feel justified in 
speaking up and making a contribution when it is required (Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
It emerged in chapter four that although a single factor can influence the ability of 
the Non Executive Director to contribute, it is much more likely that a complex 
combination of factors work together to either enable or inhibit successful 
boardroom contribution. 
5.3.5 Section Three Summary and Conclusions 
Some disparity existed between the Non Executives' expectations of their role and 
the roles they actually performed in the boardroom. Although the study participant's 
personal role expectations were in line with much of the previous work on the 
operations of boards of directors, the reality of the Non Executive role tended to be 
much more mundane. The study participants' expectations of power and control 
were often unrealised, their ability to influence decisions hampered by dominant 
CEO's and an inability to form alliances with other Non Executives with whom they 
worked in the boardroom. 
The emerging outcomes of the analysis of this final theme would suggest that the 
study participants perceive that they were poorly utilised by their boards. Their 
views suggest that boards do not provide them with the tools that are necessary to 
fulfil the Non Executive role effectively. Informants described the need for better 
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access to information, training, support, more time and a more effective team 
environment. It emerged that the information asymmetry and lack of time that the 
Non Executives described, led to the use of almost exclusive financial language in 
the boardroom. This impeded the ability of the Non Executive to introduce (soft) 
corporate responsibility issues because these were viewed as requiring a different 
kind of language. 
It emerged that Non Executive Directors perceive that their responsibilities 
encompass more than the narrow shareholder model of corporate governance; they 
recognise a need for a long-term approach to organisational success. However, 
within many boards the symptoms of groupthink cause the Non Executive to set 
aside his personal expectations of the role in favour of maintaining the status quo. 
The model presented below shows how, within the confines of the boardroom, Non 
Executives may experience groupthink. This leads them to behave in a manner 
which conflicts with their private beliefs, commitments and notions of acceptability. 
The role conflict and ambiguity that is created by this scenario leaves the Non 
Executive with deep feelings of frustration, discourages information sharing, 
impedes trust within the group and may ultimately drive the Non Executive to wish 
to leave the organisation. 
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Figure 5.7 The Effect of Groupthink on the Non Executives' Commitment to Corporate 
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5.5 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
The discussion presented in this chapter, revealed the study participants' perceptions 
of many problems within the boardroom. Study participants described themselves as 
feeling intimidated, isolated and undervalued and confirmed their frustration at not 
being able to effectively fulfil their perceived Non Executive roles. The study 
participants discussed their fear of stepping forward when they had a problem for 
fear of ridicule and censorship by the group. 
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Some Non Executives did provide positive examples of behaviour on some of the 
boards on which they worked. They described the importance of having individuals 
with perceived high capabilities who were respected by the role set. The Non 
Executives' propensity to effectively optimise their role requires a cultural 
environment within the boardroom which supports mutual action and uninhibited 
information flow; the individual needs to feel supported and valued by the whole 
group, starting with the CEO and Chairman. Within such boards the Non 
Executives reported unusually high effort norms. 
The final model in this chapter presented in figure 5.8 brings together the key 
emerging themes from the analysis presented in this chapter. The model exemplifies 
the effect on the Non Executive contribution of boardroom culture. The model 
shows how the Non Executives' personal capabilities in terms of skill, experience 
and reputation within the role set, may allow them to partially fulfil their role, 
despite the possible presence of groupthink. 
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Figure 5.8: Non Executive Director Role Fulfilment 
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Optimum contribution is likely to occur within a board with balanced power 
structures where individuals' conflicting and diverse opinions are encouraged, 
populated by individuals with perceived high capabilities. Those Non Executives 
with strong personal capabilities were, at times, able to overcome some elements of 
a poor boardroom environment but were still unlikely to be entirely effective; such 
individuals were more likely to seek organisational exit, due to their private 
frustrations about their conflicting role expectations and fears about the loss of 
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personal reputation if future corporate failure were to occur through poor board 
A 
management. 
The initial analysis of the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director, 
which was presented in chapter four, has been explored in this chapter in the light of 
existing research. A number of explanatory models have been presented to aid the 
reader's understanding of the complex phenomenon. In the next chapter, the final 
model will be presented which brings together the many dynamic factors that 
emerged from the research analysis in chapters four and five. The application of the 
research findings and the emergent model, will be used in chapter six to address the 
research questions that were introduced in chapter two. Chapter six will also 
introduce a set of propositions designed to test the emergent model and stimulate 
future avenues of research. 
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Chapter Six: Revisiting the Research Question 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapters four and five of this thesis presented a comprehensive and complex 
analysis of the research examining the role and contribution of the Non Executive 
Director from their own perspective. This chapter will examine the findings as they 
relate specifically to the primary research question. 
Following the review of the key research findings, this chapter will present a 
tentative model and a set of propositions, which might be used to test the proposed 
model. The implications of the main research findings will then be discussed; the 
chapter closes with an evaluation of the quality of the research. The outline of this 
chapter is provided in figure 6.1: 
4 
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Figure 6.1 Outline of Chapter 6 
6.1. Introduction 
6.2 Revisiting the 6.3. The Model 
6.4 Developing 
Research Question Propositions 
6.5 Implications 
of the Research 
6.6 Evaluating 
Research Quality 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
Source: Compiled by the Author 
6.1.1 Concluding the Research 
The overarching aim of this research was to explore how Non Executive Directors, 
in their role as boundary spanners on corporate boards, balance divergent 
expectations whilst contributing to corporate responsibility practices. Through an 
analysis of the subjective perceptions of (25) individual Non Executive Directors 
gathered over a two year period, the analysis presented in chapters four and five 
provided insight into a hitherto little explored area of management research (Cohan, 
2002; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992). 
The literature review presented in chapter two revealed that despite much interest in 
the role of the Board of Directors, there has been little empirical work to date which 
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has examined the actual role of the Non Executive Director from the director's own 
perspective, or the effect of directors on corporate responsibility practices. As a 
result it was considered most appropriate for this research to adopt an exploratory, 
interpretative approach to social enquiry. The subjective perceptions of the Non 
Executives themselves were analysed in order to understand their roles, expectations 
and different perspectives. 
By using the study participants' own thick descriptions of their role within the 
corporate board, the methodology which was used to address the research question 
has uncovered both broad and deep evidence of the behaviour of the Non Executive 
Director (Thompson 2001; Denzin 1989; Geertz 1973). This has afforded a rich, 
detailed - and often colourful - account of the Non Executive role within corporate 
boards, portraying a role that is influenced both by the individual's own abilities and 
also the environment within which he performs the role. The complex and 
contextual nature of the research phenomenon intersects a number of theoretical 
fields; in particular the analysis has drawn on role, group and corporate governance 
literatures to underpin this exploration of the Non Executive Director within the 
boardroom context. 
The following section provides a discussion of the key findings of the research in the 
light of the posed research question. 
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6.2 Revisiting the Research Question 
This research has explored the complexity of the role and contribution of the Non 
Executive Director, through the individuals' own perceptions of their role. The 
underlying purpose of the research was to understand: 
How do Non Executive Directors in their role as boundary spanners on 
corporate boards, balance divergent expectations whilst contributing to 
corporate responsibility practices? 
This section will focus on exploring the findings of the research as they relate to the 
overarching research question. As in the previous analysis the discussion of the 
research findings will take place under three headings; role set interactions, 
perceptions of boardroom leadership and primary role focus. The section will be 
followed by a tentative model (figure 6.2) generated from the key research findings. 
The section will conclude with a series of propositions, which may be used to test 
the validity of the model. 
6.2.1 Role Set Interactions 
6.2.1a The Non Executive Director 
Non Executive Directors are unique in that their roles place them in a position of 
only partial inclusion in relation to the host organisation (Weick, 1979). The 
research revealed that they perform multiple roles whilst receiving conflicting 
signals of success and effectiveness from the constituents that they serve. 
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The analysis exposed conflicts in the enactment of the Non Executives' perceived 
role. Their role expectations encompass control elements in line with the normative 
agency approach to corporate governance (Eisenhardt, 1989), but also long-term 
organisational goals which more closely reflect the behaviour of a steward (Davis et 
al. 1997). When faced with the competing objectives of stakeholders and 
shareholders, stewards are motivated to make choices that are in the best interests of 
the organisation (Davis et al. 1997). In particular, to achieve long-term 
sustainability the Non Executives argue that it is sometimes necessary to protect the 
CEO from short-term market pressures (Nasi et al. 1997; Gilbert et al. 1988) in 
order to make it easier for him (the CEO) to make effective long-term strategic 
decisions. 
The research findings suggest that Non Executive Directors perceive that their 
responsibilities entail more than the narrow shareholder model advocated by neo- 
classical economists such as Freidman (1962). Non Executive Directors personally 
recognise a need for a long-term approach to organisational success incorporating 
wider constituent goals (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Wang and Dewhurst, 1992). 
They perceive that their goals within the Non Executive role are sometimes 
divergent from their Executive colleagues, in that managers are predisposed to focus 
more on short-term profitability issues (Johnson and Greening, 1999). Non 
Executive Directors perceive pressure from within the host board and also from the 
wider social set of board members to conform to the behavioural norms of the group 
(Westphal and Khann, 2003). 
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6.2.1b Corporate Responsibility Practices 
The research revealed that some factors increased the likelihood that the individual 
Non Executive will attempt to influence corporate responsibility behaviour in the 
host organisation. Gaining an insight into the operationalisation and value of 
corporate responsibility issues was of key importance. However, this research 
suggests that Non Executives lack adequate resources for training and mentoring. 
Many individuals are, as a result of this, reliant on their working and social 
connections with the wider set of Non Executive Directors. The research adds to our 
understanding of interlocking directorates as alternative sources of information 
(Haunschild and Beckman, 1998; Haunschild, 1993). 
6.2.1c Director Interlocks 
Non Executive Directors rely upon their interlocks to scan the environment for the 
latest innovations in business practice (Nicholson et al. 2004; Lorsch and MacIver, 
1989; Mace, 1986; Useem, 1984). Haunschild and Beckman (1998) found that 
director interlocks influenced firm acquisition activity. The findings of this current 
research suggest that corporate responsibility practices may be similarly affected, 
suggesting a link between director interlocks and corporate responsibility practices. 
The research has revealed that the use of interlocking directorates by Non 
Executives can generate both a positive and a negative influence on their power and 
motivation to make a beneficial contribution to specific issues, because interlocks 
spread bad as well as good practices. 
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6.2.1d Using Individual Capabilities 
, 
When Non Executives gain an insight into the operationalisation and value of 
dealing with corporate responsibility issues in one board, they appear more likely to 
try to take their new knowledge to other boards. Additionally, the research suggests 
that other host board members may attach greater credence, and as a result acquiesce 
to individuals whom they know are associated with boards that have a positive 
reputation for advocating corporate responsibility issues. This is because other team 
members' perception of the individual's effectiveness may moderate the individual's 
ability to perform his role (Tsui, Ashford et al. 1995: 1528). 
Westphal and Khann (2003) argue that high status board members may not always 
be subject to social controls to the same extent as lower status board members. The 
findings of this research suggest that the Non Executive's ability to contribute to 
corporate responsibility is affected by the perception, of the group, of the 
individual's capabilities. Non Executive Directors with interlocks between firms 
with high credibility may, as a result, be assigned greater credence within the host 
boardroom team, creating a "positive spiral of performance and reputation" (Tsui, 
Ashford et al. 1995: 1528). 
6.2. le Conflicting Opinions 
The complex nature of the decisions facing the corporate board might be expected to 
lead to high levels of cognitive conflict amongst board members (Forbes and 
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Milliken, 1999). Such conflict was, however, rarely expressed in the boardroom 
(Mace, 1986). Instead, many individuals displayed functional commitment 
(DeLamater et al. 1969). Rather than voicing concerns, they remained silent, even 
when they were unhappy or unclear about an issue, in order to allow rapid group 
consensus. The Non Executives appeared to effectively relinquish some external 
role expectations in order to maintain their membership of the group (Sheard and 
Kakabadse, 2004; Janis and Katz, 1959). 
6.2.1f Debating the Needs of Divergent Constituents 
The Non Executives' ability to understand and deal with the organisations' 
constituents is limited by their lack of understanding of the complex organisational 
environment. The research reveals that information asymmetry (Pettigrew and 
McNulty, 1998; Westphal, 1998) and lack of time (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989; 
Mace, 1986) forced the Non Executives to view issues within a bounded context 
(Cohan, 2002). This led to the use of almost exclusively financial language in the 
boardroom. Financial language fails to reveal the subtlety of choice needed for 
effective decision-making (Schaffer, 2002), as it leads to a focus on the bottom-line 
(Eisenhardt et al. 1997) and may lead to unethical decisions (Sims, 1992). In 
particular, the excessive use of financial language emerged as a major constraint on 
the ability of the Non Executive to introduce (soft) corporate responsibility issues, 
because these were viewed as requiring a different kind of language. 
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Boardroom discussions regarding corporate responsibility are perceived as requiring 
the use of `soft language', which does not fit easily with the groups' behavioural 
norms. As a result corporate responsibility issues are unlikely to be put forward by 
the Non Executive to the group, unless a clear `business case' or a quantifiable risk 
can be shown. The use of a business case allows the Non Executive to align his 
contribution with the normal processes of the group, which is accustomed to using 
financial language and attaches importance to the bottom line approach to decision- 
making. An interesting finding of this research was that to counteract this use of 
financial language, some Non Executives resort to using personal scenarios, such as 
the opinions of their mothers or the effect on their own children, to deal with highly 
complex issues. 
6.2.2 Perceptions of Boardroom Leadership 
6.2.2a Fear, Insecurity and Intimidation 
The research findings suggest that a degree of uncertainty and ambiguity exists for 
many Non Executive Directors within the corporate board. Emerging from the 
analysis were the Non Executives' perceptions of insecurity and intimidation, 
possibly due to lack of a clear role understanding (Floyd and Lane, 2000). The 
pressure that individuals feel to conform to the expectations of others in the 
boardroom to reach rapid consensus and avoid stressful disagreements leads to a 
high degree of frustration, caused by both ambiguous and conflicting role signals. 
The autocratic power structures which many of the Non Executives describe, in 
which there is little `real' consultation, may ultimately lead the individual towards 
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apathy and withdrawal from the decision-making process, because individuals 
perceive that as Non Executives they have little power to influence events (Tsui et 
al. 1995; Katz, 1959). 
The findings reveal that the Non Executive Directors' inability to form close ties 
within the boardroom is a significant constraint on their ability to influence debate. 
This was particularly salient in the case of corporate responsibility issues. Corporate 
responsibility was viewed as `soft' and difficult to convey within the `hard' financial 
debate of the boardroom. As a result, individually the Non Executives often resisted 
raising corporate responsibility issues for fear of ridicule by the group. Individuals 
would not risk standing alone on issues, and were often unaware that other Non 
Executives had similar ideas to their own. Only when another, more powerful, Non 
Executive Director focuses the debate, will the majority of Non Executives 
subsequently enter the discussion. The research suggests that if the Non Executives 
can act together they are significantly more likely to achieve their ends. 
6.2.2b The Effect of Groupthink on the Discussion of Constituent Issues 
Many Non Executive Directors believe that they are powerless to make change. The 
research suggests that individuals will sometimes keep quiet on issues, even when 
they perceive that there is a problem. The Non Executives' feelings of 
powerlessness result from several factors including a lack of internal sources of 
information and power (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; Westphal, 1998), feeling 
intimidated by a Chairman/ CEO (Demp and Neubauer, 1992), the fear of acting 
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alone (Alderfer, 1986), the fear of ridicule, or even exclusion by the group for 
raising contentious issues (Westphal and Khann, 2003). 
The research findings also suggest that Non Executive Directors may, at times, 
cognitively suppress the expectations of some constituents. Non Executive Directors 
personally recognise their responsibilities to different constituencies. However the 
study revealed that as part of a group, Non Executives may suppress these 
expectations if they perceive that voicing certain opinions would create stress within 
the group (Janis, 1971). Instead, many Non Executives appear to comply with 
leadership's preference (Eisenhardt et al. 1997) for maintaining the status quo 
(Cohan, 2002; Demp and Neubauer, 1992). This research finding suggests that the 
inability of the Non Executive Director to raise certain issues results from the 
presence of groupthink (Janis, 1971; Janis, 1972; Esser, 1998). 
In terms of influencing corporate responsibility the problems of groupthink may be 
particularly acute in the presence of a dominant leader, who uses aggressive signals, 
which conflict with priorities of wider constituents. Non Executive Directors may 
consciously or subconsciously circumnavigate wider constituent agendas, because of 
the importance they perceive in remaining part of the social set and avoiding any 
social sanctioning they might face by upsetting group behaviour norms. 
Non Executives, perceive that their personal reputation amongst group members and 
the wider social set of corporate board members is of immense importance. 
Reputation dictates the individual's future earning potential (Fombrun and Shanley, 
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1990; Weigelt and Camerer, 1988; Wilson, 1985). The Non Executives' continued 
employment on powerful corporate boards ensures their reputation as a member of 
the high status elite and, as such, their right to receive the privileges associated with 
the role. DeLamater, Katz et al. (1969) described this type of behaviour as 
"functional commitment" where the individual's personal power and status are 
enhanced by maintaining the status quo. 
Previous research suggests that individuals will often work very hard to maintain 
their affiliation with a group, even to the point of doing things that they would not 
do as individuals. But, as part of the team, Non Executives may overlook actions 
they would not tolerate for themselves as individuals (Sheard and Kakabadse, 2004; 
Janis and Katz, 1959). This may lead Non Executive Directors to behave in an 
unethical way, even when they consider themselves to be highly ethical people in 
their own right (Sims, 1992). 
6.2.3 Primary Role Focus 
6.2.3a Role Conflict 
As a result of the groupthink phenomenon, the findings suggest that Non Executives 
appear to experience role conflict because, despite their perceptions of the 
importance of external constituents within the group, they arc inhibited from 
discussing them. This finding is significant because some studies have suggested 
that upper echelons do not experience role conflict to the same extent as lower level 
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role types, since they are believed to have more control of their environments 
(House and Rizzo, 1972; Hamner and Tosi, 1974). 
The Non Executive's role differs from other upper echelons' roles because 
individuals only experience partial inclusion in the host organisation (Weick, 1979). 
This creates power asymmetry in favour of internal executives. In addition, Non 
Executives perform multiple roles whilst receiving conflicting signals of success and 
effectiveness from constituents; such role holders are likely to be highly susceptible 
to role dysfunction (Nandram and Klandermans, 1993). 
In line with research into the effects of role conflict and ambiguity within other role 
types, the findings of this research suggest that role conflict and ambiguity result in 
deep feelings of frustration for the role sender - in this case the Non Executive 
Director. Role conflict discourages the information sharing that is fundamental for 
successful boundary spanning (Manev and Stevenson, 2001; Tushman and 
Romanelli, 1983), impedes trust within the group and may ultimately drive some 
Non Executive Directors to wish to leave the host organisation ( Janis and Katz, 
1959: Katz and Kahn, 1978; Friedman and Podolny, 1992; Floyd and Lane, 2000). 
6.2.3b Setting the Tone 
The Non Executives expressed their belief that they should be able to influence the 
tone of the host organisation (Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978); 
this was achieved, they perceived, by setting a clear example through the board's 
own conduct. The findings suggest that the Non Executives perceive that over time 
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the board's example of appropriate behaviours would be imitated by others in the 
organisation. They express this as creating an understanding of "the right thing to 
do". Despite the Non Executives' desire to affect the host organisation in a positive 
way, the findings indicate that it was very difficult to influence an organisation with 
which the Non Executive often has little contact. 
6.2.3c Boundary Spanning 
According to Pava and Krausz (1997: 340), only through an active stance on the part 
of boundary spanners can the organisation hope to fulfil its social responsibility 
mandate. A serious constraint on the Non Executive Director's ability to bring 
corporate responsibility issues into the boardroom and hence, influence 
organisational behaviour is that despite sometimes being employed because of 
highly specific capabilities, such as government or international contacts, or 
knowledge of particular markets, these skills were often not exploited by the host 
organisation. 
The results of this research indicate that the Non Executive Director's potential to 
offer advice about, and linkages to the external environment, are rarely fully utilised 
by the host organisation and sometimes even actively discouraged by management. 
This is an important finding as it contradicts much previous research, which has 
argued that boards provide the link between managers and shareholders and the 
wider environment (Meyer, 2000; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Pettigrew, 1992; Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Fama and Jenson, 1983). 
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This finding brings into question the Non Executives' ability to effectively perform 
the boundary-spanning role prescribed for them by the resource dependency 
literature (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992; Daily and Cannella, 2003; Geletkanycz and 
Hambrick, 1997; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Previous theory suggests that to be 
effective, boundary spanners must work equally inside and outside the organisation 
(Tushman and Romanelli, 1983; Manev and Stevenson, 2001). 
6.2.3d Balancing Divergent Constituents 
Despite the Non Executive Director's personal recognition of the importance of 
divergent constituent issues, the findings of this research strongly suggest that many 
Non Executives behave as `rationalisers' (Lorsch and Maclver, 1989). Non 
Executive Directors see the inconsistencies and sense the tensions inherent in their 
roles; however they rationalise them away within the specific context of the 
boardroom. Many Non Executives find it preferable to maintain the status quo of 
the group, rather than introduce stressful divergent constituent dilemmas that require 
extra effort to deal with and which may still not result in clear-cut conclusions. 
6.2.3e The Use of Balanced Power Structures to Aid Discussion of Constituent 
Issues 
The findings identified a small number of Non Executives whose perceptions were 
distinctive from the majority of study participants. These individuals portrayed 
boards where the CEO and/or Chairman played a more motivational role than that 
widely found in this research. These boards encourage positive behaviours by 
providing support and encouragement to board members within an environment 
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where individuals were valued for their unique capabilities and diverse opinions. 
Such board might be described as having balanced power structures (Eisenhardt et 
al. 1997). 
In these boards, the study participants perceived that the opinions of others were 
respected, cognitive conflict was encouraged and individuals were valued for being 
both highly skilled and career diverse. Within this type of environment the ability of 
the Non Executive to discuss corporate responsibility issues is enhanced because 
new and divergent opinions are openly embraced. The findings suggest that the Non 
Executives' propensity to effectively optimise their role requires a cultural 
environment within the boardroom that supports mutual action and uninhibited 
information flow. The individual needs to feel supported and valued by the whole 
group, starting with the CEO and Chairman. Within such boards the Non Executives 
reported unusually high effort norms. 
6.2.4 Summary of Key Findings 
This section has explored the findings of the research in the light of the overarching 
research question. The findings reveal that Non Executives perceive they have 
responsibilities to a range of constituents. However, their ability to deal with these 
constituents as boundary spanners is moderated by the dynamics of the boardroom 
environment. Non Executive Directors may set aside their personal understanding 
of their responsibilities to constituents in order to maintain the status quo in the 
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group. This in turn leads the Non Executive to experience role conflict and 
ambiguity, which results in feelings of deep frustration for the individual. 
Non Executive Directors rely on interlocking directorates for information regarding 
corporate responsibility practices because they lack adequate sources of training and 
support. Individuals may be able to enhance their ability to contribute to corporate 
responsibility practices through their association with boards with good reputations 
in this area. This is because other team members' perceptions of the individual's 
capabilities and group status appears to moderate the individual's ability to make a 
contribution. 
Non Executive Directors appear to make decisions within a bounded context. This 
results in the use of highly financial language in the boardroom. The findings reveal 
that the use of financial language makes it difficult for the Non Executive to 
introduce `soft' corporate responsibility issues. As a result individuals tend to only 
introduce corporate responsibility issues if they can present them as a business case 
or show a quantifiable risk. 
/ 
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6.3 The Model 
Figure 6.2 below integrates the key emerging findings from the complex analysis 
presented in this thesis. Building on the models presented over the course of the 
analysis Figure 6.2 shows how a combination of group dynamics, personal 
capabilities and the individuals' role expectations, affect the Non Executive's ability 
to contribute to corporate responsibility practices. The groupthink phenomenon, acts 
to inhibit the Non Executives from performing the roles that they perceive as 
expected of them by their wider constituents, which, in turn, produces deep levels of 
frustration, caused by the internalised role conflict that they subsequently 
experience. 
Figure 6.2 The Dynamics of the Non Executive Contribution to Corporate Responsibility 
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The upper element of the model shows how within some boards the dynamics which 
lead to groupthink, and the ensuing role problems associated with it, are overcome 
by using more balanced power structures (Eisenhardt et al. 1997). These boards 
were characterised by leaders who performed a more motivational role than that 
widely found in this research. Positive behaviours were cultivated by providing 
support and encouragement to board members within an environment where 
individuals were valued for their unique capabilities and diverse opinions. Boards 
with balanced power structures were perceived to have a culture, which supported 
mutual action and uninhibited information flow in order to encourage the generation 
of differing opinions and alternative strategic choices. 
6.4 Developing Propositions 
This research has explored the role and contribution within the corporate board, of 
the Non Executive Director. An interpretive approach was adopted, using in-depth 
interviews to gather `thick descriptions' (Thompson, 2001; Denzin, 1989) of the 
Non Executives' subjective perceptions of their roles, within the context of the 
corporate board. This approach has allowed a rare insight into the behaviour of the 
Non Executive Director within a rich context. With the exception of a handful of 
previous studies such as Kakabadse (2001), Pettigrew (1992), Demp and Neubauer 
(1992), Lorsch and Maclver (1989) and Mace (1986), most of the theory underlying 
the behaviour of the Non Executive has been based on a hands-off approach. Such 
positivistic methods have, it is argued, failed to recognise the "endogenous and 
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exogenous factors" which affect the Non Executive's ability to successfully 
contribute to corporate performance Pettigrew (1992: 170). 
This current research has generated a highly complex picture of the contextual 
dynamics that appear to affect the ability of the Non Executive Director to make a 
contribution. The emerging themes at times challenge the findings of previous 
studies, whilst other themes contribute to our understanding of previous arguments. 
The literature review presented in chapter two identified a range of concepts and 
theories that has helped to guide this research. The complexity and contextual 
nature of the phenomenon suggests that at present no single theory adequately 
reflects the entire scope of the research. In order to test whether or not the 
exploration and tentative explanation of the Non Executive Director's role and 
contribution can be extended across a more generalisable population of Non 
Executive Directors, further research needs to be undertaken (Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
The results presented earlier in this chapter suggest many opportunities for further 
research, which might aid both practitioners and academics to understand more fully 
the role and contribution of the Non Executive Director within the corporate board. 
To facilitate further research, which might test the tentative model presented in 
figure 6.2, a number of propositions are presented next. It should be noted that the 
nature of this research has created the possibility for almost endless avenues of 
investigation; in order to maintain the brevity of this section the propositions 
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presented here will focus on the explicit aims of the research and the testing of the 
model. 
This research has established the significance of the Non Executive Director's 
environment within the host board. The impact of the boardroom environment in 
terms of culture, management behaviour, personal relationships and the group's 
perception of the individual's personal capabilities, all emerged as important 
mediators of the Non Executives ability to contribute. Further research, which 
specifically examines these elements of boardroom behaviour, would greatly 
enhance the ability of management researchers to understand the `black box' 
(Hambrick and Mason, 1984; Lawrence, 1997), which is the Board of Directors. 
Accordingly, the first set of propositions relates to the Non Executive Director's 
boardroom environment. 
1. The ability of the individual Non Executive Director to contribute to 
corporate responsibility within the corporate board is moderated by the 
boardroom environment. 
a. The ability of the individual Non Executive Director to contribute to 
corporate responsibility within the corporate board is moderated by 
groupthink. 
b. The ability of the individual Non Executive Director to contribute to 
corporate responsibility within the corporate board is moderated by 
balanced power structures. 
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c. The ability of the individual Non Executive Director to contribute to 
corporate responsibility within the corporate board is moderated by 
boardroom role set expectations. 
The findings in this research have suggested that in addition to the boardroom 
environment, the Non Executives' personal capabilities also influence their ability to 
make a contribution to the host board. High personal capabilities may allow Non 
Executives to traverse normal group behaviour; it may even enable the individual to 
change boardroom culture. Highly capable Non Executives are able to do this 
through their knowledge and experience but also through the elevated status that 
other group members assign to them; in the latter case capabilities may be real or 
perceived. 
2. The Non Executive Director's ability to contribute to corporate responsibility 
is moderated by the individual's capabilities. 
a. The Non Executive Director's ability to contribute to corporate 
responsibility is moderated by the individual's reputed capabilities 
within the boardroom. 
b. The Non Executive Director's ability to contribute to corporate 
responsibility is moderated by the individual's actual capabilities. 
c. The Non Executive Director's ability to contribute to corporate 
responsibility is moderated by the individual's capability to overcome 
the behaviour norms of the group. 
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The individual Non Executive Director's role understanding impacts on their ability 
to contribute to corporate responsibility practices. Many Non Executives expect to 
serve a variety of constituents as part of their boardroom roles. However, the 
presence of groupthink in many boardrooms leads them to set aside personal role 
expectations in favour of maintaining the status quo. This causes some Non 
Executives to suffer from role conflict and ambiguity, which in turn leads to low 
effort norms and low contribution. 
3. The Non Executive Directors' ability to contribute to corporate responsibility 
is moderated by their role understanding. 
a. When Non Executive Directors experience role congruence it 
generates high effort norms. 
b. When Non Executive Directors experience role conflict and role 
ambiguity it generates low effort norms. 
As boundary spanners the Non Executive Directors' role set extends beyond the 
boundaries of the boardroom. Non Executive Directors perceive that part of their 
role is to deal with constituents outside the boardroom such as shareholders, 
employees and customers. Many Non Executives, whilst accepting the importance 
of external constituents, fail to represent them effectively once in the boardroom. 
The Non Executive's ability contribute to corporate responsibility is also moderated 
by a second group of external role set members. Interlocking directorates send 
signals to the Non Executive about current business trends as well as sending signals 
about the norms of behaviour appropriate to the boardroom. 
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4. The Non Executive Directors' ability to contribute to corporate responsibility 
is moderated by their external role set. 
a. The Non Executive Director's ability to contribute to corporate 
responsibility is moderated by divergent constituent expectations. 
b. The Non Executive Director's ability to contribute to corporate 
responsibility is moderated by director interlocks. 
The Non Executive Directors' ability to balance the needs of divergent constituents 
is moderated by their perceptions of their responsibilities, in addition to the signals 
that they receive from within the boardroom. The research suggests that many Non 
Executive Directors understand the value of balancing the needs of different 
constituents, but at times ignore their personal understanding in order to maintain the 
status quo within the group and avoid personal ridicule or social sanctions. This 
leads to the final set of propositions: 
5. The Non Executive Directors' ability to balance divergent constituents is 
moderated by the context in which they perform their role: 
a. The Non Executive Director's ability to balance divergent 
constituents is moderated by the boardroom environment. 
b. The Non Executive Directors' ability to balance divergent 
constituents is moderated by their internal role set expectations. 
c. The Non Executive Directors' ability to balance divergent 
constituents is moderated by their external role set expectations. 
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d. The Non Executive Directors' ability to balance divergent 
constituents is moderated by their personal capabilities. 
e. The Non Executive Directors' ability to balance divergent 
constituents is moderated by their role understanding. 
6.5 Implications of the Research 
This study has explored how Non Executive Directors subjectively perceive that in 
their role as boundary spanners on corporate boards, they are able to balance 
divergent expectations whilst contributing to corporate responsibility practices. The 
findings of this exploration into the Non Executives' role and the wider context of 
the Board of Directors have implications for both research and practice. In this 
section, the implications of the research will be discussed within the framework of 
the PhD remit. 
6.5.1 Role Set Interactions 
6.5.1a The Need for Change 
The findings show that many Non Executive Directors perceive that they are 
constrained, by their lack of necessary skills and understanding, from adequately 
fulfilling their roles within the corporate board. The role ambiguity and role 
conflict, which many Non Executive Directors perceive, stems from the failure of 
many boards to provide clear job descriptions, job evaluations and adequate training, 
as well as from leadership's inability to provide adequate linkages into the 
organisation, Non Executive's own failure to speak out and ask for help, together 
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with the autocratic leadership structures which permeated many of the organisations 
in which the Non Executives worked. In order for the Non Executive to improve his 
ability to make a valid and useful contribution, these issues need to be addressed. 
Additionally, the Non Executive must understand his role within each unique board 
and be given the opportunity to share unique insights without fear of reprisals or 
ridicule. 
6.5.1b Language 
This study provided new and unique insight into the use of language in the 
boardroom. The research suggests that boards of directors operate within a bounded 
context, because of the information constraints that are placed upon them (Cohan, 
2002). This leads the board to use highly financial language as a common 
denominator between board members. An important implication of this reliance on 
financial language is that it fails to reveal the subtlety of choice needed for effective 
decision-making (Schaffer, 2002). Financial language leads to a focus on the 
bottom-line (Eisenhardt et al. 1997) and may lead to unethical decisions (Sims, 
1992). Additionally, as a result of the use of financial language, Non Executives 
find it difficult to introduce issues that might be considered `soft' as these do not fit 
easily into the group's behaviour norms. Therefore, when Non Executives wish to 
introduce an issue relating to corporate responsibility they generally try to frame it 
within a business case scenario. If a business case cannot be found, then it is 
unlikely that the suggestion will even be put forward. This highlights the problems 
that Non Executives face, even if they are prepared to try to introduce corporate 
responsibility issues. 
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6.5.1c Groupthink 
The finding of this research that Janis's (1972) groupthink appears to be present in 
many corporate boards is significant. The ability of the Non Executive to make a 
contribution is extensively challenged by their failure to speak out within the group, 
even on issues about which they are unhappy. Westphal and Khann's (2003) finding 
that directors may avoid conduct that could upset normal group behaviours go some 
way towards explaining this phenomenon. 
The research revealed that Non Executive Directors maintain functional 
commitment to the group (DeLamater et al. 1969). Because they assign importance 
to maintaining their position within the social set, their future earning potential is 
reliant on the reputation, which others assign to them (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990). 
However, the findings of this research also imply that the Non Executives' 
propensity to maintain the status quo within the group develops from their desire to 
avoid ridicule, their feelings of intimidation, their fear of acting alone and the 
pressure that they feel to make decisions and reach agreement at great speed. 
6.5.1d Interlocking Directorates 
This research has implications for our understanding of interlocking directorates; the 
study supports the view put forward by Haunschild and Beckman et al. (1998) and 
Haunschild (1993), that interlocks can affect firm behaviour. The current research 
also supports the work of Lorsch and Maclver (1989) and Mace (1986) who both 
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suggest that directors use interlocks to scan the environment for new business 
practices. The current research suggests that Non Executives have insufficient 
resources for training and professional development. This results in an over-reliance 
on interlocks and leads to the dissemination of bad as well as good business 
practices. The implications of these findings are twofold; firstly, and most 
importantly for this current research, it suggests that when a Director sees good 
corporate responsibility practices he will attempt to spread them through his 
interlocks with other boards of directors. Secondly, these findings suggest that more 
work needs to be done to develop reliable sources of information, training and 
personal evaluation for the Non Executive Director. 
6.5.2 Perceptions of Boardroom Leadership 
6.5.2a Boardroom Leadership 
The research has revealed the problems that many Non Executives perceive in the 
behaviour styles of their CEO's and Chairmen. The qualitative approach employed 
in this study, and in particular the use of thick description, has enabled the study to 
examine the Non Executive and his perceptions in a way that has not previously 
been achieved. The individual interviews position participants so that they are 
"forced" to explain themselves (Kaplowitz, 2000) which leads to sharing and 
elaboration and sometimes generates intimate information (Agar and MacDonald, 
1995). Demp and Neubauer (1992) alluded to the presence of dominating leaders in 
their study of international corporate boards. The findings of the current research 
describe egotistical and domineering behaviour - in many boardrooms and the 
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perceived effect that this has on other board members and their ability to make a 
contribution. This conclusion has wide implications for the future structure of 
boards and the recruitment of board members. 
6.5.3 Primary Role Focus 
6.5.3a Balancing Constituents 
The findings of this study have implications for our understanding of the Non 
Executives' role. The current system of corporate governance views managers as 
agents and puts Non Executive Directors into the boardroom to control their self- 
serving behaviour on behalf of shareholders (the owners of the firm). The analysis 
revealed conflicts in the enactment of the Non Executives' governance role. Their 
role expectations encompass control elements in line with the normative agency 
approach to corporate governance as described by Eisenhardt (1989), but also long- 
term organisational goals, which more closely reflect the behaviour of a steward as 
described by Davis et al. (1997) - the implication being that Non Executives enter 
the boardroom in the belief that their role is to protect a range of different 
constituents, not just the organisations' owners. This is in line with the findings of 
Johnson and Greenings (1999) and Wang and Dewhirst (1992). However, in 
contrast to the findings of these two studies, this research reveals that once in the 
boardroom many Non Executive Directors set aside their personal expectations in 
order to conform to their perceptions of the group norm. Many Non Executives, 
despite recognising the value of dealing with wider constituents, fail to follow 
through with their beliefs whilst in the boardroom. 
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6.5.3b Performing the Non Executive Director's Role 
The research revealed important implications regarding the ability of the Non 
Executive to fulfil his role within the boardroom environment. Some previous 
studies have suggested that upper echelons may not experience role conflict and 
ambiguity to the same degree as other role holders (Hamner and Tosi, 1974) because 
they have more control over their environments. However, the findings of this 
research imply that Non Executives often lack power and control in comparison with 
their Executive counterparts. The Non Executive Director's power and influence is 
hampered by information asymmetry (Pettigrew and McNulty, 1998; Pettigrew, 
1992) which results from their only partial inclusion in the host organisation (Weick, 
1979). 
Non Executives Directors perform multiple roles whilst receiving conflicting signals 
of success and effectiveness from constituents. The unique, complex and ambiguous 
nature of the Non Executives' role, in conjunction with their position of only partial 
inclusion within the host organisation makes the Non Executive highly susceptible 
to conflict and ambiguity, within their roles. The acute frustration that many Non 
Executives feel appears to be due to their inability to fulfil the roles that they 
perceive they have been employed by the host board to undertake. 
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6.5.4 Wider Implications of the Research 
Non Executive Directors are considered by many to be pivotal to the success or 
failure of an organisation (Alderfer, 1986), and yet this research suggests that their 
role is under- utilised. The research findings imply that the culture in many boards is 
highly autocratic and lacking in creative thought. If the Non Executive Director is to 
fulfil a useful role, creativity, diversity and conflicting opinions will need to be more 
openly encouraged. As business becomes more and more of a global operation, 
individuals need to be in place to ensure that boards take note of their responsibility 
to wider constituents. No longer can Lorsche and Mclvers (1989) `traditionalists' 
steer their companies without consideration for anything but the whim of the 
shareholder. Education, board procedures and role clarity must be enhanced so that 
Non Executive Directors can fulfil their obligations to both their organisations and 
their wider constituents. 
6.6 Evaluating Research Quality 
This research was designed to explore the role and contribution of the Non 
Executive Director within the Anglo-American corporate governance system. The 
research has sought to further current understanding of the Non Executive Director's 
ability to contribute to the corporate board. In particular the study has explored how 
the Non Executive Directors balance divergent constituencies whilst contributing to 
the corporate responsibility practices within the board. To insure the suitability of 
the research methods and the rigour of its application (Scandura and Williams, 
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2000), this section will evaluate the quality of this research and assess whether the 
research aims have been achieved. 
The primary aim of this research was to explore the Non Executive Directors' 
perceptions of their role and contribution to corporate responsibility whilst balancing 
divergent constituents. Table 6.1 summarises how quality and rigour have been 
achieved in this research. 
Table 6.1: Operationalising the Research 
Qualitative Assumptions Research 
Inquiry Operationalisation 
Characteristics 
Constructivist: multiple The subjective realities of 25 Non Executive 
Ontology realities, from Directors in their roles in corporate boards within 
participants, local, the Anglo American governance system 
everyday, emergent 
Interpretive: Inquirer Non Executive Directors' interpretations of their 
Epistemology interacts with participants: experience captured through in-depth interviews, 
Meaning is value relevant held in the participants' own environment. 
Adopted Interpretive Interpretation of how Non Executive Directors 
Paradigm perceive their experience of their roles 
Focus on the Non Executives' own concepts, 
Inquiring Logic Inductive meanings and perceptions of their roles within 
corporate boards. Then describe these views 
Hard to study settings and All 25 Non Executive Directors working in multiple, 
Inquiry groups: ambiguous large complex organisations. In-depth interviews 
Question phenomenon, open ended used to provide rich context and to uncover deeper 
questions and veiled meanings. 
Guiding Values Ethical conduct of All 25 participants were treated equally and with 
& Research individual scientists respect. Focusing on the participant's comfort zone, 
Ethic showing regard for matters which were important to 
them. Anonymity was guaranteed to all participants 
Source: Based on Harris (2004) framework 
In-depth interviews were used to obtain thick descriptions (Geertz, 1973) of the Non 
Executives' own subjective perceptions of their role. The qualitative interpretation 
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of the in-depth interviews has allowed the research to bring both context and 
meaning (Thompson, 2001) to our understanding of the Non Executive Director's 
role and contribution within the corporate board. The resultant analysis has allowed 
a detailed exploration of all the facets that comprised the aims of this research. As a 
result of the analysis, a model has been proposed which illustrates the key salient 
findings of the research. A set of propositions was then presented which might be 
used to generate future research and test the proposed model. Finally the key 
implications of the findings of the research were discussed. The aims of the research 
have been achieved. 
6.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has brought together a summary of the key findings from the research 
and related them to the research question. A model that illustrates the key salient 
findings from the research has been developed from the analysis. Following this, a 
number of propositions were outlined to generate future research and test the 
relevance of the model. Some of the implications of the research were then 
discussed and the quality of the research was evaluated. 
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Chapter Seven: Research Contributions 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis has been to explore the role and contribution of the Non 
Executive Director, using the subjective perceptions of those who perform the role. 
The research has used an interpretive approach to qualitative inquiry in order to 
uncover how, within the context of the corporate board, Non Executive Directors are 
able to balance divergent constituents, whilst contributing to corporate responsibility 
practices. This chapter will demonstrate the originality and contribution of this 
study to both the academic and practitioner communities, along with the limitations 
of the research and suggestions for areas of further study. The thesis will close with 
a short reflection from the author of the journey undertaken to bring this thesis to 
completion. 
7.2 The Contribution to Knowledge 
The findings of this research make a number of contributions to theory and practice. 
Most significantly the research adds new insight into the actual role of the Non 
Executive Director within the corporate board. Many academics have made calls for 
research which examines from a contextual perspective, the work of the board of 
directors and in particular the Non Executive Directors' role within the board 
(Pettigrew, 1992; Dalton et al., 1999; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Kakabadse et al., 
2001; Letza et al., 2004). 
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The contribution that this research makes to our understanding of the Non Executive 
Directors' role within the corporate board will provide insight and guidance to future 
researchers and practitioners. Whilst supporting some previous theory, the study 
also suggests that the moderators of boardroom behaviour are much more complex 
than had been previously recognised. To avoid further erosion of the gap between 
management theory and management practice, there is a need for additional 
endeavours in order to understand the effects of context on the Non Executive 
Directors' ability to make useful contribution. 
7.2.1 Contributions to Management Theory 
7.2.1a The Role of the Non Executive Director 
The interpretive methodology that was adopted for this study, using in-depth 
interviews to gather "thick descriptions" (Thompson, 2001) has contributed a rare 
insight into the behaviour of the Non Executive Director within a rich context. With 
the exception of a handful of previous studies such as Mace (1986), Lorsch and 
MacIver (1989), Pettigrew (1992), Demp and Neubauer (1992), and Kakabadse 
(2001), most of the theoretical research underlying the behaviour of the Non 
Executive has utilised questionnaires or publicly available statistics to try to 
understand the phenomenon from a distance. 
The constructivist ontology that underlies this research reflects the notion that the 
reality of the Non Executive Director is subjective. An interpretive epistemology 
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was utilised to uncover the Non Executive Directors' own subjective perceptions of 
their roles within the corporate board. As a result, this research contributes to theory 
by exploring the actual role of the Non Executive through their own unique 
perceptions of the role, using thick description to add context to their reality. 
However, in line with the constructivist philosophy, it should be noted that the 
researcher's interpretation is in itself a subjective interpretation of the Non 
Executives' reality. The researcher confirms that she performed the analysis in good 
faith and tried to stay true to the data at all times. By allowing the Non Executive 
Directors' own words to come through into the analysis, the researcher has been able 
to interpret the Non Executive Directors' own subjective meanings. 
7.2.1b Boundary Spanning 
Johnson and Greenings (1999) found that Non Executive Directors were sometimes 
employed specifically to attend to certain constituent groups. This research supports 
this finding, but contributes to the debate by suggesting, that although Non 
Executives are sometimes employed to attend to constituents, their potential to fulfil 
this role is not always utilised by the host organisation. 
The research supports the arguments of Aram and Coehn (1983) and Pass (2004) 
that the company's internal executives control the volume and also the integrity of 
information, available to the board of directors. Additionally this research has found 
that the CEO tightly controls access to management. These factors lead to the 
information asymmetry described by Pettigrew and McNulty (1995). 
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This research contributes to the boundary spanning theory and literature by arguing 
that if the Non Executive is restricted in his ability to reach into the organisation and 
also his ability to reach outside, his ability to be a successful boundary spanner is 
questionable (Tushman and Romanelli, 1983). The implications of these findings 
challenge earlier research which argues that boards provide the link between 
managers and shareholders and the wider environment (Fama and Jenson, 1983; 
Pearce and Zahra, 1991; Pettigrew, 1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Johnson and 
Greening, 1999; Meyer, 2000). 
7.2. Ic Power and Influence 
The research adds to our understanding of the sources and uses of power in the 
boardroom. The findings support Pettigrew and McNulty's (1995) conclusion that 
information asymmetry affects the Non Executive Directors' ability to influence 
events. In addition, this research suggests that language can be used as a source of 
power in the boardroom in order to control the behaviours of others. This finding 
contributes to the work on social control theory undertaken by Westphal and Khann 
(2003). Further, it emerged that there was significant reciprocity in the role of 
friendship in shaping boardroom influence. Not only are CEO's perceived as being 
more likely to seek advice within a safe trusting "friendly" environment, Non 
Executives also appear to be much more likely to offer advice when they perceive 
themselves to be in an environment where they feel valued, trusted and like each 
other. 
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7.2.1d Capabilities 
Westphal and Khann (2003) argued that those with very high group status might not 
be subject to social controls to the same extent of lower status members; this 
argument is substantiated by the current study. Further, the findings of Tsui (1984) 
and Tsui et al., (1995) that an individual's ability to perform his role is affected by 
the perceptions of others in the team, appears to transfer to the Non Executive role. 
The ability of the Non Executive to instigate a contribution is facilitated if other 
members of the board perceive that the Non Executive Director is in some way 
powerful, in terms of capabilities, reputation and influence within the group. 
This study also contributes to our understanding of how individual Non Executive 
Directors' capabilities are utilised within the board. The findings support Kakabadse 
et al. (1998) who found that simply placing highly capable individuals onto a team 
will not in itself make a team work effectively. The research findings provide 
further support for Forbes and Milliken (1999) who suggested that just because 
individuals have specialised skills and knowledge, the availability of such skills does 
not necessarily guarantee their effective use. Time, good management and the right 
mix of individuals remain as essential for long-term success. 
7.2.1c Complex Decision-Making 
The study contributes to our understanding of Non Executive Directors' decision- 
making processes by arguing that they use bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) or 
cognitive nearsightedness (Katz, 1959) when dealing with complex issues. The 
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resultant reliance on financial language often fails to reveal the subtlety of choice 
needed for effective decision-making (Schaffer, 2002), particularly in the context of 
corporate responsibility issues (Baysinger and Hoskinsons, 1990). 
7.2.1f Corporate Responsibility 
The study contributes to the literature on business in society; this research has 
explored the perceptions of individuals who, with the right motivation, have the 
ability to make a significant impact on the role of business in society. It is argued 
that only by first understanding how boards of directors work, can serious attempts 
be made to enhance their behaviour. The current research contributes to our 
understanding of the Non Executive Director as a potential influencer of corporate 
responsibility practices; it also links the implementation of corporate responsibility 
to director interlocks and implies that when Non Executives gain understanding of 
corporate responsibility elsewhere they may try to encourage implementation in 
other boards. 
The research also contributes to our understanding of boardroom culture. 
Boardroom culture influences the ability of the Non Executive to contribute to 
corporate responsibility. Specifically, the use of financial language impedes the 
ability of the Non Executive Director to introduce corporate responsibility issues 
because such issues are perceived as requiring the use of `soft language', which does 
not fit easily with the group's behaviour norms. Corporate responsibility issues are 
unlikely to be put forward by the Non Executive to the group, unless a clear 
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`business case' or a quantifiable risk can be shown. The use of a business case 
allows the Non Executive to align his contribution with the normal processes of the 
group, which is accustomed to using financial language and attaches importance to 
the bottom line approach to decision-making. 
7.2.1g Interlocking Directorates 
The current research supports the seminal works of Mace (1986), and Lorsch and 
Maclver (1989) who suggest that directors use interlocks to scan the environment 
for new business practices. This research further contributes to our understanding of 
interlocking directorates. The view put forward by Haunschild (1993) and 
Haunschild et al. (1998) that interlocks can affect firm behaviour, is supported by 
this research. This research contributes to our understanding of this phenomenon by 
adding a new instance of the effect on firms of director interlocks, by arguing that 
interlocks can at times influence the likelihood of firms adopting corporate 
responsibility practices. 
7.2.1h Corporate Governance 
The findings of this study contribute to both agency and stewardship theory. The 
prevailing view that Non Executives are present in the boardroom to control 
managers' self-serving behaviour on behalf of shareholders appears to be over 
simplistic. The analysis revealed conflicts in the enactment of the Non Executives' 
governance role. Their role expectations encompass control elements in line with 
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the normative agency approach to corporate governance as described by Eisenhardt 
(1989), but also long-term organisational goals, which more closely reflect the 
behaviour of a steward as described by Davis et al. (1997). The implication is that 
Non Executives enter the boardroom in the belief that their role is to protect a range 
of different constituents, not just shareholders. This reflects the findings of Wang 
and Dewhirst (1992) and Johnson and Greenings (1999). However in contrast to the 
findings of these two studies, this research reveals that once in the boardroom many 
Non Executive Directors set aside personal beliefs in order to conform to their 
perceptions of the group norm; they fear acting alone (Alderfer, 1986). The 
domineering and autocratic behaviour of many CEO's, in conjunction with the 
inability of the Non Executive to form alliances with other board members leads to 
power asymmetry in the boardroom. Resultant boardroom behavioural norms tend 
to reflect leadership's desire to stay in control, at the expense of wider constituent 
expectations. The reason for this behaviour appears to be groupthink, which is 
explained next. 
i 
7.2.1i Groupthink 
The findings of this research contributes to our understanding of the dynamics of the 
board of directors, in particular the prevalence of groupthink (Janis, 1971), which 
leads the Non Executive, at times, to cognitively suppress the expectations of 
external constituents. As part of the team, individuals may overlook actions they 
would not tolerate for themselves as individuals (Sheard and Kakabadse, 2004) 
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particularly if they perceive that voicing certain opinions will create stress within the 
group (Janis and Katz, 1959; Janis, 1971). 
The desire to maintain membership of the group may lead Non Executive Directors 
to behave in an unethical way, even when they consider themselves to be highly 
ethical individuals in their own right (Sims, 1992). Non Executive Directors appear 
to prefer to maintain the status quo within their group rather than risk social 
sanctioning or exclusion from the group (Westphal and Khann, 2003). Instead Non 
Executives display functional commitment to the group (DeLamater et al., 1969). 
Non Executives appear to effectively relinquish some external role expectations in 
order to maintain their membership of the group (Janis and Katz, 1959; Sheard and 
Kakabadse, 2004). As a result many Non Executives, despite recognising the value 
of dealing with wider constituents, fail to follow through with their beliefs whilst in 
the boardroom. 
7.2.1j Role Theory 
The research adds a contribution to the literature on roles, role theory and in 
particular to the role conflict. The study reveals that Non Executives appear to 
experience role conflict, due to the disparity between their personal expectations and 
their moderated behaviour within the boardroom. This finding is noteworthy 
because some studies have suggested that upper echelons do not experience role 
conflict to the same extent as lower level role types because they have more control 
of their environments (House and Rizzo, 1972; Hamner and Tosi, 1974). The 
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research suggests that the Non Executive role differs from other upper echelons 
roles. Non Executive Directors only experience partial inclusion in the host 
organisation (Weick, 1979); this creates power asymmetry in favour of internal 
executives. Additionally, Non Executives perform multiple roles whilst receiving 
conflicting signals of success and effectiveness from constituents; research suggests 
that such role holders are susceptible to role dysfunction (Nandram and 
Klandermans, 1993). 
7.1.1k Contribution to Research Methods 
In addition to adding to the debate on the role and contribution of the Non Executive 
Director, this research makes a small methodological contribution. Despite many 
calls for more work, which explores the real work of corporate board members, to 
the best of the author's knowledge this study is the first to use an interpretivist 
approach to examine the subjective perceptions of the individual Non Executive 
Director. The use of in-depth interviews to develop thick descriptions has allowed a 
unique insight into the Non Executives' perceptions. The unstructured nature of the 
interviews, combined with the guaranteed anonymity of the one-to-one interview 
within the study participants' own environment encouraged the study participants to 
reveal insights, which had previously remained veiled, because of their sensitive 
nature. 
7.2.2 Contributions to Management Practice 
Ahmed (2004: 1) calls for work that "builds deep understanding of what works, why 
and under what circumstances". Above all, this research contributes to management 
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practice by exploring the actual role of the Non Executive Director. The research 
provides a rich description of the experiences of real Non Executive Directors, not 
data extrapolated from a distant phenomenon. The study addressed the issues faced 
by Non Executive Directors on a daily basis and explores the symptoms and 
outcomes of behaviour from their own perspectives within the dynamic environment 
of the board of directors. In particular, the study provides guidance to those who 
wish to improve the relationships between business and society, by highlighting the 
current problems that the Non Executive Directors experience in trying to contribute 
to this important endeavour. 
The research contributes to management practice by highlighting the role of 
boardroom dynamics in mediating the ability of those within the board to make a 
useful contribution. In particular, it highlights the need to ensure that board 
members understand their purpose and are provided with the facilities necessary to 
fulfil their role. The research suggests that Non Executive Directors are often 
restricted from forming ties with both other board members and the wider 
organisation. This inhibits their ability to contribute to debate, by limiting access to 
information and reducing the ability of individuals to act together. Practitioners 
need to find ways to overcome this problem so as to create more balanced power 
structures within the boardroom, where each board member is recognised and 
appreciated for the unique capabilities that he or she can bring to the debate. The 
research suggests that through the development of more balanced power structures; 
boards may be able to overcome the problems of groupthink, which the research 
suggests permeates many boardrooms. 
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The findings reveal a strong preference for financial language in the boardroom, 
which may not always reveal the nuances necessary for effective decision-making. 
This type of language also makes it difficult for board members to introduce soft 
issues into the debate, as these are perceived as not fitting in to group behaviour 
norms. The research suggests that financial language is also difficult for some board 
members to understand. Practitioners need to find ways to introduce more contextual 
dialogue into the boardroom or, as a very minimum, ensure that all board members 
understand the debate in progress. 
The study highlights the need to ensure that the board successfully utilises the 
unique capabilities of the individual Non Executive Director. The research findings 
imply that in many cases Non Executives feel frustrated by their inability to 
contribute, even in areas where they are considered to be an expert. One way of 
achieving this might be through the employment of boardroom staff, to facilitate the 
contribution of each board member. 
The research has identified that Non Executive Directors often have insufficient 
resources for training and professional development. Insufficient information 
resources, thus, result in an over-reliance on interlocks for information, which leads 
to the dissemination of bad as well as good business practices. The implications of 
these findings are that more work needs to be done to develop reliable sources of 
information, training and personal evaluation for the Non Executive Director. 
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The research found that Non Executives use director interlocks to find out about 
corporate responsibility practices. The findings suggest that when a Non Executive 
Director sees good corporate responsibility practices, he may attempt to spread them 
through his interlocks with other boards. Boards who are trying to improve their 
corporate responsibility practices may benefit from recruiting members with 
linkages to firms already active in this particular area. 
The study suggests that Non Executive Directors may suffer from role conflict and 
ambiguity; their understanding of what is expected of them is confused by the 
signals of divergent constituents. Most Non Executives do not receive a job 
description and few have ever spent time with their board discussing their purpose or 
evaluating each other's performance. This research highlights the need to insure that 
Non Executive Directors understand what is expected of them within each unique 
boardroom setting. A summary of the key research contributions is provided in table 
7.1 on the next page. 
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7.2.3 Contribution Summary 
This research makes a contribution to our understanding of the role and contribution of 
the Non Executive director within the corporate board. It is hoped that the findings will 
be of value to both academics and also practitioners because theories are literally just 
theories unless they can be applied to the real world. 
7.3 The Limitations of the Research 
The contribution to existing knowledge that this research makes, must be judged within 
important limitations. The consideration of limitations within any research project is 
crucial if the beneficiary is to understand the extent of the research contribution. 
7.3.1 Research Bias 
Interpretivist inquiry is "unapologetically subjectivist" (Greene, 1994: 536). The use of 
an interpretivist research approach leads the realities of the researched and the 
researcher to become intertwined in the process of explanation. "Reality resides neither 
with an objective external world nor with the subjective mind of the knower but within 
the dynamic transaction between the two" (Barone, 1992: 31). As a result, it is 
recognised that the interpretation of the Non Executive Directors' subjective perceptions 
must be viewed by the reader with some caution. The researcher has made every effort 
to overcome the possibility that her own perceptions might overwhelm those of the 
study participants. However the nature of the inquiry is certain to lead to some bias. A 
number of steps were taken to reduce this bias. 
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1. The researcher has allowed the Non Executive Directors' own voices to come 
through into the analysis. 
2. The researcher has encouraged others to read the interview transcripts and the 
subsequent analysis to ensure that the researcher's personal bias has not 
advanced a particular notion without thought for other possibilities. 
3. Interviews were all taped, transcribed and entered into NVivo for analysis and 
quick retrieval. This aided the analysis by ensuring that what the researcher 
thought she heard was the same as what was actually said; this was particularly 
useful given the depth and length of the interviews. 
4. The technique of adding one instance at a time (Ragin, 1998) and then going 
back and analysing over the population of study participants has limited both the 
possibility of extreme bias and also the chance that something important might 
be missed. 
5. Above all, the researcher has tried to behave ethically and with consideration for 
the study participants by remaining true to their own subjective perceptions of 
their role. 
7.3.2 Limitations on the Voice of the Research 
The research has examined individual Non Executive Directors from their own 
perspective. The research, therefore, can only speak from the perspective of those 
individuals. However, as most of the study participants also held CEO and/or 
Chairmanships in other organisations some fertilisation between roles was inevitable. 
Additionally as part of the pilot study, interviews were conducted with a number of 
experts in the field, including consultants, head-hunters, academics and executive 
directors; this allowed the researcher to develop a deeper understanding of the Non 
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Executive Directors' context and also gave the researcher greater credibility with the 
study participants when entering the field. 
7.3.3 Ethical Considerations 
As a result of the sensitivity and personal nature of many of the interviews that were 
conducted as part of this study, the researcher guaranteed all the study participants 
complete anonymity. The high profile nature of many of the study participants and the 
gravity, for the organisations with which they work, of the divulgence of their identities 
in this study could be considerable. In order to comply with this the researcher has 
altered the names of all the study participants and their organisations in the text of this 
thesis. 
7.3.4 Sample Size Limitations 
The research gathered the subjective perceptions of 25 Non Executive Directors; the 
size of the study presents a limitation on the validity of its findings. Non Executive 
Directors tend to be very busy people, holding complex and highly sensitive job 
positions in multiple organisations so their diaries fill up months in advance. As a 
result, a larger sample was not feasible within the scope of the current project. It is 
possible that if a much greater number of Non Executive Directors had taken part in the 
study, a different picture may have emerged. However, as the research progressed it 
became clear that despite the unique setting of each board, there was much uniformity 
in the findings across the research. Once findings stabilise over a number of instances 
saturation is reached (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
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7.4 Areas of Further Investigation 
The contextual nature of this study has produced as many questions as it has given 
answers. The study has highlighted the importance of context as a mediator of 
contribution within the boardroom and particularly the presence of groupthink. This 
study examined the issue from the perspective of the individual Non Executive Director; 
further research now needs to examine the board of directors at group level. Interviews 
need to be gathered from the perspectives of different board members to better 
understand their own perceptions of what makes a board `work', and what enables/ 
inhibits individual contribution. Such research might best take the form of case studies 
based around different boards. The model presented in figure 6.2 of chapter six provides 
a starting point for further investigation into many of these issues. 
The language of the boardroom proved to be a fascinating dynamic of group behaviour. 
This research was only able to examine the issue from one perspective. Understanding 
how language is used in the boardroom requires the cooperation of both the user of 
language and the receiver. Further research into boardroom language would necessitate 
access to multiple members of the same board. 
Research also needs to address the issue of interlocking directorates; many studies have 
viewed interlocks as a negative influencer of board behaviour. This current study has 
highlighted the role that interlocks can play in encouraging corporate responsibility 
practices. Further studies need to investigate the context of interlocks; previous studies 
have tended to be positivistic. Qualitative research now needs to take place to add 
context to existing theory. 
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7.5 The PhD Journey 
This PhD journey is long and for some people tortuous. For myself, I have found it a 
wonderful and liberating experience. It has allowed me to meet a group of people to 
whom few have access. I will be forever in their debt for their generosity in sharing 
their personal views with me so freely. Although the process has certainly been long 
and at times arduous it has proved to be a very personal journey, I have watched my 
little daughter grow up at a pace comparable to the project. 
As the thesis now at last nears completion, it is time to reflect on what has gone before 
and what is to come. The journey has certainly provided me with an understanding of 
what it is to be a researcher; Cranfield's unparalleled methodology course and the 
access to a learned academic community which it provides, affords great privileges to 
its PhD students and I count myself lucky to be amongst them. 
However, if I am to take anything from this experience it is the importance of having a 
good supervisor or in my own case two great supervisors. Their guidance throughout 
this project has been positive, even when there did not seem to me to be anything to be 
positive about. They have simultaneously allowed me to discover for myself whilst 
ensuring that I did not go beyond the edge of reason! I hope that as I now move on into 
my own academic career I can emulate their abilities in some small way. The topic 
under enquiry has proved to be one of great interest to the world at large. The process 
of disseminating the research must now begin in earnest. 
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7.6 Summary 
This chapter brings the thesis to a close. The chapter has identified the contributions to 
knowledge that the research has made, acknowledged the limitations of the research and 
the research methodology and then suggested further potential avenues for investigation 
in the future. The aims of the research have been fulfilled. 
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Appendix I: Initial Table of Key Themes 
The reason for displaying the table below is to show the process that the researcher went 
through in order to reach the preliminary research findings. It is not designed to provide 
the reader with a useful tool in itself. 
Key Themes arising from the pilot study 
Interv iewees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gender M F M F M F M F 
Age 60 55 45 45 65 50 60 50 
Ambiguity ** ** * * ** ** *** ** 
Background * * * * * ** ** ** 
Board Size ** * * ** 
Board Unity ** ** * ** ** ** *** ** 
Boundary Spanners ** * * ** ** ** *** *** 
Business Case ** ** * ** ** *** *** 
CEO Style ** ** * *** *** 
Chair Style «« «« ** «« ** *** 
Complexity ** ** ** *** *** 
Control ** ** * * ** * *** *** 
Corp Rep ** * ** ** ** ** ** 
Corp Social fesp ** ** ** *** 
Executive [tole ** **` * ** *** *** 
Family Company ** * 
Gender Issues ** * * *** 
Individual Rep ** * ** ** * *** ** 
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Inferiority ** *** ** * *** ** 
Informal Meet *** ** ** ** *** ** 
Information ** * * ** ** ** ** 
Intimidation ** ** * *** ** * *** *** 
Key: ' issue'', Important issue "', Critical Issue. 
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Cont' 
Key Themes arising from the pilot study Continued 
Interviewees 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Gender Al F Al F M F M F 
Age - 60 55 45 45 65 50 60 50 
Legality « « * * 
Number of Meet *** * * ** *** *** 
Personality ** ** ** ** ** ** ** 
Relationships *' *** * *** *** *** *** *** 
Risk Corporate ** * * ** *** *** 
Risk Individual ** * *** 
Safe Haven ** ** * ** * ** *** 
Secrecy * ** * * 
Constituents ** ** ** *** 
Succession ** * ** ** ** 
Training ««« ««« «« ««« *** *** *** ** 
Team «« «* «* «** «*« 
'Team Dynamic ** *' ** ** ** *** *** 
'Team Rep * ** * *** 
"Time ««« «« «« «« ** ** 
Tokenism ** ** * * * ** 
Info Sharing '* ** * `* ** * ** 
Role 
Understanding 
* «« « ««« «** *« «** ** 
Kcy: * issuc "", Important issuc *", Critical Issuc. 
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Appendix 11: Expansion of Key Themes and Question Map 
Advance Question Clarification for Respondents 
Can you tell me a little about yourse For example what are your current roles, what 
have you have done previously? 
THEME ONE: The contribution of Non Executive Directors, role, impact, interests 
1) Little is currently known about the actual work of Non Executive Director's, there 
appears to be a general lack of understanding of their roles, objectives, their routine 
operations within the board and moreover their affect on the wider organisation. 
What do you believe the role of Non Executive Director's to be? 
THEME TWO: The decision making process 
2) The way in which the board reaches decisions, is likely to be crucial to the 
successful operation of the organisation. If we are to improve the success strategies 
of the business it will first be necessary to understand how strategic decisions are 
reached. I low arc decisions made on the board of (Next): For example - 
(1) Do you meet as a board and debate until agreement is reached? 
(2) Do you reach decisions within the forum of a smaller committee? 
(3) Are decisions reached less formally? 
THEME TI IREE: The contribution of Senior Managers, role, impact and relationship 
with the Board 
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3) In many modem boards the majority of members serve on a part time basis, senior 
executives therefore play a crucial role in the dissemination of information, without 
which it is unlikely the board will be able to function effectively. Successful 
channels for the upward as well as downward flows of information are likely to 
prove invaluable. How in reality does the work of the main board differ from that of 
the senior managers? 
THEME FOUR: Organisational context, life cycles, economics, effect on board 
composition 
4) Many studies of boards have ignored the effect of context. The organisations 
position within its economic life cycle atld the wider environments within which it 
operates may impact on the effectiveness of the board and the ability of its members 
to operate as a team and also as individuals. Have you found that there are times in 
an organisations life cycle when your skills have been particularly useful? 
THEME FIVE: Capabilities of Non Executive Directors, skills, personal reputation and 
reputation by association 
5) The role of the board in developing corporate reputation is not clearly understood, 
although many argue that they play a fundamental part in its management. By 
understanding how the board impacts on the reputation of the organisation it may be 
possible to improve their overall contribution. How do you think a Non Executive 
Director's personal reputation and that of other organisations with which they are 
involved impacts on (Next)? 
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THEME SIX: Corporate Reputation the role and contribution of the board 
6) The reputation of any organisation consists of a highly complex mix of factors, 
some argue that it accounts almost entirely for a companies share value, moreover it 
is likely to be vital in generating and retaining customers, acquiring finance and 
possibly building supplier relationships. What do you think that the reputation of 
(Next) is based upon? 
THEME SEVEN: The impact of corporate Constituents 
7) If we are to improve an organisations reputation we must first understand who the 
key constituents are how they impact upon the organisation and moreover how the 
organisation impacts on them. Can you talk about who you believe the constituents 
of (Next) to be? 
THEME EIGHT: Perceived importance of corporate reputation in enhancing value and 
the role of context in this process 
8) If we are to manage corporate reputation effectively we need to identify and 
understand its most important elements. How important do you believe reputation is 
in enhancing/maintaining corporate value? 
THEME NINE: Enhancing boardroom performance in the future 
9) Finally, in the long term the character and makeup of the boardroom appears to be 
changing, if these changes are to be effective and lead to heightened levels of 
performance and competitive advantage, we must start to look now at what makes a 
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good board member, what training they might require, what works and also what 
does not. How would you characterise a "good" board member within (Next)? 
Question Map 
Can you tell me a little about yourself? For example what do you do now, what have 
you have done previously? 
THEME ONE: The contribution of Non Executive Directors, role, impact, interests 
What do you believe the role of the Non Executive Director to be? 
THEME TWO: The decision making process 
1) How would you describe the board of (Next) Does it have certain 
characteristics/culture? 
a) Are these characteristics similar on other boards on which you sit? 
OR 
Are the boards on which you sit all very similar in character/ culture? 
2) Do you think that the culture of the board, affects its ability to operate successfully? 
(i) What do you think the reasons for this are? 
3) How are decisions made on the board of (Next): For example - 
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Do you meet as a board and debate until agreement is reached? 
Do you reach decisions within the forum of a smaller committee? 
Are decisions reached less formally 
a) What is the role of NED's in terms of corporate strategy? 
i) Do you follow similar procedures on other boards on which you sit? 
b) What part do governance procedures play in the boardroom? 
i) Do you think that good governance contributes to the success of the 
organisation? 
THEME THREE: Corporate Reputation the role and contribution of the board 
c) How do Non Executive Director's contribute in terms of the management of 
corporate reputation? 
i) Within (Next) is the management of reputation seen as being the 
responsibility of all 
ii) Is corporate reputation handled differently within other boards on which you 
Sit? 
4) What do you think that the reputation of (Next) is based upon? 
i) Is this also the reputation that you desire for the future? 
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b) Do you think that Non Executive Directors are more able to contribute to certain 
aspects of corporate reputation? 
i) What are these areas? 
THEME FOUR: Capabilities of Non Executive Directors, skills, personal reputation and 
reputation by association 
5) How do you think a Non Executive Director's personal reputation and that of other 
organisations with which they are involved impact on (Next)? 
a) What are there skills that you personally bring to the board that might allow you 
to make a positive contribution to corporate reputation? 
THEME FIVE: The Impact of Corporate Constituents. 
6) Can you talk about who you believe the constituents of (Next) to be? 
i) Does your organisation consciously identify its constituents? 
b) Are any of these groups more central to the success of the organisation than any 
others? 
i) Can you put them in any kind of order for me? 
c) What is the board's role in influencing the opinions of its constituents? 
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i) Do you believe that the organisation consciously tries to present a different 
image to different constituents? 
d) How does organisational life cycle, economic climate (context) affect the ability 
of the board to manage corporate reputation? 
i) Can you think of any examples? 
THEME SIX: Perceived importance of corporate reputation in enhancing value and the 
role of context in this process. 
7) Is it part of the NED's role to consider and anticipate the wider implications of the 
organisation's actions? 
a) Do you believe this for altruistic reasons or is it also to do with corporate 
survival? 
i) How does this manifest itself within the boardroom? 
Do you think that advancing issues of social responsibility is an important means of 
enhancing corporate reputation? 
Can you think of any examples of this? 
8) Are there certain social issues, which NED's are more likely to become involved 
with? 
9) Do you think that there is any way of analysing these elements in terms of adding 
value, bearing in mind that this may not necessarily imply direct financial value? 
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THEME SEVEN: The contribution of Senior Managers, role, impact and relationship 
with the Board 
10) How in reality does the work of the main board differ from that of the senior 
managers? 
11) Is there ever disparity between senior managers and the board as to the key 
functions of the firm? 
i) How does this manifest itself? (for example do NED's tend to take a longer 
term approach to the management of the organisation? ) 
ii) How are these resolved? 
iii) How important is it to have a shared vision? 
THEME EIGHT: Organisational context, life cycles, economics and the effect on 
boardroom composition 
12) Have you found as a Non Executive Director that there are times in an organisations 
life cycle when your skills have been particularly useful? 
a) Do you believe that the organisations stage in its life cycle should influence the 
composition of the board? 
i) Does this actually happen in reality 
b) What percentage of NED's do you think should sit on the board? 
i) Is there an ideal background for a Non Executive Director? 
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THEME NINE: Enhancing boardroom performance in the future 
13) How would you characterise the "ideal" board member within (Next)? 
i) Would your description be different for other boards on which you sit? 
ii) Why do you think that is? 
b) Do you think the selection criterion for Non Executive Director's and senior 
managers is designed towards the needs of the organisation? 
i) Can you think of any ways in which it might be improved? 
c) How might Non Executive Director's and senior managers enhance their skills 
for the future? 
That brings us to the end of my questions, is there anything that you feel you would like 
to add? 
Thank you for your time 
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